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With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, our model is in the spirit of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983): the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, i.e. cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. Depending on the sizes of the fixed set-up cost, the cost of capacity and the relative costs of production, our model produces a wide spectrum of equilibrium behaviors. Using a "reverse-judo " tactic a cost disadvantaged incumbent may limit his capacity to induce the entrant to respond less aggressively. When the incumbent is equally or more efficient, a stochastic version of Gelman and Salop's (1983) judo equilibrium may arise. Entry accommodation can also result in the Stackelberg outcome, or the equilibria from Dixit's (1980) quantity-setting game. In contrast to

this paper we summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health care industry. We will focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. We will discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions for inquisitive researchers.

In this paper we study how industry-specific and institutional factors affect the size of corporations. We find that countries that have better institutional development, as measured by the efficiency of their judicial system, have larger firms. Once we correct for institutional development, there is little evidence that richer countries or countries with better developed capital markets have larger firms. Interaction effects are perhaps of greatest use in discriminating between theories. We find the efficiency of the judicial system has the strongest relationship with firm size in industries with low physical capital intensity, a finding consistent with a broad class of theories emphasizing “Critical Resources ” as central to determining the boundaries of firms.

This article follows the evolution of thinking about competition since 1890 as reflected by major antitrust decisions and research in industrial organization. We divide the U.S. antitrust experience into five periods and discuss each period's legal trends and economic thinking in three core areas of antitrust: cartels, cooperation, or other interactions among independent firms; abusive conduct by dominant firms; and mergers.

This paper develops an approach to organizational governance decisions that recognizes how the choice of organizational governance form affects both the creation and appropriation of economic value. The paper begins with a detailed survey of three theoretical approaches— transaction cost economics (TCE), the resource based view (RBV), and real options analysis (RoA) to the study of organizational governance. This review serves to provide background material on each theory as well as to identify the similarities and differences in the assumptions underlying these perspectives. A concluding section provides a series of propositions for future empirical research that may help to integrate these theories by incorporating notions of both value creation and value appropriation.

An important and intriguing aspect of e-entrepreneurship is the formation of new ventures in the domain of open source software (OSS). Previous research on these ventures has primarily looked at the design of business models, yet has neglected other key questions relating to the management of these firms, despite clear indications that some existing insights on venture management cannot be applied to new ventures in OSS. The purpose of this paper is to explore how three key challenges of venture management -- the liabilities of newness and smallness of start-ups and market entry barriers -- affect new ventures in OSS. Based on empirical data from personal interviews and a large scale survey we find that many of the liabilities that are typically discussed in the entrepreneurship literature are much less of a challenge for new ventures in OSS. Our findings have interesting implications for the emerging theory on e-entrepreneurship, and for entrepreneurs considering to exploit business opportunities in OSS, and more generally business opportunities based on open innovations.

Abstract: Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value added per employee in naturally “high entry ” industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse effect on entry in corrupt countries, only in less corrupt ones. Taken together, the evidence suggests bureaucratic entry regulations are neither benign nor welfare improving. However, not all regulations inhibit entry. In particular, regulations that enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights or those that lead to a better developed financial sector do lead to greater entry in industries that do more R&D or industries that need more external finance.

would like to thank Plurimus Corporation for providing me with the data and for generously allowing me to work at their offices for several weeks and J. Walter Thompson Company for providing me with advertising data. Thanks also go to Shane Greenstein, Charles Manski, Robert Porter, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own. Abstract: This paper examines the causes on market concentration in advertisingsupported online markets such as sports, news, and email. In particular, it is the first paper to explore the relationship between concentration and product differentiation, economies of scale, market size, advertising, content costs, and multi-market ownership in online markets. As expected, differentiated large markets with low content costs and little multi-market ownership are less concentrated. Furthermore, I show that advertising-supported online markets have much in common with the magazine industry (JEL classification: L1, L8).1 1.

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