Results 1  10
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59
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions
, 2003
"... We show how to prove in honest verifier zeroknowledge the correctness of a shuffle of homomorphic encryptions (or homomorphic commitments.) A shuffle consists in a rearrangement of the input ciphertexts and a reencryption of them so that the permutation is not revealed. Our scheme ..."
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Cited by 63 (7 self)
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We show how to prove in honest verifier zeroknowledge the correctness of a shuffle of homomorphic encryptions (or homomorphic commitments.) A shuffle consists in a rearrangement of the input ciphertexts and a reencryption of them so that the permutation is not revealed. Our scheme
On Deniability in the Common Reference String and Random Oracle Model
 In proceedings of CRYPTO ’03, LNCS series
, 2003
"... Abstract. We revisit the definitions of zeroknowledge in the Common Reference String (CRS) model and the Random Oracle (RO) model. We argue that even though these definitions syntactically mimic the standard zeroknowledge definition, they loose some of its spirit. In particular, we show that there ..."
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Cited by 54 (5 self)
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Abstract. We revisit the definitions of zeroknowledge in the Common Reference String (CRS) model and the Random Oracle (RO) model. We argue that even though these definitions syntactically mimic the standard zeroknowledge definition, they loose some of its spirit. In particular, we show that there exist a specific natural security property that is not captured by these definitions. This is the property of deniability. We formally define the notion of deniable zeroknowledge in these models and investigate the possibility of achieving it. Our results are different for the two models: – Concerning the CRS model, we rule out the possibility of achieving deniable zeroknowledge protocols in “natural ” settings where such protocols cannot already be achieved in plain model. – In the RO model, on the other hand, we construct an efficient 2round deniable zeroknowledge argument of knowledge, that preserves both the zeroknowledge property and the proof of knowledge property under concurrent executions (concurrent zeroknowledge and concurrent proofof knowledge). 1
Boundedconcurrent secure twoparty computation without setup assumptions
 STOC 2003
, 2003
"... ..."
Strict Polynomialtime in Simulation and Extraction
, 2004
"... The notion of efficient computation is usually identified in cryptography and complexity with (strict) probabilistic polynomial time. However, until recently, in order to obtain constantround ..."
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Cited by 46 (9 self)
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The notion of efficient computation is usually identified in cryptography and complexity with (strict) probabilistic polynomial time. However, until recently, in order to obtain constantround
Simulationsound nizk proofs for a practical language and constant size group signatures
, 2006
"... Noninteractive zeroknowledge proofs play an essential role in many cryptographic protocols. We suggest several NIZK proof systems based on prime order groups with a bilinear map. We obtain linear size proofs for relations among group elements without going through an expensive reduction to an NP ..."
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Cited by 45 (9 self)
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Noninteractive zeroknowledge proofs play an essential role in many cryptographic protocols. We suggest several NIZK proof systems based on prime order groups with a bilinear map. We obtain linear size proofs for relations among group elements without going through an expensive reduction to an NPcomplete language such as Circuit Satisfiability. Security of all our constructions is based on the decisional linear assumption. The NIZK proof system is quite general and has many applications such as digital signatures, verifiable encryption and group signatures. We focus on the latter and get the first group signature scheme satisfying the strong security definition of Bellare, Shi and Zhang [7] in the standard model without random oracles where each group signature consists only of a constant number of group elements. We also suggest a simulationsound NIZK proof of knowledge, which is much more efficient than previous constructions in the literature. Caveat: The constants are large, and therefore our schemes are not practical. Nonetheless, we find it very interesting for the first time to have NIZK proofs and group signatures that except for a constant factor are optimal without using the random oracle model to argue security.
Efficient TwoParty Secure Computation on Committed Inputs
 In EUROCRYPT
, 2007
"... Abstract. We present an efficient construction of Yao’s “garbled circuits ” protocol for securely computing any twoparty circuit on committed inputs. The protocol is secure in a universally composable way in the presence of malicious adversaries under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) and ..."
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Cited by 40 (2 self)
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Abstract. We present an efficient construction of Yao’s “garbled circuits ” protocol for securely computing any twoparty circuit on committed inputs. The protocol is secure in a universally composable way in the presence of malicious adversaries under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) and strong RSA assumptions, in the common reference string model. The protocol requires a constant number of rounds (fourfive in the standard model, twothree in the random oracle model, depending on whether both parties receive the output), O(C) modular exponentiations per player, and a bandwidth of O(C) group elements, where C  is the size of the computed circuit. Our technical tools are of independent interest. We propose a homomorphic, semantically secure variant of the CamenischShoup verifiable cryptosystem, which uses shorter keys, is unambiguous (it is infeasible to generate two keys which successfully decrypt the same ciphertext), and allows efficient proofs that a committed plaintext is encrypted under a committed key. Our second tool is a practical fourround (tworound in ROM) protocol for committed oblivious transfer on strings (stringCOT) secure against malicious participants. The stringCOT protocol takes a few exponentiations per player, and is UCsecure under the DCR assumption in the common reference string model. Previous protocols of comparable efficiency achieved either committed OT on bits, or standard (noncommitted) OT on strings. 1
RoundOptimal Secure TwoParty Computation
 In CRYPTO 2004
, 2004
"... We consider the central cryptographic task of secure twoparty computation: two parties wish to compute some function of their private inputs (each receiving possibly di#erent outputs) where security should hold with respect to arbitrarilymalicious behavior of either of the participants. Despit ..."
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Cited by 35 (4 self)
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We consider the central cryptographic task of secure twoparty computation: two parties wish to compute some function of their private inputs (each receiving possibly di#erent outputs) where security should hold with respect to arbitrarilymalicious behavior of either of the participants. Despite extensive research in this area, the exact roundcomplexity of this fundamental problem (i.e., the number of rounds required to compute an arbitrary polytime functionality) was not previously known.
Finding collisions in interactive protocols – A tight lower bound on the round complexity of statisticallyhiding commitments
 In Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
, 2007
"... We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tight lower bound on the round complexity of any fullyblackbox construction of a statisticallyhiding commitment scheme from oneway permutations, and even from trapdoor permutations. This lower bound matches th ..."
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Cited by 33 (11 self)
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We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tight lower bound on the round complexity of any fullyblackbox construction of a statisticallyhiding commitment scheme from oneway permutations, and even from trapdoor permutations. This lower bound matches the round complexity of the statisticallyhiding commitment scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (CRYPTO ’92). As a corollary, we derive similar tight lower bounds for several other cryptographic protocols, such as singleserver private information retrieval, interactive hashing, and oblivious transfer that guarantees statistical security for one of the parties. Our techniques extend the collisionfinding oracle due to Simon (EUROCRYPT ’98) to the setting of interactive protocols (our extension also implies an alternative proof for the main property of the original oracle). In addition, we substantially extend the reconstruction paradigm of Gennaro and Trevisan (FOCS ‘00). In both cases, our extensions are quite delicate and may be found useful in proving additional blackbox separation results.