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203
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
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Cited by 226 (14 self)
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We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of normalform games and graphical games, and shows that these kinds of games can implement arbitrary members of a PPADcomplete class of Brouwer functions. 1
On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
 JCSS
, 1994
"... We define several new complexity classes of search problems, "between " the classes FP and FNP. These new classes are contained, along with factoring, and the class PLS, in the class TFNP of search problems in FNP that always have a witness. A problem in each of these new classes is define ..."
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Cited by 158 (8 self)
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We define several new complexity classes of search problems, "between " the classes FP and FNP. These new classes are contained, along with factoring, and the class PLS, in the class TFNP of search problems in FNP that always have a witness. A problem in each of these new classes is defined in terms of an implicitly given, exponentially large graph. The existence of the solution sought is established via a simple graphtheoretic argument with an inefficiently constructive proof; for example, PLS can be thought of as corresponding to the lemma "every dag has a sink. " The new classes are based on lemmata such as "every graph has an even number of odddegree nodes. " They contain several important problems for which no polynomial time algorithm is presently known, including the computational versions of Sperner's lemma, Brouwer's fixpoint theorem, Chfvalley's theorem, and the BorsukUlam theorem, the linear complementarity problem for Pmatrices, finding a mixed equilibrium in a nonzero sum game, finding a second Hamilton circuit in a Hamiltonian cubic graph, a second Hamiltonian decomposition in a quartic graph, and others. Some of these problems are shown to be complete. © 1994 Academic Press, Inc. 1.
Solving Systems of Polynomial Equations
 American Mathematical Society, CBMS Regional Conferences Series, No 97
, 2002
"... Abstract. One of the most classical problems of mathematics is to solve systems of polynomial equations in several unknowns. Today, polynomial models are ubiquitous and widely applied across the sciences. They arise in robotics, coding theory, optimization, mathematical biology, computer vision, gam ..."
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Cited by 143 (10 self)
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Abstract. One of the most classical problems of mathematics is to solve systems of polynomial equations in several unknowns. Today, polynomial models are ubiquitous and widely applied across the sciences. They arise in robotics, coding theory, optimization, mathematical biology, computer vision, game theory, statistics, machine learning, control theory, and numerous other areas. The set of solutions to a system of polynomial equations is an algebraic variety, the basic object of algebraic geometry. The algorithmic study of algebraic varieties is the central theme of computational algebraic geometry. Exciting recent developments in symbolic algebra and numerical software for geometric calculations have revolutionized the field, making formerly inaccessible problems tractable, and providing fertile ground for experimentation and conjecture. The first half of this book furnishes an introduction and represents a snapshot of the state of the art regarding systems of polynomial equations. Afficionados of the wellknown text books by Cox, Little, and O’Shea will find familiar themes in the first five chapters: polynomials in one variable, Gröbner
Engineering and economic applications of complementarity problems
 SIAM Review
, 1997
"... Abstract. This paper gives an extensive documentation of applications of finitedimensional nonlinear complementarity problems in engineering and equilibrium modeling. For most applications, we describe the problem briefly, state the defining equations of the model, and give functional expressions f ..."
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Cited by 132 (24 self)
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Abstract. This paper gives an extensive documentation of applications of finitedimensional nonlinear complementarity problems in engineering and equilibrium modeling. For most applications, we describe the problem briefly, state the defining equations of the model, and give functional expressions for the complementarity formulations. The goal of this documentation is threefold: (i) to summarize the essential applications of the nonlinear complementarity problem known to date, (ii) to provide a basis for the continued research on the nonlinear complementarity problem, and (iii) to supply a broad collection of realistic complementarity problems for use in algorithmic experimentation and other studies.
Representations and Solutions for GameTheoretic Problems
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... A system with multiple interacting agents (whether artificial or human) is often best analyzed using gametheoretic tools. Unfortunately, while the formal foundations are wellestablished, standard computational techniques for gametheoretic reasoning are inadequate for dealing with realistic games. ..."
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Cited by 120 (0 self)
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A system with multiple interacting agents (whether artificial or human) is often best analyzed using gametheoretic tools. Unfortunately, while the formal foundations are wellestablished, standard computational techniques for gametheoretic reasoning are inadequate for dealing with realistic games. This paper describes the Gala system, an implemented system that allows the specification and efficient solution of large imperfect information games. The system contains the first implementation of a recent algorithm, due to Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel. Experimental results from the system demonstrate that the algorithm is exponentially faster than the standard algorithm in practice, not just in theory. It therefore allows the solution of games that are orders of magnitude larger than were previously possible. The system also provides a new declarative language for compactly and naturally representing games by their rules. As a whole, the Gala system provides the capability for automa...
COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA in Finite Games
, 1996
"... We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nitenperson games. Classical path following methods, such as the LemkeHowson algorithm for two person games, and Scarftype fixed point algorithms for nperson games provide globally convergent metho ..."
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Cited by 118 (1 self)
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We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nitenperson games. Classical path following methods, such as the LemkeHowson algorithm for two person games, and Scarftype fixed point algorithms for nperson games provide globally convergent methods for finding a sample equilibrium. For large problems, methods which are not globally convergent, such as sequential linear complementarity methods may be preferred on the grounds of speed. None of these methods are capable of characterizing the entire set of Nash equilibria. More computationally intensive methods, which derive from the theory of semialgebraic sets are required for finding all equilibria. These methods can also be applied to compute various equilibrium refinements.
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
, 2002
"... In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribu ..."
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Cited by 101 (22 self)
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In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the routing of its own assigned trac. In a Nash equilibrium, each user sel shly routes its trac on those links that minimize its expected latency cost, given the network congestion caused by the other users. The social cost of a Nash equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over all links, latency through a link.
Playing Large Games using Simple Strategies
, 2003
"... We prove the existence of #Nash equilibrium strategies with support logarithmic in the number of pure strategies. We also show that the payo#s to all players in any (exact) Nash equilibrium can be #approximated by the payo#s to the players in some such logarithmic support #Nash equilibrium. These ..."
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Cited by 92 (1 self)
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We prove the existence of #Nash equilibrium strategies with support logarithmic in the number of pure strategies. We also show that the payo#s to all players in any (exact) Nash equilibrium can be #approximated by the payo#s to the players in some such logarithmic support #Nash equilibrium. These strategies are also uniform on a multiset of logarithmic size and therefore this leads to a quasipolynomial algorithm for computing an #Nash equilibrium. To our knowledge this is the first subexponential algorithm for finding an #Nash equilibrium. Our results hold for any multipleplayer game as long as the number of players is a constant (i.e., it is independent of the number of pure strategies). A similar argument also proves that for a fixed number of players m, the payo#s to all players in any mtuple of mixed strategies can be #approximated by the payo#s in some mtuple of constant support strategies.