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Epsilon Substitution Method for Elementary Analysis
, 1993
"... We formulate epsilon substitution method for elementary analysis EA (second order arithmetic with comprehension for arithmetical formulas with predicate parameters). Two proofs of its termination are presented. One uses embedding into ramied system of level one and cutelimination for this system. Th ..."
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We formulate epsilon substitution method for elementary analysis EA (second order arithmetic with comprehension for arithmetical formulas with predicate parameters). Two proofs of its termination are presented. One uses embedding into ramied system of level one and cutelimination for this system. The second proof uses noneective continuity argument.
Hilbert’s Program Then and Now
, 2005
"... Hilbert’s program is, in the first instance, a proposal and a research program in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. It was formulated in the early 1920s by German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943), and was pursued by him and his collaborators at the University of Göttingen and els ..."
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Hilbert’s program is, in the first instance, a proposal and a research program in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. It was formulated in the early 1920s by German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943), and was pursued by him and his collaborators at the University of Göttingen and elsewhere in the 1920s
The Practice of Finitism: Epsilon Calculus and Consistency Proofs in Hilbert's Program
, 2001
"... . After a brief flirtation with logicism in 19171920, David Hilbert proposed his own program in the foundations of mathematics in 1920 and developed it, in concert with collaborators such as Paul Bernays and Wilhelm Ackermann, throughout the 1920s. The two technical pillars of the project were the ..."
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. After a brief flirtation with logicism in 19171920, David Hilbert proposed his own program in the foundations of mathematics in 1920 and developed it, in concert with collaborators such as Paul Bernays and Wilhelm Ackermann, throughout the 1920s. The two technical pillars of the project were the development of axiomatic systems for ever stronger and more comprehensive areas of mathematics and finitistic proofs of consistency of these systems. Early advances in these areas were made by Hilbert (and Bernays) in a series of lecture courses at the University of Gttingen between 1917 and 1923, and notably in Ackermann 's dissertation of 1924. The main innovation was the invention of the ecalculus, on which Hilbert's axiom systems were based, and the development of the esubstitution method as a basis for consistency proofs. The paper traces the development of the "simultaneous development of logic and mathematics" through the enotation and provides an analysis of Ackermann's consisten...
Epsilonsubstitution method for the ramified language and # 1 comprehension rule
 Logic and Foundations of Mathematics
, 1999
"... We extend to Ramified Analysis the definition and termination proof of Hilbert’s ɛsubstitution method. This forms a base for future extensions to predicatively reducible subsystems of analysis. First such system treated here is second order arithmetic with ∆1 1comprehension rule. ..."
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We extend to Ramified Analysis the definition and termination proof of Hilbert’s ɛsubstitution method. This forms a base for future extensions to predicatively reducible subsystems of analysis. First such system treated here is second order arithmetic with ∆1 1comprehension rule.
The growth of mathematical knowledge: an open world view
 The growth of mathematical knowledge, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2000
"... mathematical knowledge: “The advance of science is not comparable to the changes of a city, where old edifices are pitilessly torn down to give place to new ones, but to the continuous evolution of zoological types which develop ceaselessly and end by becoming unrecognizable to the common sight, but ..."
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mathematical knowledge: “The advance of science is not comparable to the changes of a city, where old edifices are pitilessly torn down to give place to new ones, but to the continuous evolution of zoological types which develop ceaselessly and end by becoming unrecognizable to the common sight, but where an expert eye finds always traces of the prior work of the centuries past ” (Poincaré 1958, p. 14). The view criticized by Poincaré corresponds to Frege’s idea that the development of mathematics can be described as an activity of system building, where each system is supposed to provide a complete representation for a certain mathematical field and must be pitilessly torn down whenever it fails to achieve such an aim. All facts concerning any mathematical field must be fully organized in a given system because “in mathematics we must always strive after a system that is complete in itself ” (Frege 1979, p. 279). Frege is aware that systems introduce rigidity and are in conflict with the actual development of mathematics because “in history we have development; a system is static”, but he sticks
The emergence of firstorder logic
 University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
, 1988
"... To most mathematical logicians working in the 1980s, firstorder logic is the proper and natural framework for mathematics. Yet it was not always so. In 1923, when a young Norwegian mathematician named Thoralf Skolem argued that set theory should be based on firstorder logic, it was ..."
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To most mathematical logicians working in the 1980s, firstorder logic is the proper and natural framework for mathematics. Yet it was not always so. In 1923, when a young Norwegian mathematician named Thoralf Skolem argued that set theory should be based on firstorder logic, it was
Historical Projects in Discrete Mathematics and Computer Science
"... A course in discrete mathematics is a relatively recent addition, within the last 30 or 40 years, to the modern American undergraduate curriculum, born out of a need to instruct computer science majors in algorithmic thought. The roots of discrete mathematics, however, are as old as mathematics itse ..."
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A course in discrete mathematics is a relatively recent addition, within the last 30 or 40 years, to the modern American undergraduate curriculum, born out of a need to instruct computer science majors in algorithmic thought. The roots of discrete mathematics, however, are as old as mathematics itself, with the notion of counting a discrete operation, usually cited as the first mathematical development
The scope of logic: deduction, abduction, analogy
"... The present form of mathematical logic originated in the twenties and early thirties from the partial merging of two different traditions, the algebra of logic and the logicist tradition (see [27], [41]). This resulted in a new form of logic in which several features of the two earlier traditions co ..."
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The present form of mathematical logic originated in the twenties and early thirties from the partial merging of two different traditions, the algebra of logic and the logicist tradition (see [27], [41]). This resulted in a new form of logic in which several features of the two earlier traditions coexist. Clearly neither the algebra of logic nor the logicist’s logic is identical to the present form of mathematical logic, yet some of their basic ideas can be distinctly recognized within it. One of such ideas is Boole’s view that logic is the study of the laws of thought. This is not to be meant in a psychologistic way. Frege himself states that the task of logic can be represented “as the investigation of the mind; [though] of the mind, not of minds” [17, p. 369]. Moreover Frege never charges Boole with being psychologistic and in a letter to Peano even distinguishes between the followers of Boole and “the psychological logicians ” [16, p. 108]. In fact for Boole the laws of thought which are the object of logic belong “to the domain of what is termed necessary truth ” [2, p. 404]. For him logic does not depend on psychology, on the contrary psychology depends on logic insofar as it is only through an investigation of logical operations that we could obtain “some probable