ALLIANCE is a software architecture that fa- cilitates the fault tolerant cooperative control of teams of heterogeneous mobile robots performing missions composed of loosely coupled subtasks that may have ordering dependencies. ALLIANCE allows teams of robots, each of which possesses a variety of high-level functions that it can perform during a mission, to individually select appropriate actions throughout the mission based on the requirements of the mission, the activities of other robots, the current environmental conditions, and the robot's own internal states. ALLIANCE is a fully distributed, behavior-based architecture that incorporates the use of mathematically-modeled motivations (such as impatience and acquiescence) within each robot to achieve adaptive action selection. Since cooperative robotic teams usually work in dynamic and unpredictable environments, this software architecture allows the robot team members to respond robustly, reliably, flexibly, and coherently to unexpected environmental changes and modifications in the robot team that may occur due to mechanical failure, the learning of new skills, or the addition or removal of robots from the team by human intervention. The feasibility of this architecture is demonstrated in an implementation on a team of mobile robots performing a laboratory version of hazardous waste cleanup.

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The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: 1) cognition is situated; 2) cognition is time-pressured; 3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; 4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; 5) cognition is for action; 6) off-line cognition is body-based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

Both direct, and evolved, behavior-based approaches to mobile robots have yielded a numberofinteresting demonstrations of robots that navigate, map, plan and operate in the real world. The work can best be described as attempts to emulate insect level locomotion and navigation, with very little work on behavior-based non-trivial manipulation of the world. There have been some behavior-based attempts at exploring social interactions, but these too have been modeled after the sorts of social interactions we see in insects. But thinking how to scale from all this insect level work to full human level intelligence and social interactions leads to a synthesis that is very di erent from that imagined in traditional Arti cial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. We report on work towards that goal.

this article, we describe the educational goals of the course, its overall design, the final competition, and student assessment.

This paper reports and extends discussions carried out during a workshop held at the Santa Fe Institute in August 1995 by the authors. It treats eight major topics: (i) the importance of carefully examining research on routine, (it) the concept of 'action patterns ' in general and in terms of routine, (Hi) the useful categorization of routines and other recurring patterns, (iv) the research implications of recent cognitive results, (v) the relation of evolution to action patterns, (vi) the contributions of simulation modeling for theory in this area, (vii) examples of various approaches to empirical jj; research that reveal key problems, and (viii) a possible definition of 'routine'. An m extended appendix by Massimo Egidi provides a lexicon of synonyms and opposites ji covering use of the word 'routine ' in such areas as economics, organization theory and z artificial intelligence. 6

We describe Localization-Space Trails (LOST), a method that enables a team of robots to navigate between places of interest in an initially unknown environment using a trail of landmarks. The landmarks are not physical; they are waypoint coordinates generated on-line by each robot and shared with team-mates. Waypoints are specified in each robot's local coordinate system, and contain references to features in the world that are relevant to the team's task and common to all robots. Using these task-level references, robots can share waypoints without maintaining a global coordinate system.

INTRODUCTION Classical symbolic systems in psychology have proven to be powerful in explaining human cognition and behavior, especially in contrast to the preceding behaviorist approach. The engineering aspect of this approach, symbolic artificial intelligence, has similarly has shown itself to be capable of mimicking and often exceeding average human cognitive abilities. However, both the cognitive science and AI communities have experienced an increasing dissatisfaction with these approaches within the last decade or so. The problems manifest in both fields are similar. The things humans do with the most ease (e.g., recognizing patterns, moving around in the world, learning to speak) are the most difficult to explain and mimic with a symbolic approach. In both domains, this dissatisfaction has led to the acceptance of different viewpoints. In cognitive science, connectionism and ecological psychology are having major influences, and in AI, specifically the fields of robotics and comp

We review recent research in robotics, neuroscience, evolutionary neurobiology, and ethology with the aim of highlighting some points of agreement and convergence. Specifically, we compare Brooks' (1986) subsumption architecture for robot control with research in neuroscience demonstrating layered control systems in vertebrate brains, and with research in ethology that emphasizes the decomposition of control into multiple, intertwined behavior systems. From this perspective we then describe interesting parallels between the subsumption architecture and the natural layered behavior system that determines defense reactions in the rat. We then consider the action selection problem for robots and vertebrates and argue that, in addition to subsumption-like conflict resolution mechanisms, the vertebrate nervous system employs specialized selection mechanisms located in a group of central brain structures termed the basal ganglia. We suggest that similar specialized switching mechanisms might...