Abstract: It is widely believed that what distinguishes the social cognition of humans from that of other animals is the belief-desire psychology of four-year-old children and adults (so-called theory of mind). We argue here that this is actually the second ontogenetic step in uniquely human social cognition. The first step is one year old children’s understanding of persons as intentional agents, which enables skills of cultural learning and shared intentionality. This initial step is ‘the real thing ’ in the sense that it enables young children to participate in cultural activities using shared, perspectival symbols with a conventional/normative/reflective dimension—for example, linguistic communication and pretend play—thus inaugurating children’s understanding of things mental. Understanding beliefs and participating in collective intentionality at four years of age—enabling the comprehension of such things as money and marriage—results from several years of engagement with other persons in perspective-shifting and reflective discourse containing propositional attitude constructions. By all appearances, the cognitive skills of human beings are very different from those of other animal species, including our nearest primate relatives. Human

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The capacity for shared attention is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. Recent accounts attribute the emergence of shared attention to multiple cognitive mechanisms. Current behavioral data support an alternative dynamic systems model, but many questions remain. To answer these questions and test alternative theories, robotic models will play a critical role. Robotic models reduce the scope of the modeling task, permit comparison of empirically supported theories, and encourage parsimonious models of complex behaviors. Current efforts to model the emergence of shared attention are described. 1.

We present an embodied model of gaze-following. The model learns how to follow another’s gaze by using cognitively plausible mechanisms. It matches a classic gazefollowing experiment (Corkum & Moore, 1998) and runs on an embodied robotic system.

The relationship between initiation of and response to joint attention and components of receptive and expressive language in 20 children with autism between the ages of 3 and 5 years were examined. Receptive language skills were assessed using the Mullen Scales of Early Learning (MSEL). Expressive language skills were evaluated by examining Mean Length of Utterance and Type Token Ratio. These variables, along with data on responses to joint attention bids and initiation of joint attention were analyzed using Spearman calculations. The ability to respond to the joint attention bids of others was positively correlated with receptive language scores on the MSEL and mean length of utterance in children with autism. There

The capacity for shared attention is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. Recent accounts attribute the emergence of shared attention to multiple cognitive mechanisms. Current behavioral data support an alternative dynamic systems model, but many questions remain. To answer these questions and test alternative theories, robotic models will play a critical role. Robotic models reduce the scope of the modeling task, permit comparison of empirically supported theories, and encourage parsimonious models of complex behaviors. Current efforts to model the emergence of shared attention are described.

The capacity for shared attention is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. We propose that the development of shared attention depends on a proper interaction of motivational biases and contingency learning mechanisms operating in an appropriately structured environment. Atypical contingency learning leads to deficits in shared attention as seen in children with autism. To test this theory, we describe a unique research effort that combines theoretically rigorous modeling techniques using both simulated and robotic learning systems with novel empirical investigations of social learning and development in infants and toddlers with and without developmental disabilities. We believe that studying embodied learning models, whose input data (from a real or virtual caregiver) is modeled after real infant-caregiver interactions, will lead to a better understanding of the development and dysfunction of shared attention.

Recent research suggests that chimpanzees are capable of level 1 perspective taking (Flavell, 1992), but that its expression is limited to situations of increased competition (Brauer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). We present a model utilizing gaze-following that learns in response to the behavior of a competitor. The model not only learns the proper application of the perspective taking strategy but also the critical spatial characteristics that influence the competitive pressure.

The capacity for shared attention is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. We propose that the development of shared attention depends on a proper interaction of motivational biases and contingency learning mechanisms operating in an appropriately structured environment. Atypical contingency learning leads to deficits in shared attention as seen in children with autism. To test this theory, we describe a unique research effort that combines theoretically rigorous modeling techniques using both simulated and robotic learning systems with novel empirical investigations of social learning and development in infants and toddlers with and without developmental disabilities. We believe that studying embodied learning models, whose input data (from a real or virtual caregiver) is modeled after real infant-caregiver interactions, will lead to a better understanding of the development and dysfunction of shared attention. 1.

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