Results 1 - 10
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30
Secrecy by Typing in Security Protocols
- Journal of the ACM
, 1998
"... We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approach is based on traditional classification techniques, and extends those techniques to handle concurrent processes that use shared-key cryptography. The rules have the form of typing rules for a basic co ..."
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Cited by 221 (11 self)
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We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approach is based on traditional classification techniques, and extends those techniques to handle concurrent processes that use shared-key cryptography. The rules have the form of typing rules for a basic concurrent language with cryptographic primitives, the spi calculus. They guarantee that, if a protocol typechecks, then it does not leak its secret inputs.
A Bisimulation Method for Cryptographic Protocols
, 1998
"... We introduce a definition of bisimulation for cryptographic protocols. The definition includes a simple and precise model of the knowledge of the environment with which a protocol interacts. Bisimulation is the basis of an effective proof technique, which yields proofs of classical security properti ..."
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Cited by 73 (5 self)
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We introduce a definition of bisimulation for cryptographic protocols. The definition includes a simple and precise model of the knowledge of the environment with which a protocol interacts. Bisimulation is the basis of an effective proof technique, which yields proofs of classical security properties of protocols and also justifies certain protocol optimizations. The setting for our work is the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptographic primitives. We prove the soundness of the bisimulation proof technique within the spi calculus.
Security Protocols and their Properties
- Foundations of Secure Computation, NATO Science Series
, 2000
"... Specifications for security protocols range from informal narrations of message flows to formal assertions of protocol properties. This paper discusses those specifications, emphasizing authenticity and secrecy properties. It also suggests some gaps and some opportunities for further work. Some of t ..."
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Cited by 39 (4 self)
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Specifications for security protocols range from informal narrations of message flows to formal assertions of protocol properties. This paper discusses those specifications, emphasizing authenticity and secrecy properties. It also suggests some gaps and some opportunities for further work. Some of them pertain to the traditional core of the field; others appear when we examine the context in which protocols operate.
Opacity generalised to transition systems
- in "Revised Selected Papers of the 3rd International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST’05), Newcastle upon
, 2005
"... Abstract. Recently, opacity has proved to be a promising technique for describing security properties. Much of the work has been couched in terms of Petri nets. Here, we extend the notion of opacity to the model of labelled transition systems and generalise opacity in order to better represent conce ..."
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Cited by 34 (5 self)
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Abstract. Recently, opacity has proved to be a promising technique for describing security properties. Much of the work has been couched in terms of Petri nets. Here, we extend the notion of opacity to the model of labelled transition systems and generalise opacity in order to better represent concepts from the work on information flow. In particular, we establish links between opacity and the information flow concepts of anonymity and non-interference such as non-inference. We also investigate ways of verifying opacity when working with Petri nets. Our work is illustrated by an example modelling requirements upon a simple voting system.
Information Flow Analysis in a Discrete-Time Process Algebra
- Proc. of 13th CSFW, IEEE CS
, 2000
"... Some of the non interference properties studied in [4, 6, 18] for information flow analysis in computer systems, notably BNDC , are reformulated here in a realtime setting. This is done by enhancing the Security Process Algebra of [6, 10] with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a d ..."
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Cited by 30 (5 self)
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Some of the non interference properties studied in [4, 6, 18] for information flow analysis in computer systems, notably BNDC , are reformulated here in a realtime setting. This is done by enhancing the Security Process Algebra of [6, 10] with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a discrete time setting); and then by studying the natural extensions of those properties in this enriched setting. We prove essentially the same results known for the untimed case: ordering relation among properties, compositionality aspects, partial model checking techniques. Finally, we illustrate a case study of a system that presents no information flows when analyzed without considering timing constraints. But, when the specification is refined with time, some interesting information flows are detected.
Static validation of security protocols
- Journal of Computer Security
, 2005
"... We methodically expand protocol narrations into terms of a process algebra in order to specify some of the checks that need to be made in a protocol. We then apply static analysis technology to develop an automatic validation procedure for protocols. Finally, we demonstrate that these techniques suf ..."
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Cited by 24 (10 self)
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We methodically expand protocol narrations into terms of a process algebra in order to specify some of the checks that need to be made in a protocol. We then apply static analysis technology to develop an automatic validation procedure for protocols. Finally, we demonstrate that these techniques suffice to identify several authentication flaws in symmetric and asymmetric key protocols such as Needham-Schroeder symmetric key, Otway-Rees, Yahalom, Andrew Secure RPC, Needham-Schroeder asymmetric key, and Beller-Chang-Yacobi MSR.
Analysis of security protocols as open systems
- Theoretical Computer Science
, 2003
"... We propose a methodology for the formal analysis of security protocols. This originates from the observation that the verification of security protocols can be conveniently treated as the verification of open systems, i.e. systems which may have unspecified components. These might be used to represe ..."
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Cited by 22 (11 self)
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We propose a methodology for the formal analysis of security protocols. This originates from the observation that the verification of security protocols can be conveniently treated as the verification of open systems, i.e. systems which may have unspecified components. These might be used to represent a hostile environment wherein the protocol runs and whose behavior cannot be predicted a priori. We define a language for the description of security protocols, namely Crypto-CCS, and a logical language for expressing their properties. We provide an effective verification method for security protocols which is based on a suitable extension of partial model checking. Indeed, we obtain a decidability result for the secrecy analysis of protocols with a finite number of sessions, bounded message size and new nonce generation.
Weak Bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata
- PROC. OF SEFM’03, IEEE CS
, 2003
"... We are interested in describing timed systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour. To this purpose, we consider a model of Probabilistic Timed Automata and introduce a concept of weak bisimulation for these automata, together with an algorithm to decide it. The weak bisimulation relation is shown t ..."
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Cited by 14 (6 self)
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We are interested in describing timed systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour. To this purpose, we consider a model of Probabilistic Timed Automata and introduce a concept of weak bisimulation for these automata, together with an algorithm to decide it. The weak bisimulation relation is shown to be preserved when either time, or probability are abstracted away. As an application, we use weak bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed Automata to model and analyze a timing attack on the dining cryptographers protocol.
Security Analysis of a Probabilistic Non-repudiation Protocol
- Proc. of PAPM-PROBMIV ’02, LNCS 2399
, 2002
"... Abstract. Non-interference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of non-interference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In partic ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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Abstract. Non-interference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of non-interference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In particular, as a case study, we model and analyze a non-repudiation protocol which employs a probabilistic algorithm to achieve a fairness property. The analysis, conducted by resorting to a definition of probabilistic non-interference in the context of process algebras, confirms that a solely nondeterministic approach to the information flow theory is not enough to study the security guarantees of cryptographic protocols. 1
Evaluating System Integrity
- In Proceedings of the ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop
, 1998
"... Conventional models of system integrity tend to be implementation-oriented in that they define integrity in terms of specific controls such as separation of duties, wellformed transactions, and so forth. In this paper we propose a formal definition of integrity that is based on the notion of dependa ..."
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Cited by 8 (6 self)
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Conventional models of system integrity tend to be implementation-oriented in that they define integrity in terms of specific controls such as separation of duties, wellformed transactions, and so forth. In this paper we propose a formal definition of integrity that is based on the notion of dependability and is implementation independent. Using a series of examples, we argue that separation of duties, assured pipelines, fault-tolerance, and cryptography may be viewed as implementation techniques for achieving integrity. 1 Introduction Conventional integrity models such as [2, 4, 22] limit themselves to the boundary of the computer system and tend to define integrity in an operational and/or implementationoriented sense. For example, the Clark-Wilson model [4] recommends that well-formed transactions, separation of duties and auditing be used to ensure integrity. However, the model does not attempt to address what is meant by integrity---evaluating a system according to the ClarkWil...

