version of the paper is only a draft. For purposes of quotation please consult the published version. Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency ’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of agency. I conclude by defending the perceptual model against a number of objections to it, and by briefly exploring its implications for the question of how to approach the study of perception. 1 The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are at every moment conscious.

www.swif.it/biblioteca/cxc CxC – Call for Comments, SWIF www.swif.it/cxc Mario De Caro © 2006- How to deal with the free will issue: the roles of conceptual analysis and empirical science One of the main difficulties of the discussion on free will is to understand what contributions are supposed to come, respectively, from philosophy (intended as a practice that essentially involves conceptual analysis) and from empirical investigation. In principle, three options are open when one reflects on what roles these two fields can play in the free will discussion: a) Scientific isolationist view: “The free will problem is empirical in character; so in principle—if it can be solved—it can be solved by empirical science alone (that is, philosophy should not be expected to offer any real contribution to the discussion)”. b) Interactionist view: “In virtue of its amphibious nature, the free will problem has to be treated both by philosophy and empirical science”. c) Philosophical isolationist view: “The free will problem is a conceptual problem that has

We commonly explain emotions by means of desires, and explain desires by means of emotions. For instance, we say things like “He admires Maria so much, he wants to spend most of his time with her” and “Sam wanted to have this book so badly, he is now overjoyed”. On the traditional belief-desire model of the mind, however, it is not clear that there is a clear distinction between desire and emotion given that the so-called category of the pro-attitudes tends to lump together many different phenomena, and among these, desires and emotions. This holds also for many philosophical and psychological accounts of the emotions in which desires and emotions are not clearly distinguished. If so, how are we to make sense of these very ordinary types of explanations in which, on the face of it, one type of mental state is appealed to in explaining another type of mental state? In light of these problems, the present project sets itself the task of explaining why and how emotions and desires should be distinguished, and proposes an account of how the relation between them should be conceived. The hypothesised account posits not only that emotions are distinct from desires, but also that the emotions, conceived as evaluative experiences of one’s environment, explain desires – causally, ontologically and epistemically – and that this fact has important consequences for our general understanding of the mental realm.