This paper investigates nonlinear pricing kernels in which the risk factor is endogenously determined and preferences restrict the definition of the pricing kernel. These kernels potentially generate the empirical performance of nonlinear and multifactor models, while maintaining empirical power and avoiding ad hoc specifications of factors or functional form. Our test results indicate that preferencerestricted nonlinear pricing kernels are both admissible for the cross section of returns and are able to significantly improve upon linear single- and multifactor kernels. Further, the nonlinearities in the pricing kernel drive out the importance of the factors in the linear multi-factor model. A PRINCIPAL IMPLICATION OF THE Capital Asset Pricing Model ~CAPM! is that the pricing kernel is linear in a single factor, the portfolio of aggregate wealth. Numerous studies over the past two decades have documented violations of this restriction. 1 In response, researchers have examined the performance of alternative models of asset prices. These models have generally fallen into two classes: ~1! multifactor models such as Ross ’ APT or Merton’s ICAPM, in which factors in addition to the market return determine asset prices; or ~2! nonparametric models, such as Bansal et al. ~1993!, Bansal and Viswanathan ~1993!, and Chapman ~1997!, in which the pricing kernel is not

I review empirical research on the relation between capital markets and financial statements.The principal sources of demand for capital markets research in accounting are fundamental analysis and valuation, tests of market efficiency, and the role of accounting numbers in contracts and the political process.The capital markets research topics of current interest to researchers include tests of market efficiency with respect to accounting information, fundamental analysis, and value relevance of financial reporting.Evidence from research on these topics is likely to be helpful in capital market investment decisions, accounting standard setting, and corporate financial

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This paper investigates the empirical characteristics of investor risk aversion over equity return states by estimating a time-varying pricing kernel, which we call the empirical pricing kernel (EPK). We estimate the EPK on a monthly basis from 1991 to 1995, using S&P 500 index option data and a stochastic volatility model for the S&P 500 return process. We find that the EPK exhibits countercyclical risk aversion over S&P 500 return states. We also find that hedging performance is significantly improved when we use hedge ratios based the EPK rather than a time-invariant pricing kernel.

This paper empirically tests the expectations hypothesis on both daily EONIA swap rates and monthly EURIBOR rates extended backwards with German LIBOR rates. In addition, we quantify the size of the risk premia in the money market at maturities of one, three, six and nine months. Using implied forward and spot rates in a cointegrated VAR model, we find that the data support the expectations hypothesis in the euro area and in Germany prior to 1999. We find that risk premia are relatively limited at the shorter maturities but more significant at maturities of six and nine months. Furthermore, the results on LIBOR/EURIBOR rates tentatively indicate a downward shift in the structure of the risk premia after the introduction of the euro.

Recent literature in empirical finance is surveyed in its relation to underlying behavioral principles, principles which come primarily from psychology, sociology and anthropology. The behavioral principles discussed are: prospect theory, regret and cognitive dissonance, anchoring, mental compartments, overconfidence, over- and underreaction, representativeness heuristic, the disjunction effect, gambling behavior and speculation, perceived irrelevance of history, magical thinking, quasi-magical thinking, attention anomalies, the availability heuristic, culture and social contagion, and global culture. Theories of human behavior from psychology, sociology, and anthropology have helped motivate much recent empirical research on the behavior of financial markets. In this paper I will survey both some of the most significant theories (for empirical finance) in these other social sciences and the empirical finance literature itself. Particular attention will be paid to the implications of these theories for the efficient markets hypothesis in finance. This is the hypothesis that financial prices efficiently incorporate all public

: This paper links the term structure to perceptions of monetary policy. Long-horizon forecasts of short rates required by no-arbitrage term structure models are heavily influenced by the endpoints, or limiting conditional forecasts, of the short rate process. Common assumptions that the short rate is mean-reverting or contains a unit root are shown to generate unrealistic yield predictions. Failures occur because these assumptions inadequately account for historical shifts in market perceptions of the policy target for inflation. This paper links endpoint shifts to agent learning about shifts in long-term policy goals. Shifting endpoints in short rate processes significantly improve yield predictions. Keywords: Expectations Hypothesis, changepoints, breakpoints, learning JEL classification: E43 a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 925 Grand Boulevard, Kansas City MO 64198, USA. b Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DD, UK. We are grateful ...

We propose a general equilibrium model with multiple securities in which investors’ risk preferences and expectations of dividend growth are time varying. While time varying risk preferences induce the standard positive relation between the dividend yield and expected returns, time varying expected dividend growth induces a negative relation between them. These offsetting effects reduce the ability of the dividend yield to forecast returns and eliminate its ability to forecast dividend growth, as observed in the data. The model links the predictability of returns to that of dividend growth, suggesting specific changes to standard linear predictive regressions for both. The model’s predictions are con…rmed empirically.

Financial press reports claim that internet stock message boards can move markets. We study the effect of more than 1.5 million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull about the 45 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and the Dow Jones Internet Index. The bullishness of the messages is measured using computational linguistics methods. News stories reported in the Wall Street Journal are used as controls. We find significant evidence that the stock messages help predict market volatility, but not stock returns. Consistent with Harris and Raviv (1993), agreement among the posted messages is associated with decreased trading volume. (JEL: G12, G14)

Richardson were especially helpful on this manuscript. Thanks to Deepak Agrawal for computational assistance and thoughtful comments. I would also like to thank Yakov Amihud, Anthony Lynch, Jennifer Carpenter, Paul Wachtel and Cliff Green for their comments and help. As always, none of the aforementioned are responsible for any opinions expressed or any errors. 1 One of the fundamental issues in finance is what are the factors that affect expected return on assets, the sensitivity of expected return to these factors, and the reward for bearing this sensitivity. There is a long history of testing in this area, and it is clearly one of the most investigated areas in finance. Almost all of the testing I am aware of involves using realized returns as a proxy for expected returns. The use of average realized returns as a proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that information surprises tend to cancel out over the period of the study and realized returns are therefore an unbiased estimate of expected returns. However, I believe that there is ample evidence that this belief is misplaced. There are periods longer than ten years where stock market realized returns are on average less than the risk-free rate (1973 to 1984). There are periods longer than fifty years in which risky long-term bonds on average underperformed the risk free