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A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data
 American Political Science Review
, 1999
"... e propose a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, districtlevel elections. This model, which provides a tool for comparative politics research analogous to that which regression analysis provides in the American twoparty context, can be used to explain or predict how geographic ..."
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Cited by 28 (12 self)
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e propose a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, districtlevel elections. This model, which provides a tool for comparative politics research analogous to that which regression analysis provides in the American twoparty context, can be used to explain or predict how geographic distributions of electoral results depend upon economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic compositions, campaign spending, and other features of the election campaign or aggregate areas. We also provide new graphical representations for data exploration, model evaluation, and substantive interpretation. We illustrate the use of this model by attempting to resolve a controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in Britain. Contraiy to previous analyses, all based on measures now known to be biased, we demonstrate that the advantage is small but meaningfkl, varies substantially across the parties, and is not growing. Finally, we show how to estimate the party from which each party's advantage is predominantly drawn. w e propose the first internally consistent statistical model for analyzing multiparty, districtlevel aggregate election data. Our model can
A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans
, 1994
"... We derive a unified statistical method with which one can produce substantially improved definitions and estimates of almost any feature of twoparty electoral systems that can be defined based on district vote shares. Our single method enables one to calculate more efficient estimates, with more tr ..."
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Cited by 23 (14 self)
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We derive a unified statistical method with which one can produce substantially improved definitions and estimates of almost any feature of twoparty electoral systems that can be defined based on district vote shares. Our single method enables one to calculate more efficient estimates, with more trustworthy assessments of their uncertainty, than each of the separate multifarious existing measures of partisan bias, electoral responsiveness, seatsvotes curves, expected or predicted vote in each district in a legislature, the probability that a given party will win the seat in each district, the proportion of incumbents or others who will lose their seats, the proportion of women or minority candidates to be elected, the incumbency advantage and other causal effects, the likely effects on the electoral system and district votes of proposed electoral reforms such as term limitations, campaign spending limits, and drawing majorityminority districts, and numerous others. To illustrate, we estimate the partisan bias and electoral responsiveness of the U.S. House of Representatives since 1900 and evaluate the fairness of competing redistricting plans for the 1992 Ohio state legislature.
2007), “Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration,”Quarterly
 Journal of Economics
"... This paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections. In the model, districting matters because it determines the seatvote curve, which describes the relationship between seats and votes. The paper rst characterizes the optimal seatvo ..."
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Cited by 17 (2 self)
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This paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections. In the model, districting matters because it determines the seatvote curve, which describes the relationship between seats and votes. The paper rst characterizes the optimal seatvote curve, and shows that, under a weak condition, there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship. The paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seatvote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting. This is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect U.S. state legislators during the 1990s. This paper combines research reported in \Socially Optimal Districting " (NBER Working Paper #11462) and \Socially Optimal Districting: An Empirical Investigation " (NBER Working Paper #12313). We are greatly indebted to Jim Snyder for providing the data on state legislative elections used in this study. For helpful comments
Estimating the Electoral Consequences of Legislative Redistricting
 Journal of the American Statistical Association
, 1990
"... We analyze the effects of redistricting as revealed in the votes received by the Democratic and Republican candidates for state legislature. We develop measures of partisan bias and the responsiveness of the composition of the legislature to changes in statewide votes. Our statistical model incorpor ..."
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Cited by 14 (6 self)
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We analyze the effects of redistricting as revealed in the votes received by the Democratic and Republican candidates for state legislature. We develop measures of partisan bias and the responsiveness of the composition of the legislature to changes in statewide votes. Our statistical model incorporates a mixed hierarchical Bayesian and nonBayesian estimation, requiring simulation along the lines of Tanner and Wong (1987). This model provides reliable estimates of partisan bias and responsiveness along with measures of their variabilities from only a single year of electoral data. This allows one to distinguish systematic changes in the underlying electoral system from typical electiontoelection variability. KEY WORDS: Bayesian estimation; Elections; Political science; Random effects; Simulation. State and national legislators in the United States are largely elected by plurality vote in individual geographic districts, whose boundaries are redrawn after every decennial census. In addition to ensuring equal populations in each district, redistricting affects which candidates are elected, the relative strengths of the two parties in a legislative house, and other features of the electoral system in a state.
Electoral Bias and Policy Choices: Theory and Evidence
, 2007
"... This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the ..."
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Cited by 13 (2 self)
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This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.
Unifying Political Methodology
, 1989
"... "political science statistics " (Rai and Blydenburgh 1973), "political statistics" ..."
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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"political science statistics " (Rai and Blydenburgh 1973), "political statistics"
The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections
 American Journal of Political Science
, 1998
"... We develop a simple formal model of the redistricting process that highlights the importance of two factors: first, partisan or bipartisan control of the redistricting process; second, the nature of the reversionary outcome, should the state legislature and governor fail to agree on a new distric ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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We develop a simple formal model of the redistricting process that highlights the importance of two factors: first, partisan or bipartisan control of the redistricting process; second, the nature of the reversionary outcome, should the state legislature and governor fail to agree on a new districting plan. Using this model, we derive various predictions about the levels of partisan bias and responsiveness that should be observed under districting plans adopted under various constellations of partisan control of state government and reversionary outcomes, testing our predictions on postwar (194670) U.S. House electoral data. We find strong evidence that both partisan control and reversionary outcomes systematically a#ect the nature of a redistricting plan and the subsequent elections held under it. Further, we show that the wellknown disappearance circa 1966 of what had been a longtime proRepublican bias of about 6% in nonsouthern congressional elections can be explaine...
Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: A Matching Rejoinder ∗
, 2003
"... In a substantial contribution to positive political economy, Rogowski and Kayser (2002, p. 526) finds that “systems of proportional representation... systematically advantage producers and disadvantage consumers. ” I find that there is no evidence to sustain that conclusion. The original study extra ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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In a substantial contribution to positive political economy, Rogowski and Kayser (2002, p. 526) finds that “systems of proportional representation... systematically advantage producers and disadvantage consumers. ” I find that there is no evidence to sustain that conclusion. The original study extrapolates severely due to the fact that proportional representation countries are systematically different from majoritarian district countries in their background characteristics. Accounting for these differences by matching on the propensity score forces us to discard observations that severely extrapolate from the data, yielding estimates of such high variance that we cannot find evidence for the pricelevel effect. The only way to reassess the hypothesis without bias or implausible assumptions is to gather a larger dataset, which by including nonOECD democracies increases potential observations. Yet even with this data the pricelevel effect remains undetectable. The conclusion of a pricelevel effect thereby rests on modeling assumptions that are theoretically and empirically unjustified.
Division Of The Humanities And Social Sciences
"... In an election the probability that a single voter is decisive is a#ected by the electoral systemthat is, the rule for aggregating votes into a single outcome. Under the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting), we prove that the average probability of a vote being de ..."
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In an election the probability that a single voter is decisive is a#ected by the electoral systemthat is, the rule for aggregating votes into a single outcome. Under the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting), we prove that the average probability of a vote being decisive is maximized under a popularvote (or simple majority) rule and is lower under any coalition system, such as the U.S. Electoral College system, no matter how complicated. Forming a coalition increases the decisive vote probability for the voters within a coalition, but the aggregate e#ect of coalitions is to decrease the average decisiveness of the population of voters. We then review results on voting power in an electoral college system. Under the random voting assumption, it is well known that the voters with the highest probability of decisiveness are those in large states. However, we show using empirical estimates of the closeness of historical U.S. Presidential elections that voters in small states have been advantaged because the random voting model overestimates the frequencies of close elections in the larger states. Finally, we estimate the average probability of decisiveness for all U.S. Presidential elections from 1960 to 2000 under three possible electoral systems: popular vote, electoral vote, and winnertakeall within Congressional districts. We find that the average probability of decisiveness is about the same under all three systems.
The Impact of MajorityMinority Districts on Congressional Elections
, 2005
"... We utilize the Cox and Katz (1998, 2002) bargaining model of the redistricting process and data from the 19722000 House elections to answer two questions: first, does the creation of majorityminority districts increase the likelihood that minority candidates will be elected in those districts? Sec ..."
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We utilize the Cox and Katz (1998, 2002) bargaining model of the redistricting process and data from the 19722000 House elections to answer two questions: first, does the creation of majorityminority districts increase the likelihood that minority candidates will be elected in those districts? Second, does the creation of majorityminority districts also generate proRepublican gerrymanders? We demonstrate that after controlling for the proportion of minorities in a state, as the proportion of majorityminority districts increases, the proportion of minorities elected to the House increases as well, regardless of which party controls the redistricting process. This result is consistent with previous research. To test the hypothesis that majorityminority districting has “perverseeffects, ” the seatsvotes curves are estimated for each election, allowing for the partisan or bipartisan control of the redistricting process and the presence of majorityminority mandates. We demonstrate that there is no significant difference in the level of partisan bias observed under redistricting plans with majorityminority districts and those without majorityminority districts. The claim that majorityminority districting has “perverseeffects ” is not supported by the data. Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April