Results 1  10
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93
Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks
 IEEE Transactions on Communication
, 2000
"... A major challenge in operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With increasing demand for wireless data servic ..."
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Cited by 201 (6 self)
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A major challenge in operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With increasing demand for wireless data services, it is necessary to establish power control algorithms for information sources other than voice. We present a power control solution for wireless data in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework. In this context, the quality of service (QoS) a wireless terminal receives is referred to as the utility and distributed power control is a noncooperative power control game where users maximize their utility. The outcome of the game results in a Nash equilibrium that is ine#cient. We introduce pricing of transmit powers in order to obtain Pareto improvement of the noncooperative power control game, i.e. to obtain improvements in user utilities relative to the case with no pricing. Specifically, we consider a pricing function that is a linear function of the transmit power. The simplicity of the pricing function allows a distributed implementation where the price can be broadcast by the base station to all the terminals. We see that pricing is especially helpful in a heavily loaded system.
Discrete Choice with Social Interactions

, 2000
"... This paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioral outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects. We study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an environment ..."
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Cited by 184 (10 self)
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This paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioral outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects. We study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking. Laws of large numbers are generated in such environments. Multiplicity of
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
, 1983
"... this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is one of ..."
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Cited by 80 (6 self)
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this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is one of the primitive features of our analysis. A companion article no. ET962236 00220531#97 #25.00 Copyright # 1997 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital
 Journal of Economic Literature
, 1983
"... The cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system. The purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest, via the cost of capi ..."
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Cited by 35 (8 self)
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The cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system. The purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest, via the cost of capital, taking full account of important issues that arise independently frpm the ques —tion of taxation. Included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest, and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty.
What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?
 FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS, EDITED BY K. ARROW AND S. HONKAPOHJA
, 1985
"... The language of game theory—coalitions, payo¤s, markets, votes— suggests that it is not a branch of abstract mathematics; that it is motivated by and related to the world around us; and that it should be able to ..."
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Cited by 34 (0 self)
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The language of game theory—coalitions, payo¤s, markets, votes— suggests that it is not a branch of abstract mathematics; that it is motivated by and related to the world around us; and that it should be able to
Robust game theory
, 2006
"... We present a distributionfree model of incompleteinformation games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our “robust game” model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian game model, and provides ..."
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Cited by 33 (0 self)
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We present a distributionfree model of incompleteinformation games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our “robust game” model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distributionfree equilibrium concept, which we call “robustoptimization equilibrium, ” to that of the ex post equilibrium. We prove that the robustoptimization equilibria of an incompleteinformation game subsume the ex post equilibria of the game and are, unlike the latter, guaranteed to exist when the game is finite and has bounded payoff uncertainty set. For arbitrary robust finite games with bounded polyhedral payoff uncertainty sets, we show that we can compute a robustoptimization equilibrium by methods analogous to those for identifying a Nash equilibrium of a finite game with complete information. In addition, we present computational results.
Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games
 IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special issue on Game Theory for Signal Processing
, 2009
"... Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where intelligent entities (e.g., terminals) interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance to be able to predict and even ensure s ..."
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Cited by 29 (18 self)
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Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where intelligent entities (e.g., terminals) interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance to be able to predict and even ensure such states at which the network will effectively operate. In this article, we provide nonexhaustive methodologies for characterizing equilibria in wireless games in terms of existence, uniqueness, selection and efficiency.
Game theory in supply chain analysis
, 2003
"... Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines gametheoretic concepts that have potential for future application. We discuss ..."
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Cited by 26 (1 self)
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Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines gametheoretic concepts that have potential for future application. We discuss both noncooperative and cooperative game theory in static and dynamic settings. Careful attention is given to techniques for demonstrating the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in noncooperative games. A newsvendor game is employed throughout to demonstrate the application of various tools.
A New Framework For Power Control In Wireless Data Networks: Games, Utility, And Pricing
, 1999
"... We develop a new framework for distributed power control for wireless data based on the economic principles of utility and pricing. Utility is defined as the measure of satisfaction that a user derives from accessing the wireless data network. Properties of utility functions are introduced and a spe ..."
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Cited by 22 (1 self)
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We develop a new framework for distributed power control for wireless data based on the economic principles of utility and pricing. Utility is defined as the measure of satisfaction that a user derives from accessing the wireless data network. Properties of utility functions are introduced and a specific function, based on throughput per terminal battery lifetime including forward error control, is presented and shown to conform to those properties. Users enter into a noncooperative game to maximize their individual utilities by adjusting their transmitter powers. A unique Nash equilibrium for the above game is shown to exist but is not Pareto efficient. A pricing function is then introduced which leads to Pareto improvements for the noncooperative game.
Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete
 Journal of Mathematical Economics
, 1990
"... If the asset market is incomplete, and if there are two or more consumption goods in each state of nature, then for fixed consumer preferences (of at least two agents), and fixed (nontrivial) technologies for the firm(s), and for a generic assignment of initial endowments, competitive equilibrium i ..."
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Cited by 21 (8 self)
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If the asset market is incomplete, and if there are two or more consumption goods in each state of nature, then for fixed consumer preferences (of at least two agents), and fixed (nontrivial) technologies for the firm(s), and for a generic assignment of initial endowments, competitive equilibrium investment decisions are constrained inefficient. An outside agency can, simply by redirecting the investment decisions of firms and by lump sum transfers to individuals before the state of nature is realized, make all consumers better off. 1.