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Computing a glimpse of randomness
- Experimental Mathematics
"... A Chaitin Omega number is the halting probability of a universal Chaitin (selfdelimiting Turing) machine. Every Omega number is both computably enumerable (the limit of a computable, increasing, converging sequence of rationals) and random (its binary expansion is an algorithmic random sequence). In ..."
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Cited by 15 (6 self)
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A Chaitin Omega number is the halting probability of a universal Chaitin (selfdelimiting Turing) machine. Every Omega number is both computably enumerable (the limit of a computable, increasing, converging sequence of rationals) and random (its binary expansion is an algorithmic random sequence). In particular, every Omega number is strongly non-computable. The aim of this paper is to describe a procedure, which combines Java programming and mathematical proofs, for computing the exact values of the first 63 bits of a Chaitin Omega: 000000100000010000100000100001110111001100100111100010010011100. Full description of programs and proofs will be given elsewhere. 1
The many forms of hypercomputation
- Applied Mathematics and Computation
, 2006
"... This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess. ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess.
Abstract Super-Tasks, Accelerating Turing Machines and Uncomputability
"... Accelerating Turing machines are abstract devices that have the same computational structure as Turing machines, but can perform super-tasks. I argue that performing super-tasks alone does not buy more computational power, and that accelerating Turing machines do not solve the halting problem. To sh ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Accelerating Turing machines are abstract devices that have the same computational structure as Turing machines, but can perform super-tasks. I argue that performing super-tasks alone does not buy more computational power, and that accelerating Turing machines do not solve the halting problem. To show this, I analyze the reasoning that leads to Thomson's paradox, point out that the paradox rests on a conflation of different perspectives of accelerating processes, and conclude that the same conflation underlies the claim that accelerating Turing machines can solve the halting problem.

