Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand. The author reviews evidence of such a bias in a variety of guises and gives examples of its operation in several practical contexts. Possible explanations are considered, and the question of its utility or disutility is discussed. When men wish to construct or support a theory, how they torture facts into their service! (Mackay, 1852/ 1932, p. 552) Confirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning. (Evans, 1989, p. 41) If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning that deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the candidates for consideration. Many have written about this bias, and it appears to be sufficiently strong and pervasive that one is led to wonder whether the bias, by itself, might account for a significant fraction of the disputes, altercations, and misunderstandings that occur among individuals, groups, and nations. Confirmation bias has been used in the psychological literature to refer to a variety of phenomena. Here I take the term to represent a generic concept that subsumes several more specific ideas that connote the inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question.

This article argues that (a) ego, or self, is an organization of knowledge, (b) ego is characterized by cognitive biases strikingly analogous to totalitarian information-control strategies, and (c) these totalitarian-ego biases junction to preserve organization in cognitive structures. Ego's cognitive biases are egocentricity (self as the focus of knowledge), "beneffectance" (perception of responsibility for desired, but not undesired, outcomes), and cognitive conservatism (resistance to cognitive change). In addition to being pervasively evident in recent studies of normal human cognition, these three biases are found in actively functioning, higher level organizations of knowledge, perhaps best exemplified by theoretical paradigms in science. The thesis that egocentricity, beneffectance, and

The study of scientific discovery—where do new ideas come from?—has long been denigrated by philosophers as irrelevant to analyzing the growth of scientific knowledge. In particular, little is known about how cognitive theories are discovered, and neither the classical accounts of discovery as either probabilistic induction (e.g., Reichenbach, 1938) or lucky guesses (e.g., Popper, 1959), nor the stock anecdotes about sudden “eureka ” moments deepen the insight into discovery. A heuristics approach is taken in this review, where heuristics are understood as strategies of discovery less general than a supposed unique logic of discovery but more general than lucky guesses. This article deals with how scientists’ tools shape theories of mind, in particular with how methods of statistical inference have turned into metaphors of mind. The tools-to-theories heuristic explains the emergence of a broad range of cognitive theories, from the cognitive revolution of the 1960s up to the present, and it can be used to detect both limitations and new lines of development in current cognitive theories that investigate the mind as an “intuitive statistician.” Scientific inquiry can be viewed as “an ocean, continuous everywhere and without a break or division ” (Leibniz, 1690/1951, p. 73). Hans Reichenbach (1938) nonetheless divided this ocean into two great seas, the context of discovery and the context of justification. Philosophers, logicians,

Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the “traditional ” symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.

This article explores how students ’ epistemological ideas about the nature of science interact with their conceptual understanding of a particular domain, as reflected in written explanations for an event of natural selection constructed by groups of high school students through a technology-supported curriculum about evolution. Analyses intended to disentangle conceptual and epistemic aspects of explanation reveal that groups sought plausible causal accounts of observed data, and were sensitive to the need for causal coherence, while articulating explanations consistent with the theory of natural selection. Groups often failed to explicitly cite data to support key claims, however, both because of difficulty in interpreting data and because they did not seem to see explicit evidence as crucial to an explanation. These findings reveal that students have productive epistemic resources to bring to bear during inquiry, but highlight the need for an epistemic discourse around student-generated artifacts to deepen both the conceptual and epistemological understanding students may develop through inquiry. Inquiry-based approaches to science education emphasize processes of inquiry, such as asking questions, generating and interpreting data, and forming conclusions

Over the past several years, a community of researchers has been using and refining a particular framework for research and curriculum development in undergraduate mathematics education. The purpose of this paper is to share the results of this work with the mathematics education community at large by describing the current version of the framework and giving some examples of its application. Our framework utilizes qualitative methods for research and is based on a very specific theoretical perspective that is being developed through attempts to understand the ideas of Piaget concerning reflective abstraction and reconstruct them in the context of college level mathematics. Our approach has three components. It begins with an initial theoretical analysis of what it means to understand a concept and how that understanding can be constructed by the learner. This leads to the design of an instructional treatment that focuses directly on trying to get students to make the constructions cal...

Contemporary business process systems are built to automate routine procedures. Automation demands well-understood domains, repetitive processes, clear organisational roles, an established terminology, and predefined plans. Knowledge work is not like that. Plans for knowledge intensive processes are elaborated and reinterpreted as the work progresses. Interactive process models are created and updated by the project participants to reflect evolving plans. The execution of such models is controlled by users and only partially automated. An interactive process system should - Enable modelling by end users, - Integrate support for ad-hoc and routine work, - Dynamically customise functionality and interfaces, and - Integrate learning and knowledge management in everyday work.

While surprisingly little has been written about context at a meaningful level, context is central to most theoretical approaches to information seeking. In this essay I explore in more detail three senses of context. First, I look at context as equivalent to the situation in which a process is immersed. Second, I discuss contingency approaches that detail active ingredients of the situation that have specific, predictable effects. Third, I examine major frameworks for meaning systems. Then, I discuss how a deeper appreciation of context can enhance our understanding of the process of information seeking by examining two vastly different contexts in which it occurs: organizational and cancer-related, an exemplar of everyday life information seeking. This essay concludes with a discussion of the value that can be added to information seeking research and theory as a result of a deeper appreciation of context, particularly in terms of our current multi-contextual environment and individuals taking an active role in contextualizing.

This chapter considers a set of questions at the interface of the study of intuitive theories, causal knowledge, and problems of inductive inference. By an intuitive theory, we mean a cognitive structure that in some important ways is analogous to a scientific theory. It is becoming broadly recognized that intuitive theories play essential roles in organizing

ABSTRACT: Science education reforms consistently maintain the goal that students develop an understanding of the nature of science, including both the nature of scientific knowledge and methods for making it. This paper articulates a framework for scaffolding epistemic aspects of inquiry that can help students understand inquiry processes in relation to the kinds of knowledge such processes can produce. This framework underlies the design of a technology-supported inquiry curriculum for evolution and natural selection that focuses students on constructing and evaluating scientific explanations for natural phenomena. The design has been refined through cycles of implementation, analysis, and revision that have documented the epistemic practices students engage in during inquiry, indicate ways in which designed tools support students ’ work, and suggest necessary additional social scaffolds. These findings suggest that epistemic tools can play a unique role in supporting students ’ inquiry, and a fruitful means for studying students ’ scientific epistemologies.