Results 1  10
of
16
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
 In 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2008
"... The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability gap between algorithms that are both truthful and computationallyef cient, and algorithms that only achieve one of these ..."
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Cited by 40 (5 self)
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The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability gap between algorithms that are both truthful and computationallyef cient, and algorithms that only achieve one of these two desiderata. This is shown in the context of a novel mechanism design problem which we call the COMBINATORIAL PUBLIC PROJECT PROBLEM (CPPP). CPPP is an abstraction of many common mechanism design situations, ranging from elections of kibbutz committees to network design. Our result is actually made up of two complementary results – one in the communicationcomplexity model and one in the computationalcomplexity model. Both these hardness results heavily rely on a combinatorial characterization of truthful algorithms for our problem. Our computationalcomplexity result is one of the rst impossibility results connecting mechanism design to complexity theory; its novel proof technique involves an application of the SauerShelah Lemma and may be of wider applicability, both within and without mechanism design. 1
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
 In Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2007
"... We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive results for makespan minimization in such a domain are O(m) ..."
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Cited by 38 (11 self)
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We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive results for makespan minimization in such a domain are O(m)approximation truthful mechanisms [22, 20]. We study a wellmotivated special case of this problem, where the processing time of a job on each machine may either be “low ” or “high”, and the low and high values are public and jobdependent. This preserves the multidimensionality of the domain, and generalizes the restrictedmachines (i.e., {pj, ∞}) setting in scheduling. We give a general technique to convert any capproximation algorithm to a 3capproximation truthfulinexpectation mechanism. This is one of the few known results that shows how to export approximation
Interdomain routing and games
 In STOC ’08
"... We present a gametheoretic model that captures many of the intricacies of interdomain routing in today’s Internet. In this model, the strategic agents are source nodes located on a network, who aim to send traffic to a unique destination node. The interaction between the agents is dynamic and compl ..."
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Cited by 32 (10 self)
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We present a gametheoretic model that captures many of the intricacies of interdomain routing in today’s Internet. In this model, the strategic agents are source nodes located on a network, who aim to send traffic to a unique destination node. The interaction between the agents is dynamic and complex – asynchronous, sequential, and based on partial information. Bestreply dynamics in this model capture crucial aspects of the only interdomain routing protocol de facto, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We study complexity and incentiverelated issues in this model. Our main results are showing that in realistic and wellstudied settings, BGP is incentivecompatible. I.e., not only does myopic behaviour of all players converge to a “stable ” routing outcome, but no player has motivation to unilaterally deviate from the protocol. Moreover, we show that even coalitions of players of any size cannot improve their routing outcomes by collaborating. Unlike the vast majority of works in mechanism design, our results do not require any monetary transfers (to or by the agents).
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
 Automata, Languages and Programming
, 2007
"... machines ..."
A lower bound of 1+φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
 In The Proc. of the 32nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS
"... Abstract. We give an improved lower bound for the approximation ratio of truthful mechanisms for the unrelated machines scheduling problem. The mechanism design version of the problem which was proposed and studied in a seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen is at the core of the emerging area of Algorith ..."
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Cited by 9 (2 self)
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Abstract. We give an improved lower bound for the approximation ratio of truthful mechanisms for the unrelated machines scheduling problem. The mechanism design version of the problem which was proposed and studied in a seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen is at the core of the emerging area of Algorithmic Game Theory. The new lower bound 1 + φ ≈ 2.618 is a step towards the final resolution of this important problem. 1
A characterization of 2player mechanisms for scheduling
, 2008
"... We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of truthful mechanisms is very limited: A decisive truthful mechan ..."
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Cited by 7 (2 self)
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We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of truthful mechanisms is very limited: A decisive truthful mechanism partitions the tasks into groups so that the tasks in each group are allocated independently of the other groups. Tasks in a group of size at least two are allocated by an affine minimizer and tasks in singleton groups by a taskindependent mechanism. This characterization is about all truthful mechanisms, including those with unbounded approximation ratio. A direct consequence of this approach is that the approximation ratio of mechanisms for two players is 2, even for two tasks. In fact, it follows that for two players, VCG is the unique algorithm with optimal approximation 2. This characterization provides some support that any decisive truthful mechanism (for 3 or more players) partitions the tasks into groups some of which are allocated by affine minimizers, while the rest are allocated by a threshold mechanism (in which a task is allocated to a player when it is below a threshold value which depends only on the values of the other players). We also show here that the class of threshold mechanisms is identical to the class of additive mechanisms.
AN IMPROVED RANDOMIZED TRUTHFUL MECHANISM FOR SCHEDULING UNRELATED MACHINES
, 2008
"... We study the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in the mechanism design setting. This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [NR99], where they gave a 1.75approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines. We improve this result by a 1 ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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We study the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in the mechanism design setting. This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [NR99], where they gave a 1.75approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines. We improve this result by a 1.6737approximation randomized truthful mechanism. We also generalize our result to a 0.8368mapproximation mechanism for task scheduling with m machines, which improve the previous best upper bound of 0.875m [MS07].
On the Importance of Migration for Fairness in Online Grid Markets (Short Paper)
"... Computational grids offer users a simple access to tremendous computer resources for solving large scale computing problems. Traditional performance analysis of scheduling algorithms considers overall system performance while fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receives ..."
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Cited by 6 (2 self)
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Computational grids offer users a simple access to tremendous computer resources for solving large scale computing problems. Traditional performance analysis of scheduling algorithms considers overall system performance while fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receives. Until recently, only few grids and cluster systems provided preemptive migration (e.g. [2]), which is the ability of dynamically moving computational tasks across machines during runtime. The emergent technology of virtualization (e.g. [4]) provides offtheshelf support for migration, thus making the use of this feature more accessible (even across different OS’s). In this paper, we study the close relation between migration and fairness. We present fairness and quality of service properties for economic online scheduling algorithms. Under mild assumptions we show that it is impossible to achieve these properties without the use of migration. On the other hand, if zero cost migration is used, then these properties can be satisfied.
Optimal collusionresistant mechanisms with verification
, 2007
"... We study the so called mechanisms with verification introduced by Nisan and Ronen [1999]. We show that these mechanisms can optimize any “reasonable ” cost function and that they can be resistant to any coalition of colluding agents in the strongest model which allows agents to exchange side payment ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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We study the so called mechanisms with verification introduced by Nisan and Ronen [1999]. We show that these mechanisms can optimize any “reasonable ” cost function and that they can be resistant to any coalition of colluding agents in the strongest model which allows agents to exchange side payments. These mechanisms, which are also known as ntruthful mechanisms, are stronger than truthful mechanisms. We apply our main result to a number of problems previously studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature and obtain ntruthful (1 + ε)approximation mechanisms with verification. By contrast, no truthful mechanism without verification can achieve such an approximation ratio. Moreover, every mechanism without verification which is collusionresistant must have an unbounded approximation factor.
Mechanism design for scheduling
"... We consider mechanism design issues for scheduling problems and we survey some recent developments on this important problem in Algorithmic Game Theory. We treat both the related and the unrelated version of the problem. ..."
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Cited by 4 (2 self)
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We consider mechanism design issues for scheduling problems and we survey some recent developments on this important problem in Algorithmic Game Theory. We treat both the related and the unrelated version of the problem.