The large-scale behavior of routing in the Internet has gone virtually without any formal study, the exceptions being Chinoy's analysis of the dynamics of Internet routing information [Ch93], and recent work, similar in spirit, by Labovitz, Malan and Jahanian [LMJ97]. We report on an analysis of 40,000 end-to-end route measurements conducted using repeated “traceroutes ” between 37 Internet sites. We analyze the routing behavior for pathological conditions, routing stability, and routing symmetry. For pathologies, we characterize the prevalence of routing loops, erroneous routing, infrastructure failures, and temporary outages. We find that the likelihood of encountering a major routing pathology more than doubled between the end of 1994 and the end of 1995, rising from 1.5 % to 3.3%. For routing stability, we define two separate types of stability, “prevalence, ” meaning the overall likelihood that a particular route is encountered, and “persistence, ” the likelihood that a route remains unchanged over a long period of time. We find that Internet paths are heavily dominated by a single prevalent route, but that the time periods over which routes persist show wide variation, ranging from seconds up to days. About 2/3's of the Internet paths had routes persisting for either days or weeks. For routing symmetry, we look at the likelihood that a path through the Internet visits at least one different city in the two directions. At the end of 1995, this was the case half the time, and at least one different autonomous system was visited 30 % of the time.

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Without a doubt, multicast communication---the one-to-manyormany-to-many delivery of data---has become a hot topic. It is of interest in the research community, among standards groups, and to network service providers. For all the attention multicast has received, there are still issues that have not been completely resolved. One result is that protocols are still evolving and some standards are not yet finished. From a deployment perspective, the lackof standards has slowed progress, but efforts to deploymulticast as an experimental service are in fact gaining momentum. The question nowishow long it will be before multicast becomes a true Internet service. The goal of this paper is to describe the past, present, and future of multicast.

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto interdomain routing protocol of the Internet. Although the performance of BGP has been historically acceptable, there are continuing concerns about its ability to meet the needs of the rapidly evolving Internet. A major limitation of BGP is its failure to adequately address security. Recent outages and security analyses clearly indicate that the Internet routing infrastructure is highly vulnerable. Moreover, the design and ubiquity of BGP has frustrated past efforts at securing interdomain routing. This paper considers the vulnerabilities currently existing within interdomain routing and surveys works relating to BGP security. The limitations and advantages of proposed solutions are explored, and the systemic and operational implications of their designs considered. We note that no current solution has yet found an adequate balance between comprehensive security and deployment cost. This work calls not only for the application of ideas described within this paper, but also for further investigation into the problems and solutions of BGP security.

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

This work focusses on the principles of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) in version 4 and presents some extensions. The use of BGP is motivated by examples of BGP application in InterDomain Routing. In the Internet, delays in BGP convergence time occur that can be reduced by applying consistency assertions which help to identify infeasible routes before they are installed.

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