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18
Robust Declassification
- in Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 2001
"... Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 122 (23 self)
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Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems that control information flow often include mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information; however, declassification can easily result in the unexpected release of confidential information.
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
, 2005
"... Computing systems often deliberately release (or declassify) sensitive information. A principal security concern for systems permitting information release is whether this release is safe: is it possible that the attacker compromises the information release mechanism and extracts more secret informa ..."
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Cited by 90 (13 self)
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Computing systems often deliberately release (or declassify) sensitive information. A principal security concern for systems permitting information release is whether this release is safe: is it possible that the attacker compromises the information release mechanism and extracts more secret information than intended? While the security community has recognised the importance of the problem, the state-of-theart in information release is, unfortunately, a number of approaches with somewhat unconnected semantic goals. We provide a road map of the main directions of current research, by classifying the basic goals according to what information is released, who releases information, where in the system information is released, and when information can be released. With a general declassification framework as a long-term goal, we identify some prudent principles of declassification. These principles shed light on existing definitions and may also serve as useful "sanity checks" for emerging models.
Process Algebra and Non-interference
- JOURNAL OF COMPUTER SECURITY
, 1999
"... The information security community has long debated the exact definition of the term `security'. Even if we focus on the more modest notion of confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal paper [4], Goguen and Meseguer took an important step towards a formalisation ..."
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Cited by 78 (1 self)
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The information security community has long debated the exact definition of the term `security'. Even if we focus on the more modest notion of confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal paper [4], Goguen and Meseguer took an important step towards a formalisation of the notion of absence of information flow with the concept of non- interference. This too was found to have problems and limitations, particularly when applied to systems displaying non-determinism which led to a proliferation of refinements of this notion and there is still no consensus as to which of these is `correct'. We show
Secure Program Partitioning
- ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
, 2002
"... This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constr ..."
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Cited by 59 (15 self)
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This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement the original program, yet the system as a whole satisfies the security requirements of participating principals without requiring a universally trusted host machine. The experience in applying this methodology and the performance of the resulting distributed code suggest that this is a promising way to obtain secure distributed computation.
What is intransitive noninterference
- In Proc. of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 1999
"... The term “intransitive noninterference ” refers to the information flow properties required of systems like downgraders, in which it may be legitimate for information to flow indirectly between two users but not directly. We examine the usual definition of this property in terms of a modified purge ..."
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Cited by 54 (0 self)
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The term “intransitive noninterference ” refers to the information flow properties required of systems like downgraders, in which it may be legitimate for information to flow indirectly between two users but not directly. We examine the usual definition of this property in terms of a modified purge function, and show that this is a distinctly weaker property than an alternative we derive from considerations of determinism. 1
A Model for Delimited Information Release
- In Proc. International Symp. on Software Security (ISSS’03), volume 3233 of LNCS
, 2004
"... Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. Howe ..."
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Cited by 51 (12 self)
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Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. However, many intuitively secure programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). Noninterference fails to recognize such programs as secure. In this respect, many security type systems enforcing noninterference are impractical.
Untrusted Hosts and Confidentiality: Secure Program Partitioning
, 2001
"... This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrai ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 50 (6 self)
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This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement the original program, yet the system as a whole satisfies the security requirements of participating principals without requiring a universally trusted host machine. The experience in applying this methodology and the performance of the resulting distributed code suggest that this is a promising way to obtain secure distributed computation. 1.
A Type System for Robust Declassification
, 2003
"... Language-based approaches to information security have led to the development of security type systems that permit the programmer to describe confidentiality policies on data. Security type systems are usually intended to enforce noninterference, a property that requires that high-security informati ..."
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Cited by 26 (5 self)
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Language-based approaches to information security have led to the development of security type systems that permit the programmer to describe confidentiality policies on data. Security type systems are usually intended to enforce noninterference, a property that requires that high-security information not affect low-security computation. However, in practice, noninterference is often too restrictive -- the desired policy does permit some information leakage. To compensate for the strictness...
Language-based information erasure
- IN PROC. IEEE COMPUTER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS WORKSHOP
, 2005
"... ..."
Enforcing robust declassification and qualified robustness
- Journal of Computer Security
, 2006
"... Noninterference requires that there is no information flow from sensitive to public data in a given system. However, many systems release sensitive information as part of their intended function and therefore violate noninterference. To control information flow while permitting information release, ..."
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Cited by 23 (7 self)
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Noninterference requires that there is no information flow from sensitive to public data in a given system. However, many systems release sensitive information as part of their intended function and therefore violate noninterference. To control information flow while permitting information release, some systems have a downgrading or declassification mechanism, but this creates the danger that it may cause unintentional information release. This paper shows that a robustness property can be used to characterize programs in which declassification mechanisms cannot be controlled by attackers to release more information than intended. It describes a simple way to provably enforce this robustness property through a type-based compile-time program analysis. The paper also presents a generalization of robustness that supports upgrading (endorsing) data integrity. 1

