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74
Learning in ExtensiveForm Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term
 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 8, 164212 (1995)
, 1995
"... We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which ..."
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Cited by 228 (13 self)
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We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The intermediate term predictions of these models track well the observed behavior in all three games, even though the models considered differ in their very long term predictions. We argue that for predicting observed behavior the intermediate term predictions of dynamic learning models may be even more important than their asymptotic properties.
Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica
 Journal of the Econometric Society
, 1990
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
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Cited by 166 (0 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
 Games and Economic Behavior
, 1996
"... Suppose two players meet each other in a repeated game where: 1. each uses a learning rule with the property that it is a calibrated forecast of the others plays, and 2. each plays a best response to this forecast distribution. ..."
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Cited by 90 (5 self)
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Suppose two players meet each other in a repeated game where: 1. each uses a learning rule with the property that it is a calibrated forecast of the others plays, and 2. each plays a best response to this forecast distribution.
AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in selfplay and learns a best response against stationary opponents
, 2003
"... A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, at a minimum, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in selfplay. The algorithm that has come closest, WoLFIGA, has been proven to have these two properties in 2player 2action repeated games— as ..."
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Cited by 81 (5 self)
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A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, at a minimum, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in selfplay. The algorithm that has come closest, WoLFIGA, has been proven to have these two properties in 2player 2action repeated games— assuming that the opponent’s (mixed) strategy is observable. In this paper we present AWESOME, the first algorithm that is guaranteed to have these two properties in all repeated (finite) games. It requires only that the other players ’ actual actions (not their strategies) can be observed at each step. It also learns to play optimally against opponents that eventually become stationary. The basic idea behind AWESOME (Adapt When Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium) is to try to adapt to the others’ strategies when they appear stationary, but otherwise to retreat to a precomputed equilibrium strategy. The techniques used to prove the properties of AWESOME are fundamentally different from those used for previous algorithms, and may help in analyzing other multiagent learning algorithms also.
Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium
 Amer. Econ. Rev
, 2003
"... It is notoriously dif � cult to formulate sensible adaptive dynamics that guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium. In fact, short of variants of exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic), there are no general results; of course, there are many important, interesting and wellstudied particul ..."
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Cited by 58 (3 self)
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It is notoriously dif � cult to formulate sensible adaptive dynamics that guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium. In fact, short of variants of exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic), there are no general results; of course, there are many important, interesting and wellstudied particular cases. See the books
On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
 Econometrica
"... We establish global convergence results for stochastic fictitious play for four classes of games: games with an interior ESS, zero sum games, potential games, and supermodular games. We do so by appealing to techniques from stochastic approximation theory, which relate the limit behavior of a stocha ..."
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Cited by 55 (11 self)
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We establish global convergence results for stochastic fictitious play for four classes of games: games with an interior ESS, zero sum games, potential games, and supermodular games. We do so by appealing to techniques from stochastic approximation theory, which relate the limit behavior of a stochastic process to the limit behavior of a differential equation defined by the expected motion of the process. The key result in our analysis of supermodular games is that the relevant differential equation defines a strongly monotone dynamical system. Our analyses of the other cases combine Lyapunov function arguments with a discrete choice theory result: that the choice probabilities generated by any additive random utility model can be derived from a deterministic model based on payoff perturbations that depend nonlinearly on the vector of choice probabilities.
Evolutionary games on graphs
, 2007
"... Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to ..."
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Cited by 54 (0 self)
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Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in nonequilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorialtype overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by nonmeanfieldtype social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Rock–Scissors–Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.
Adaptive Heuristics
 Econometrica
, 2005
"... We exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral viewpoints. Taken toge ..."
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Cited by 51 (4 self)
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We exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral viewpoints. Taken together, the results presented here establish a solid connection between the dynamic approach of adaptive heuristics and the static approach of correlated equilibria.
Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
 In SODA
, 2004
"... In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a ..."
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Cited by 49 (6 self)
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In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a scheduling problem, and an economic application is the allocation of transportation tickets.
Conditional Universal Consistency
, 1997
"... Each period, a player must choose an action without knowing the outcome that will be chosen by "Nature," according to an unknown and possibly historydependent stochastic rule. We discuss have a class of procedures that assign observations to categories, and prescribe a simple randomized variation o ..."
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Cited by 34 (0 self)
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Each period, a player must choose an action without knowing the outcome that will be chosen by "Nature," according to an unknown and possibly historydependent stochastic rule. We discuss have a class of procedures that assign observations to categories, and prescribe a simple randomized variation of fictitious play within each category. These procedures are "conditionally consistent," in the sense of yielding almost as high a timeaverage payoff as could be obtained if the player chose knowing the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. Cycles can persist if all players classify histories in the same way; however in an example, where players classify histories differently, the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. We also argue that in the long run the timeaverage of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.