The purpose of this paper is to study the fundamental mechanism humans use in argumentation and its role in different major approaches to commonsense reasoning in AI and logic programming. We present three novel results: We develop a theory for argumentation in which the acceptability of arguments is precisely defined. We show that logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning in AI are different forms of argumentation. We show that argumentation can be viewed as a special form of logic programming with negation as failure. This result introduces a general method for generating metainterpreters for argumentation systems. 1.

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Abstract. The practice of first-order logic is replete with meta-level concepts. Most notably there are meta-variables ranging over formulae, variables, and terms, and properties of syntax such as alpha-equivalence, capture-avoiding substitution and assumptions about freshness of variables with respect to metavariables. We present one-and-a-halfth-order logic, in which these concepts are made explicit. We exhibit both sequent and algebraic specifications of one-and-a-halfth-order logic derivability, show them equivalent, show that the derivations satisfy cut-elimination, and prove correctness of an interpretation of first-order logic within it. We discuss the technicalities in a wider context as a case-study for nominal algebra, as a logic in its own right, as an algebraisation of logic, as an example of how other systems might be treated, and also as a theoretical foundation

MultiLanguage systems (ML systems) are formal systems allowing the use of multiple distinct logical languages. In this paper we introduce a class of ML systems which use a hierarchy of first order languages, each language containing names for the language below, and propose them as an alternative to modal logics. The motivations of our proposal are technical, epistemological and implementational. From a technical point of view, we prove, among other things, that the set of theorems of the most common modal logics can be embedded (under the obvious bijective mapping between a modal and a first order language) into that of the corresponding ML systems. Moreover, we show that ML systems have properties not holding for modal logics and argue that these properties are justified by our intuitions. This claim is motivated by the study of how ML systems can be used in the representation of beliefs (more generally, propositional attitudes) and provability, two areas where modal logics have been extensively used. Finally, from an implementation point of view, we argue that ML systems resemble closely the current practice in the computer representation of propositional attitudes and metatheoretic theorem proving.

We provide a general investigation of Logic in which the notion of a simple consequence relation is taken to be fundamental. Our notion is more general than the usual one since we give up monotonicity and use multisets rather than sets. We use our notion for characterizing several known logics (including Linear Logic and non-monotonic logics) and for a general, semantics-independent classification of standard connectives via equations on consequence relations (these include Girard's "multiplicatives" and "additives"). We next investigate the standard methods for uniformly representing consequence relations: Hilbert type, Natural Deduction and Gentzen type. The advantages and disadvantages of using each system and what should be taken as good representations in each case (especially from the implementation point of view) are explained. We end by briefly outlining (with examples) some methods for developing non-uniform, but still efficient, representations of consequence relations.

We present the syntax and proof theory of a logic of argumentation, LA. We also outline the development of a category theoretic semantics for LA. LA is the core of a proof theoretic model for reasoning under uncertainty. In this logic, propositions are labelled with a representation of the arguments which support their validity. Arguments may then be aggregated to collect more information about the potential validity of the propositions of interest. We make the notion of aggregation primitive to the logic, and then define strength mappings from sets of arguments to one of a number of possible dictionaries. This provides a uniform framework which incorporates a number of numerical and symbolic techniques for assigning subjective confidences to propositions on the basis of their supporting arguments. These aggregation techniques are also described, with examples. Key words: Uncertain reasoning, epistemic probability, argumentation, non-classical logics, non-monotonic reasoning 1. Introd...

Possible world semantics underlies many of the applications of modal logic in computer science and philosophy. The standard theory arises from interpreting the semantic definitions in the ordinary meta-theory of informal classical mathematics. If, however, the same semantic definitions are interpreted in an intuitionistic metatheory then the induced modal logics no longer satisfy certain intuitionistically invalid principles. This thesis investigates the intuitionistic modal logics that arise in this way. Natural deduction systems for various intuitionistic modal logics are presented. From one point of view, these systems are self-justifying in that a possible world interpretation of the modalities can be read off directly from the inference rules. A technical justification is given by the faithfulness of translations into intuitionistic first-order logic. It is also established that, in many cases, the natural deduction systems induce well-known intuitionistic modal logics, previously given by Hilbertstyle axiomatizations. The main benefit of the natural deduction systems over axiomatizations is their

Abstract. Hybrid languages are extended modal languages which can refer to (or even quantify over) states. Such languages are better behaved proof theoretically than ordinary modal languages for they internalize the apparatus of labeled deduction. Moreover, they arise naturally in a variety of applications, including description logic and temporal reasoning. Thus it would be useful to have a map of their complexity-theoretic properties, and this paper provides one. Our work falls into two parts. We first examine the basic hybrid language and its multi-modal and tense logical cousins. We show that the basic hybrid language (and indeed, multi-modal hybrid languages) are no more complex than ordinary uni-modal logic: all have pspace-complete K-satisfiability problems. We then show that adding even one nominal to tense logic raises complexity from pspace to exptime. In the second part we turn to stronger hybrid languages in which it is possible to bind nominals. We prove a general expressivity result showing that even the weak form of binding offered by the ↓ operator easily leads to undecidability.

This paper shows how to internalize the Kripke satisfaction denition using the basic hybrid language, and explores the proof theoretic consequences of doing so. As we shall see, the basic hybrid language enables us to transfer classic Gabbay-style labelled deduction methods from the metalanguage to the object language, and to handle labelling discipline logically. This internalized approach to labelled deduction links neatly with the Gabbay-style rules now widely used in modal Hilbert-systems, enables completeness results for a wide range of rst-order denable frame classes to be obtained automatically, and extends to many richer languages. The paper discusses related work by Jerry Seligman and Miroslava Tzakova and concludes with some reections on the status of labelling in modal logic. 1 Introduction Modern modal logic revolves around the Kripke satisfaction relation: M;w ': This says that the model M satises (or forces, or supports) the modal formula ' at the state w in M....

In 1933 G odel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that G odel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves G odel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and #-calculus.