The original formulation of SharedPlans (Grosz and Sidner, 1990a) was developed to provide a model of collaborative planning in which it was not necessary for one agent to have intentions-to toward an act of a different agent. Unlike other contemporaneous approaches (Searle, 1990), this formulation provided for two agents to coordinate their activities without introducing any notion of irreducible joint intentions. However, it only treated activities that directly decomposed into single-agent actions, did not address the need for agents to commit to their joint activity, and did not adequately deal with agents having only partial knowledge of the way in which to perform an action. This paper provides a revised and expanded version of SharedPlans that addresses these shortcomings. It also reformulates Pollack's definition of individual plans (Pollack, 1990) to handle cases in which a single agent has only partial knowledge; this reformulation meshes with the definition of Shar...

Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) has existed as a subfield of AI for less than two decades. DAI is

Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One may prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. Furthermore, finding the optimal coalition structure is NP-complete. But then, can the coalition structure found via a partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum? We show that none of the previous coalition structure generation algorithms can establish any bound because they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show necessary for establishing a bound. We present an algorithm that establishes a tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show that any other algorithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to be searched approaches zero as the number of agents grows. If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm searches further, and establishes a progressively lower tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm lowers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits diminishing returns to computation. It also significantly outperforms its obvious contenders. Finally, we show how to distribute the desired

Introduction Automated negotiation systems with self-interested agents are becoming increasingly important. One reason for this is the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure---Internet, WWW, NII, EDI, KQML, FIPA, Concordia, Voyager, Odyssey, Telescript, Java, etc---over which separately designed agents belonging to different organizations can interact in an open environment in realtime and safely carry out transactions. The second reason is strong application pull for computer support for negotiation at the operative decision making level. For example, we are witnessing the advent of small transaction electronic commerce on the Internet for purchasing goods, information, and communication bandwidth [29]. There is also an industrial trend toward virtual enterprises: dynamic alliances of small, agile enterprises which together can take advantage of economies of scale when available (e.g., respond to mor

This paper analyzes coalitions among self-interested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization prob-lem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decision-theoretically traded o against computation cost. A normative, application- and protocol-independent theory of coalitions among bounded-rational agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are signi cantly a ected by the agents ' algorithms ' performance pro les and the cost of computation. This relationship is rst analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classi cation including rational and bounded-rational agents is in-troduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with real data from ve dispatch centers. This problem is NP-complete and the instances are so large that|with current technology|any agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity. 1

Automated intelligent agents inhabiting a shared environmentmust coordinate their activities. Cooperation { not merely coordination { may improve the performance of the individual agents or the overall behavior of the system they form. Research in Distributed Arti cial Intelligence (DAI) addresses the problem of designing automated intelligent systems which interact e ectively. DAI is not the only eld to take on the challenge of understanding cooperation and coordination. There are a variety of other multi-entity environments in which the entities coordinate their activity and cooperate. Among them are groups of people, animals, particles, and computers. We argue that in order to address the challenge of building coordinated and collaborated intelligent agents, it is bene cial to combine AI techniques with methods and techniques from a range of multi-entity elds, such as game theory, operations research, physics and philosophy. To support this claim, we describe some of our projects, where we have successfully taken an interdisciplinary approach. We demonstrate the bene ts in applying multi-entity methodologies and show the adaptations, modi cations and extensions necessary for solving the DAI problems.

A Dissertation Presented by TUOMAS W. SANDHOLM

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of Carnegie Mellon University. The problem of efficient multirobot coordination has risen to the forefront of robotics research in recent years. Interest in this problem is motivated by the wide range of application domains demanding multirobot solutions. In general, multirobot coordination strategies assume either a centralized approach, where a single robot/agent plans for the group, or a distributed approach, where each robot is responsible for its own planning. Inherent to many centralized approaches are difficulties such as intractable solutions for large groups, sluggish response to changes in the local environment, heavy communication requirements, and brittle systems with single points of failure. The key advantage of centralized approaches is that they can produce globally optimal plans. While most distributed approaches can overcome the obstacles inherent to centralized approaches, they can only produce suboptimal plans. This work explores the development of a market-based architecture that will be inherently distributed, but will also opportunistically form centralized sub-groups to improve efficiency, and thus

Most autonomous agents are situated in a social context and need to interact with other agents (both human and artificial) to complete their problem solving objectives. Such agents are usually capable of performing a wide range of actions and engaging in a variety of social interactions. Faced with this variety of options, an agent must decide what to do. There are many potential decision making functions which could be employed to make the choice. Each such function will have a different effect on the success of the individual agent and of the overall system in which it is situated. Therefore, this paper examines agents' decision making functions to ascertain their likely properties and attributes. A framework for characterising social decision making is presented and a socially responsible decision making principle is proposed which enables both the agent and the overall system to perform well. This principle is illustrated, and empirically evaluated, in a multiagent system for unloading lorries at a warehouse. 1.

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