This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. Botswana is typical of the countries that are endowed with abundant natural resources. Although it is commonly accepted that resource-rich economies tend to fail in accelerating growth, Botswana has experienced the most remarkable economic performance in the region. Using the latest cross-country data, this study empirically readdresses the question of whether resource abundance can contribute to growth. It finds that governance determines the extent to which the growth effects of resource wealth can materialize. In developing countries in particular, the quality of regulation, such as the predictability of changes of regulations, and anticorruption policies, such as transparency and accountability in the public sector, are most important for effective natural resource management and growth.

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for their numerous and insightful remarks on earlier drafts of this Report. The authors thank professor Michael J. Artis for his excellent assistance with the English language version of the Report. The Report was submitted for publishing in March 2004. Design: Oliwka s.c. Printed by:

The authors investigate the relationship between the quality of institutions and output volatility. Using instrumental variable regressions, they address whether higher entry barriers and lower property rights protection lead to higher volatility. They find that a 1-standard-deviation increase in entry costs increases the standard deviation of output growth by roughly 40 percent of its average value in the sample. In contrast, property rights protection has no statistically significant effect on volatility. (JEL O11, O17, O43) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2010, 92(3), pp. 205-23. Poor macroeconomic policies in lessdeveloped countries have been blamed for the negative relationship between growth and macroeconomic volatility as measured by the volatility of the growth rate of output per worker. Acemoglu et al. (2003) offer a different explanation: Volatility is related to institutional quality; once institutions are controlled

We show that estimated productivities of labor and capital which rationalize trade flows across countries are related to total factor productivities which rationalize output differences across countries. We present evidence that these productivies from trade flows are related to the institutions and geography across countries. Protection of property rights is the dominant influence on both labor and capital productivity, with geography less important and democracy even less important. We also present preliminary evidence that protection of property rights has similar effects on workers with only primary education and those with more education.

This Draft Report to Congress on regulatory policy was prepared pursuant to the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act. It provides a statement of the costs and benefits of Federal regulations and recommendations for regulatory reforms. The report will be published in its final form later this year, after revisions to this draft are made based on public comment, external peer review, and interagency review. A major feature of this report is the estimates of the total costs and benefits of regulations reviewed by OMB. Major Federal regulations cleared by OMB from October 1, 1993, to September 30, 2003, were examined to determine their quantifiable benefits and costs. The estimated annual benefits range from $62 billion to $168 billion, while the estimated annual costs range from $34 billion to $39 billion. A substantial portion of both benefits and costs is attributable to a handful of EPA clean-air rules that reduce public exposure to fine particulate matter. During the past year, 6 “major ” final rules with quantified and monetized benefits and costs were adopted. These rules added $1.6 to $4.5 billion in annual benefits compared to $1.9 billion in annual costs. There were an additional 8 final “major ” rules that did not have quantified and monetized estimates of both benefits and costs. The Report also reviews the international literature on the effects of regulation on national economic growth and performance. Based on a comparison of 130 countries, the

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Designations such as “developed”,“industrialized ” and “developing ” are intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgement about the state reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The mention of firm names or commercial products does not imply endorsement by UNIDO. Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, but acknowledgement is requested, together with a copy of the publication containing the quotation or reprint. UNIDO ID No.: 438

The relationship between legal tradition and competition policy is a multidimensional and complex one. Qualitative arguments on such a relationship have revolved around the evolution of competition laws in the United States and Europe and the difficulty of convergence between the two. This issue is further complicated by institutional variations in the structures and processes of competition law enforcement. Preliminary quantitative analysis based on very limited variables and data indicate that legal tradition may have very limited effects on competition law.

The relationship between legal tradition and competition policy is a multidimensional and complex one. Qualitative arguments on such a relationship have revolved around the evolution of competition laws in the United States and Europe and the difficulty of convergence between the two. This issue is further complicated by institutional variations in the structures and processes of competition law enforcement. Preliminary quantitative analysis based on very limited variables and data indicate that legal tradition may have very limited effects on competition law. Legal Traditions and Competition Policy