Analogy and similarity are often assumed to be distinct psychological processes. In contrast to this position, the authors suggest that both similarity and analogy involve a process of structural alignment and mapping, that is, that similarity is like analogy. In this article, the authors first describe the structure-mapping process as it has been worked out for analogy. Then, this view is extended to similarity, where it is used to generate new predictions. Finally, the authors explore broader implications of structural alignment for psychological processing.

Similarity-based and rule-based accounts of cognition are often portrayed as opposing accounts. In this paper we suggest that in learning and development, the process of comparison can act as a bridge between similarity-based and rule-based processing. We suggest that comparison involves a process of structural alignment and mapping between two representations. This kind

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The distinction between rule-based and similarity-based processes in cognition is of fundamental importance for cognitive science, and has been the focus of a large body of empirical research. However, intuitive uses of the distinction are subject to theoretical difficulties and their relation to empirical evidence is not clear. We propose a ‘core ’ distinction between ruleand similarity-based processes, in terms of the way representations of stored information are ‘matched ’ with the representation of a novel item. This explication captures the intuitively clear-cut cases of processes of each type, and resolves apparent problems with the rule/ similarity distinction. Moreover, it provides a clear target for assessing the psychological and AI literatures. We show that many lines of psychological evidence are less conclusive than sometimes assumed, but suggest that converging lines of evidence may be persuasive. We then argue that the AI literature suggests that approaches which combine rules and similarity are an important new focus for empirical work. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. Keywords: Similarity-based process; Rule-based process 1.

Categories in the middle level of a taxonomic hierarchy tend to be highly differentiated in that they have both high levels of within-category similarity and low levels of between-category similarity. Research on similarity reveals a distinction between pairs of categories that are seen as dissimilar because they have few commonalities and pairs that are seen as dissimilar because they have many psychologically relevant alignable differences. The authors suggest that the low between-category similarity proposed for neighboring basic-level categories is actually a matter of having many psychologically relevant differences. In contrast, the low between-category similarity of superordinates is a result of their having few commonalities. The authors evaluate this claim in 4 experiments using a variety of natural stimuli and converging measures. The data support the importance of aliguable differences for distinguish-ing between pairs of basic-level categories. People typically categorize objects at a number of levels of generality. For example, an object on top of a coffee table that has a rectangular shape, contains pages of printed text, and describes a mysterious murder can be called a murder

This article describes the path-mapping theory of how humans integrate analogical mapping and general problem solving. The theory posits that humans represent analogs with declarative roles, map analogs by lower-level retrieval of analogous role paths, and coordinate mappings with higher-level organizational knowledge. Implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture, the path-mapping theory enables models of analogical mapping behavior to incorporate and interface with other problem-solving knowledge. Path-mapping models thus can include task-specific skills such as encoding analogs or generating responses, and can make behavioral predictions at the level of real-world metrics such as latency or correctness. We show that the path-mapping theory can successfully account for the major phenomena addressed by previous theories of analogy. We also describe a path-mapping model that can account for subjects’ incremental eye-movement and typing behavior in a story-mapping task. We discuss extensions and implications of this work to other areas of analogy and problem-solving research.

world, that the human conceptual system is designed to create systematic categories, and that people have theories about the world that bind together seemingly unrelated features. The authors have suggested that the need to establish reference in communication also influences category coherence. This proposal was tested in 2 studies involving a referential communica-tion task. In these studies, consistency was promoted between individuals by communication, which synchronized the category structures of different people. Further, people were focused on the commonalities of objects and on the differences related to the commonalities by communication--a pattern that is compatible with what has been observed in existing categories. These results suggest that categorization research must incorporate communication tasks into the canon of methodologies used to study category structure. The human conceptual system is notable both for its rich structure and its profound flexibility. For example, studies of taxonomic categories demonstrate that people have hierarchi-cally organized category structures and that they often name pictures of objects with a term at a middle level of

this article should be addressed to R. Goldstone, Psychology Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 (e-mail: rgoldsto@ indiana.edu). Further information can be found at http://cognitrn.psych. indiana.edu/ Similarity in context ROBERT L. GOLDSTONE DOUGLAS L. MEDIN Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois and JAMIN HALBERSTADT Similarity comparisons are highly sensitive to judgment context. Three experiments explore context effects that occur within a single comparison rather than across several trials. Experiment 1 shows reliable intransitivities in which a target is judged to be more similar to stimulus A than to stimulus B, more similar to B than to stimulus C, and more similar to C than to A. Experiment 2 explores the locus of Tversky's (1977) diagnosticity effect in which the relative similarity of two alternatives to a target is influenced by a third alternative. Experiment 3 demonstrates a new violation of choice independence which is explained by object dimensions' becoming foregrounded or backgrounded, depending upon the set of displayed objects. The observed violations of common assumptions to many models of similarity and choice can be accommodated in terms of a dynamic property-weighting process based on the variability and diagnosticity of dimensions

This article, based on Chapters I and 2 of the first author's dissertation at Columbia University, was supported by the Institute for Marketing Studies at Columbia University and The Marketing Studies Center at UCLA, and by the National Science Foundation CAREER award SBR-95-10924 given to the second author. A special thanks to Ellie Fang. Bruce Lee, and Angel Coleman for coding the protocols, and to Stcye Pew erly. Barbara Sanburg. and Deb Heisley for the use of their classes. The authors are grateful for the comnents from Vijay Mahajan, Russ Winer, and four anonymous JMR reviewers. They also thank Lee Cooper. Mike Hanssens. Morris Holbrook, Gita Jobar, Frank Kardes, Dave Kramz, Don Lehmann, Michel Pham, Bernd Schmitt, Christos Sklavemis, and Takashi Yamauchi for their helpful comments

Five studies examine the role that category and exemplar knowledge play in the mediation of anchoring effects---the assimilation of an absolute estimate to a previously considered standard. Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate that comparing the target object with a plausible anchor (i.e., a standard that constitutes a possible value for the target) leads to a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent exemplar knowledge about the target. This easily accessible knowledge is then used to generate the absolute estimate, which leads to its assimilation to the standard. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrate that comparing the target with an implausible anchor, however, involves the activation of knowledge about the general category of the target, rather than exemplar knowledge about the target itself. In a series of research programs (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), social judgments were found to depend on two types of knowledge. One possibility is that people use a general category to which a target belongs. For example, judgments about a person named James Cheng may be based on the knowledge that