The Hippocratic Oath has guided the conduct of physicians for centuries. Inspired by its tenet of preserving privacy, we argue that future database systems must include responsibility for the privacy of data they manage as a founding tenet. We enunciate the key privacy principles for such Hippocratic database systems. We propose a strawman design for Hippocratic databases, identify the technical challenges and problems in designing such databases, and suggest some approaches that may lead to solutions. Our hope is that this paper will serve to catalyze a fruitful and exciting direction for future database research. 1

The Semantic Web consists of many RDF graphs nameable by URIs. This paper extends the syntax and semantics of RDF to cover such named graphs. This enables RDF statements that describe graphs, which is beneficial in many Semantic Web application areas. Named graphs are given an abstract syntax, a formal semantics, an XML syntax, and a syntax based on N3. SPARQL is a query language applicable to named graphs. A specific application area discussed in detail is that of describing provenance information. This paper provides a formally defined framework suited to being a foundation for the Semantic Web trust layer.

P3P [23, 24] is a set of standards that allow corporations to declare their privacy policies. Hippocratic Databases [6] have been proposed to implement such policies within a corporation's datastore. From an end-user

Ubiquitous computing can be thought of as consisting of two parts, firstly the devices that a user owns and may or may not carry around and secondly the devices that form a "ubiquitous infrastructure", the smart environment. While the first part is usually considered to be under the administration of the user, the second part is not under his control. How can a user verify proper administration of the smart environment? One example where bad administration of the smart environment can not be recognized easily by the user is privacy. We examine the trust model for using smart environments for a hospital scenario and show how attestation techniques similar to the ones used in DRM can be introduced which may force device manufacturers to make their devices secure without relying on manual "hardening" by an administrator.