In a multi-agent environment, where self-motivated agents try to pursue their own goals, cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Cooperation must be planned for and achieved through communication and negotiation. We present a logical model of the mental states of the agents based on a representation of their beliefs, desires, intentions, and goals. We present argumentation as an iterative process emerging from exchanges among agents to persuade each other and bring about a change in intentions. We look at argumentation as a mechanism for achieving cooperation and agreements. Using categories identified from human multi-agent negotiation, we demonstrate how the logic can be used to specify argument formulation and evaluation. We also illustrate how the developed logic can be used to describe different types of agents. Furthermore, we present a general Automated Negotiation Agent which we implemented, based on the logical model. Using this system, a user can analyze and explore differe...

We often reach conclusions partially on the basis that we do not have evidence that the conclusion is false. A newspaper story warning that the local water supply has been contaminated would prevent a person from drinking water from the tap in her home. This suggests that the absence of such evidence contributes to her usual belief that her water is safe. On the other hand, if a reasonable person received a letter telling her that she had won a million dollars, she would consciously consider whether there was any evidence that the letter was a hoax or somehow misleading before making plans to spend the money. All to often we arrive at conclusions which we later retract when contrary evidence becomes available. The contrary evidence defeats our earlier reasoning. Much of our reasoning is defeasible in this way. Since around 1980, considerable research in AI has focused on how to model reasoning of this sort. In this paper, I describe one theoretical approach to this problem, discuss implementation of this approach as an extension of Prolog, and describe some application of this work to normative reasoning, learning, planning, and other types of automated reasoning.

Given a knowledge base KB containing first-order and statistical facts, we consider a principled method, called the random-worlds method, for computing a degree of belief that some formula ' holds given KB . If we are reasoning about a world or system consisting of N individuals, then we can consider all possible worlds, or first-order models, with domain f1; : : : ; Ng that satisfy KB , and compute the fraction of them in which ' is true. We define the degree of belief to be the asymptotic value of this fraction as N grows large. We show that when the vocabulary underlying ' and KB uses constants and unary predicates only, we can naturally associate an entropy with each world. As N grows larger, there are many more worlds with higher entropy. Therefore, we can use a maximum-entropy computation to compute the degree of belief. This result is in a similar spirit to previous work in physics and artificial intelligence, but is far more general. Of equal interest to the result itself are...

We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible worlds. We interpret default rules as extreme statistical statements, thus obtaining a knowledge base KB comprised of statistical and first-order statements. We then assign equal probability to all worlds consistent with KB in order to assign a degree of belief to a statement '. The degree of belief can be used to decide whether to defeasibly conclude '. Various natural patterns of reasoning, such as a preference for more specific defaults, indifference to irrelevant information, and the ability to combine independent pieces of evidence, turn out to follow naturally from this technique. Furthermore, our approach is not restricted to default reasoning; it supports a spectrum of reasoning, from quantitative to qualitative. It is also related to other systems for default reasoning. In particular, we show that the work of [ Goldszmidt et al., 1990 ] , which applies maximum entropy ideas t...

How should what one knows about an individual affect default conclusions about that individual? This paper contrasts two views of "knowledge" in default reasoning systems. The first is the traditional view that one knows the logical consequences of one's knowledge base. It is shown how, under this interpretation, having to know an exception is too strong for default reasoning. It is argued that we need to distinguish "background" and "contingent" knowledge in order to be able to handle specificity, and that this is a natural distinction. The second view of knowledge is what is contingently known about the world under consideration. Using this view of knowledge, a notion of conditioning that seems like a minimal property of a default is defined. Finally, a qualitative version of the lottery paradox is given; if we want to be able to say that individuals that are typical in every respect do not exist, we should not expect to conclude the conjunction of our default conclusions. This paper...

Irrelevance reasoning refers to the process in which a system reasons about which parts of its knowledge are relevant (or irrelevant) to a specific query. Aside from its importance in speeding up inferences from large knowledge bases, relevance reasoning is crucial in advanced applications such as modeling complex physical devices and information gathering in distributed heterogeneous systems. This article presents a novel framework for studying the various kinds of irrelevance that arise in inference and efficient algorithms for relevance reasoning. We present a

This paper presents a logical formalism for representing and reasoning with statistical knowledge. One of the key features of the formalism is its ability to deal with qualitative statistical information. It is argued that statistical knowledge, especially that of a qualitative nature, is an important component of our world knowledge and that such knowledge is used in many different reasoning tasks. The work is further motivated by the observation that previous formalisms for representing probabilistic information are inadequate for representing statistical knowledge. The representation mechanism takes the form of a logic that is capable of representing a wide variety of statistical knowledge, and that possesses an intuitive formal semantics based on the simple notions of sets of objects and probabilities defined over those sets. Furthermore, a proof theory is developed and is shown to be sound and complete. The formalism offers a perspicuous and powerful representational tool for stat...

The idea of fully accepting statements when the evidence has rendered them probable enough faces a number of difficulties. We leave the interpretation of probability largely open, but attempt to suggest a contextual approach to full belief. We show that the difficulties of probabilistic acceptance are not as severe as they are sometimes painted, and that though there are oddities associated with probabilistic acceptance they are in some instances less awkward than the difficulties associated with other nonmonotonic formalisms. We show that the structure at which we arrive provides a natural home for statistical inference. 1 Introduction. You and I often jump to conclusions that are not strictly (deductively) entailed by the evidence and background knowledge we have available. In doing so, we are not always acting irrationally. An alternative would be to assign to each proposition the degree of belief less than unity that is appropriate, in the light of the evidence, but...

This paper is essentially identical to one that appears in Computational Intelligence

We propose a theory of utterance processing meant to clarify the respective roles of incrementality and underspecification in semantic interpretation. After reviewing the available psychological evidence, we introduce (i) a theory of the semantic interpretations constructed by the language processor while processing utterances in an incremental fashion, including the cases in which these interpretations are semantically underspecified; and (ii) a formal model of the disambiguation process. We use our theory to account for the psychological findings concerning two areas of semantic interpretation: lexical disambiguation and pronoun resolution, emphasizing similarities and differences between the two processes. We also make a few preliminary hypotheses about scope disambiguation. The novel aspects of our proposal with respect to previous work on semantic underspecification include our emphasis on psychological evidence, our use of a standard logical formalism to characteriz...