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227
Discrete Choice with Social Interactions

, 2000
"... This paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioral outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects. We study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an environment ..."
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Cited by 372 (14 self)
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This paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioral outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects. We study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking. Laws of large numbers are generated in such environments. Multiplicity of
Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks
 IEEE Trans. on Commun
, 2002
"... Abstract—A major challenge in the operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With the increasing demand for wir ..."
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Cited by 331 (8 self)
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Abstract—A major challenge in the operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With the increasing demand for wireless data services, it is necessary to establish power control algorithms for information sources other than voice. We present a power control solution for wireless data in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework. In this context, the quality of service (QoS) a wireless terminal receives is referred to as the utility and distributed power control is a noncooperative power control game where users maximize their utility. The outcome of the game results in a Nash equilibrium that is inefficient. We introduce pricing of transmit powers in order to obtain Pareto improvement of the noncooperative power control game, i.e., to obtain improvements in user utilities relative to the case with no pricing. Specifically, we consider a pricing function that is a linear function of the transmit power. The simplicity of the pricing function allows a distributed implementation where the price can be broadcast by the base station to all the terminals. We see that pricing is especially helpful in a heavily loaded system. Index Terms—Game theory, Pareto efficiency, power control, pricing, wireless data. I.
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
, 1983
"... this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is on ..."
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Cited by 140 (8 self)
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this paper is to study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. The approach that we take is in the spirit of cooperative game theory, in the sense that the concept of blocking" by a coalition is one of the primitive features of our analysis. A companion article no. ET962236 00220531#97 #25.00 Copyright # 1997 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital
, 1982
"... The cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system. The purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest, via the cost of capi ..."
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Cited by 76 (10 self)
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The cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system. The purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest, via the cost of capital, taking full account of important issues that arise independently frpm the question of taxation. Included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest, and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty.
Power Control in TwoTier Femtocell Networks
, 2008
"... Two tier cellular networks, comprising of a central macrocell underlaid with short range femtocell hotspots offer an economical way to improve cellular capacity. With shared spectrum and lack of coordination between tiers, crosstier interference limits overall capacity. To quantify nearfar effects ..."
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Cited by 71 (6 self)
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Two tier cellular networks, comprising of a central macrocell underlaid with short range femtocell hotspots offer an economical way to improve cellular capacity. With shared spectrum and lack of coordination between tiers, crosstier interference limits overall capacity. To quantify nearfar effects with universal frequency reuse, this paper derives a fundamental relation providing the largest feasible macrocell SignaltoInterferencePlusNoise Ratio (SINR), given any set of feasible femtocell SINRs. A distributed utilitybased SINR adaptation at femtocells is proposed in order to alleviate crosstier interference at the macrocell from overlaid femtocell infrastructure. The FoschiniMiljanic (FM) algorithm is a special case of the adaptation. Each femtocell maximizes its individual utility consisting of a SINR based reward less an incurred cost (interference to the macrocell). Numerical results show greater than 30 % improvement in mean femtocell SINRs relative to FM. In the event that crosstier interference prevents a macrouser from obtaining its SINR target, an algorithm is proposed that adaptively curtails transmission powers of the strongest femtocell interferers. The algorithm ensures that a macrouser achieves its SINR target even with 100 femtocells/cellsite, and requires a worst case SINR reduction of only 16 % at femtocells. These results motivate design of power control schemes requiring minimal network overhead in twotier networks with shared spectrum.
GAME THEORY IN SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS
"... Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines gametheoretic concepts that have potential for future application. We discus ..."
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Cited by 59 (1 self)
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Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines gametheoretic concepts that have potential for future application. We discuss both noncooperative and cooperative game theory in static and dynamic settings. Careful attention is given to techniques for demonstrating the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in noncooperative games. A newsvendor game is employed throughout to demonstrate the application of various tools.
Spectrum sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks
 in IEEE 27th Conference on Computer Communications
, 2008
"... Abstract — We consider the problem of cooperative spectrum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary users, where the primary user selects a proper set of secondary users to serve as the cooperative relays for its transmission. In return, the primary user leases portion of channel access t ..."
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Cited by 55 (4 self)
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Abstract — We consider the problem of cooperative spectrum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary users, where the primary user selects a proper set of secondary users to serve as the cooperative relays for its transmission. In return, the primary user leases portion of channel access time to the selected secondary users for their own transmission. The primary user decides the portion of channel access time it will leave for the selected secondary users (i.e., the cooperative relays), and the cooperative relays decide their power level used to help primary user’s transmission in order to achieve proportional access time to the channel. We assume that the primary user and secondary users are rational and selfish, i.e., they only aim at maximizing their own utility. As secondary user’s utility is in term of their own transmission rate and the power cost for primary user’s transmission, so they will choose a proper power level to meet the tradeoff between transmission rate and power cost. Primary user will choose a proper portion of channel access time for the cooperative relays to attract them to employ higher power level. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game between primary user and secondary users, and it is proved to converge to a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. By employing an iterative updating algorithm, we can achieve the unique equilibrium point. I.
Robust game theory
, 2006
"... We present a distributionfree model of incompleteinformation games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our “robust game” model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian game model, and provides ..."
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Cited by 54 (0 self)
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We present a distributionfree model of incompleteinformation games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our “robust game” model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distributionfree equilibrium concept, which we call “robustoptimization equilibrium, ” to that of the ex post equilibrium. We prove that the robustoptimization equilibria of an incompleteinformation game subsume the ex post equilibria of the game and are, unlike the latter, guaranteed to exist when the game is finite and has bounded payoff uncertainty set. For arbitrary robust finite games with bounded polyhedral payoff uncertainty sets, we show that we can compute a robustoptimization equilibrium by methods analogous to those for identifying a Nash equilibrium of a finite game with complete information. In addition, we present computational results.
Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete
 Journal of Mathematical Economics
, 1990
"... If the asset market is incomplete, and if there are two or more consumption goods in each state of nature, then for fixed consumer preferences (of at least two agents), and fixed (nontrivial) technologies for the firm(s), and for a generic assignment of initial endowments, competitive equilibrium i ..."
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Cited by 50 (16 self)
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If the asset market is incomplete, and if there are two or more consumption goods in each state of nature, then for fixed consumer preferences (of at least two agents), and fixed (nontrivial) technologies for the firm(s), and for a generic assignment of initial endowments, competitive equilibrium investment decisions are constrained inefficient. An outside agency can, simply by redirecting the investment decisions of firms and by lump sum transfers to individuals before the state of nature is realized, make all consumers better off. 1.
What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?
 FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS, EDITED BY K. ARROW AND S. HONKAPOHJA
, 1985
"... The language of game theory—coalitions, payo¤s, markets, votes— suggests that it is not a branch of abstract mathematics; that it is motivated by and related to the world around us; and that it should be able to ..."
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Cited by 48 (0 self)
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The language of game theory—coalitions, payo¤s, markets, votes— suggests that it is not a branch of abstract mathematics; that it is motivated by and related to the world around us; and that it should be able to