The study of scientific discovery—where do new ideas come from?—has long been denigrated by philosophers as irrelevant to analyzing the growth of scientific knowledge. In particular, little is known about how cognitive theories are discovered, and neither the classical accounts of discovery as either probabilistic induction (e.g., Reichenbach, 1938) or lucky guesses (e.g., Popper, 1959), nor the stock anecdotes about sudden “eureka ” moments deepen the insight into discovery. A heuristics approach is taken in this review, where heuristics are understood as strategies of discovery less general than a supposed unique logic of discovery but more general than lucky guesses. This article deals with how scientists’ tools shape theories of mind, in particular with how methods of statistical inference have turned into metaphors of mind. The tools-to-theories heuristic explains the emergence of a broad range of cognitive theories, from the cognitive revolution of the 1960s up to the present, and it can be used to detect both limitations and new lines of development in current cognitive theories that investigate the mind as an “intuitive statistician.” Scientific inquiry can be viewed as “an ocean, continuous everywhere and without a break or division ” (Leibniz, 1690/1951, p. 73). Hans Reichenbach (1938) nonetheless divided this ocean into two great seas, the context of discovery and the context of justification. Philosophers, logicians,

Five studies explored cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to proscribed forms of social cognition. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that people responded to taboo trade-offs that monetized sacred values with moral outrage and cleansing. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that racial egalitarians were least likely to use, and angriest at those who did use, race-tainted base rates and that egalitarians who inadvertently used such base rates tried to reaffirm their fair-mindedness. Experiment 5 revealed that Christian fundamentalists were most likely to reject heretical counterfactuals that applied everyday causal schemata to Biblical narratives and to engage in moral cleansing after merely contemplating such possibilities. Although the results fit the sacred-value-protection model (SVPM) better than rival formulations, the SVPM must draw on cross-cultural taxonomies of relational schemata to specify normative boundaries on thought. Research on social cognition ultimately rests on functionalist assumptions about what people are trying to accomplish when they judge events or make choices. The most influential of these assumptions have been the intuitive scientist and the intuitive economist. The former tradition depicts people whose central objective

accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake. " An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. The accuracy of human social judgment is a topic of obvious

Research suggests that causal judgment is influenced primarily by counterfactual or covariational reasoning. In contrast, the author of this article develops judgment dissociation theory (JDT), which predicts that these types of reasoning differ in function and can lead to divergent judgments. The actuality principle proposes that causal selections focus on antecedents that are sufficient to generate the actual outcome. The substitution principle proposes that ad hoc categorization plays a key role in counterfactual and covariational reasoning such that counterfactual selections focus on antecedents that would have been sufficient to prevent the outcome or something like it and covariational selections focus on antecedents that yield the largest increase in the probability of the outcome or something like it. The findings of 4 experiments support JDT but not the competing counterfactual and covariational accounts. If causation is the cement of the universe, as the philosopher David Hume (1740/1938) put it, then it is fair to say that causal knowledge is the cement that binds together each person’s representational universe. Causal reasoning—the process that generates this glue—confers many functional advantages. In virtually every sphere of human interest, our abilities to learn and categorize

The authors argue against a purely behavioral definition of praise as verbal reinforcement in favor of the view that praise may serve to undermine, enhance, or have no effect on children’s intrinsic motivation, depending on a set of conceptual variables. Provided that praise is perceived as sincere, it is particularly beneficial to motivation when it encourages performance attributions to controllable causes, promotes autonomy, enhances competence without an overreliance on social comparisons, and conveys attainable standards and expectations. The motivational consequences of praise also can be moderated by characteristics of the recipient, such as age, gender, and culture. Methodological considerations, such as including appropriate control groups and measuring postfailure outcomes, are stressed, and directions for future research are highlighted. Praise, like penicillin, must not be administered haphazardly. There are rules and cautions that govern the handling of potent medicines— rules about timing and dosage, cautions about possible allergic reactions. There are similar regulations about the administration of emotional medicine. (H. Ginott, 1965, p. 39) On the whole, we as a society seem to believe that praise has

Are human contingency judgments based on associationistic principles such as cue competition or on normative principles as specified by rational-cognitive models? In this study, participants learned to predict an outcome from several simultaneously presented cues. They were asked to judge the cues in regard to causal power or statistical concepts such as probability or relative frequency. Uniform application of associationistic principles implies cue-interaction effects of blocking (Experiment 1) and conditioned inhibition (Experiment 2) for all judgments. A rational-cognitive framework predicts cueinteraction effects for causality judgments, but not for probability and relative frequency judgments. The results support the rational-cognitive framework on all accounts.

Disciplines that study science are relatively well established in philosophy, history, and sociology. Psychology of science, by comparison, is a late bloomer but has recently shown signs of codification. The authors further this codification by integrating and reviewing the growing literature in the developmental, cognitive, personality, and social psychology of science. Only by integrating the findings from each of these perspectives can the basic questions in the study of scientific behavior be answered: Who becomes a scientist and what role do biology, family, school, and gender play? Are productivity, scientific reasoning, and theory acceptance influenced by age? What thought processes and heuristics lead to successful discovery? What personality characteristics distinguish scientists from nonscientists and eminent from less eminent scientists? Finally, how do intergroup relations and social forces influence scientific behavior? A model that integrates the consensual empirical findings from the psychology of science is pro-posed. Without the addition of a psychological dimension, I believe, it is impossible to appreciate fully the essence

This paper focuses on the perceived pattern of alignment between a manager’s words and deeds, with special attention to promise keeping, and espoused and enacted values. It terms this perceived pattern of alignment “Behavioral Integrity. ” The literatures on trust, psychological contracts, and credibility combine to suggest important consequences for this perception, and literatures on hypocrisy, social accounts, social cognition, organizational change, and management fashions suggest key antecedents to it. The resulting conceptual model highlights an issue that is problematic in today’s managerial environment, has important organizational outcomes, and is relatively unstudied. (Trust; Psychological Contracts; Credibility; Fashions) A rapidly growing body of literature recognizes that trust plays a central role in employment relationships. Though

This paper considers how fluent language users are rational in their language processing, their unconscious language representation systems optimally prepared for comprehension and production, how language learners are intuitive statisticians, and how acquisition can be understood as contingency learning. But there are important aspects of second language acquisition that do not appear to be rational, where input fails to become intake. The paper describes the types of situation where cognition deviates from rationality and it introduces how the apparent irrationalities of L2 acquisition result from standard phenomena of associative learning as encapsulated in the models of Rescorla and Wagner (1972) and Cheng and Holyoak (1995), which describe how cue salience, outcome importance, and the history of learning from multiple probabilistic cues affect the development of ‘learned selective attention’ and transfer. This article considers how fluent language users are rational in their language processing, rational in the sense that their unconscious language representation

How do observers respond when the actions of one individual inflict harm on another? The primary reaction to carelessly inflicted harm is to seek restitution; the offender is judged to owe compensation to the harmed individual. The primary reaction to harm inflicted intentionally is moral outrage producing a desire for retribution; the harm-doer must be punished. Reckless conduct, an intermediate case, provokes reactions that involve elements of both careless and intentional harm. The moral outrage felt by those who witness transgressions is a product of both cognitive interpretations of the event and emotional reactions to it. Theory about the exact nature of the emotional reactions is considered, along with suggestions for directions for future research.