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Consistency preservation and crazy formulas in BMS
 Logics in Artificial Intelligence, 11th European Conference, JELIA 2008. Proceedings
, 2008
"... Abstract. We provide conditions under which seriality is preserved during an update in the BMS framework. We consider not only whether the entire updated model is serial but also whether its generated submodels are serial. We also introduce the notion of crazy formulas which are formulas such that a ..."
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Abstract. We provide conditions under which seriality is preserved during an update in the BMS framework. We consider not only whether the entire updated model is serial but also whether its generated submodels are serial. We also introduce the notion of crazy formulas which are formulas such that after being publicly announced at least one of the agents ’ beliefs become inconsistent. 1
doi:10.1111/j.17552567.2011.01119.x Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is Truetheo_1119 1..22
, 2012
"... Abstract: Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Mooresentences is that not all propositions are known af ..."
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Abstract: Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Mooresentences is that not all propositions are known after their announcement, i.e., not every proposition is successful. Fitch’s and Moore’s results are related, as they equally apply to standard notions of knowledge and belief (S 5 and KD45, respectively). If we interpret ‘successful ’ as ‘known after its announcement ’ and ‘knowable ’ as ‘known after some announcement’, successful implies knowable. Knowable does not imply successful: there is a proposition j that is not known after its announcement but there is another announcement after which j is known. We show that all propositions are knowable in the more general sense that for each proposition, it can become known or its negation can become known. We can get to know whether it is true: �(Kj ⁄ K¬j). This result comes at a price. We cannot get to know whether the proposition was true. This restricts the philosophical relevance of interpreting ‘knowable ’ as ‘known after an announcement’. Keywords: modal logic, knowability, Fitch’s paradox, dynamic epistemics, public announcements 1. Successful – the Historical Record
A tableau method for public announcement logics
 Proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Reasoning with Ana. Tableaux and Related Methods (TABLEAUX
, 2007
"... Abstract. Public announcement logic is an extension of multiagent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose a labelled tableaucalculus for this logic. We also present an extension of the calculus for a ..."
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Abstract. Public announcement logic is an extension of multiagent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose a labelled tableaucalculus for this logic. We also present an extension of the calculus for a logic of arbitrary announcements. 1
A Uniform Logic of Information Dynamics
"... Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitution core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a nonuniform dynamic epistemic ..."
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Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitution core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a nonuniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a wellknown open problem is to axiomatize the substitution core of PAL. In this paper we solve this problem for PAL over the class of all relational models with infinitely many agents, PALKω, as well as standard extensions thereof, e.g., PALTω, PALS4ω, and PALS5ω. We introduce a new Uniform Public Announcement Logic (UPAL), prove completeness of a deductive system with respect to UPAL semantics, and show that this system axiomatizes the substitution core of PAL.