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36
M-dpop: Faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
- In AAMAS’06 - Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
, 2006
"... In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem ..."
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Cited by 30 (10 self)
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In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem as a distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP), in which each agent can communicate with other agents that share an interest in one or more variables. Whereas existing DCOP algorithms can be easily manipulated by an agent, either by misreporting private information or deviating from the algorithm, we introduce M-DPOP, the first DCOP algorithm that provides a faithful distributed implementation for efficient social choice. This provides a concrete example of how the methods of mechanism design can be unified with those of distributed optimization. Faithfulness ensures that no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from any aspect of the protocol, neither informationrevelation, computation, nor communication, and whatever the private information of other agents. We allow for payments by agents to a central bank, which is the only central authority that we require. To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report
Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations
- In Proc. 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05
, 2005
"... We analyze the computational and communication complexity of combinatorial auctions from a new perspective: the degree of interdependency between the items for sale in the bidders ' preferences. Denoting by Gk the class of valuations displaying up to k-wise dependencies, we consider the hierarch ..."
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Cited by 22 (7 self)
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We analyze the computational and communication complexity of combinatorial auctions from a new perspective: the degree of interdependency between the items for sale in the bidders ' preferences. Denoting by Gk the class of valuations displaying up to k-wise dependencies, we consider the hierarchy G1 G2 # # Gm , where m is the number of items for sale. We show that the minimum non-trivial degree of interdependency (2-wise dependency) is sufficient to render NP-hard the problem of computing the optimal allocation (but we also exhibit a restricted class of such valuations for which computing the optimal allocation is easy). On the other hand, bidders' preferences can be communicated efficiently (i.e., exchanging a polynomial amount of information) as long as the interdependencies between items are limited to sets of cardinality up to k, where k is an arbitrary constant. The amount of communication required to transmit the bidders' preferences becomes super-polynomial (under the assumption that only value queries are allowed) when interdependencies occur between sets of cardinality g(m), ##.
Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-search Auctions
, 2008
"... A mechanism can be simplified by restricting its message space. If the restricted message spaces satisfy a certain “outcome closure property,” then the simplification is “tight”: for every, any Nash equilibrium of the simplified mechanism is also an Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted mechanism. Pr ..."
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Cited by 14 (1 self)
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A mechanism can be simplified by restricting its message space. If the restricted message spaces satisfy a certain “outcome closure property,” then the simplification is “tight”: for every, any Nash equilibrium of the simplified mechanism is also an Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted mechanism. Prominent auction and matching mechanisms are tight simplifications of mechanisms studied in economic theory and often incorporate price-adjustment features that facilitate simplification. The generalized second price auction used for sponsored-search advertising is a tight simplification of a series of second-price auctions that eliminates the lowest revenue equilibrium outcomes and leaves intact only higher revenue equilibria.
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
- In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS
, 2008
"... Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) bud ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents ’ payments will sum to more than 0. Very recently, several mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a significant percentage of the VCG payments back to the agents while maintaining the other properties. This increases the agents ’ utilities. One redistribution mechanism dominates another if it always redistributes at least as much to each agent (and sometimes more). In this paper, we provide a characterization of undominated redistribution mechanisms. We also propose several techniques that take a dominated redistribution mechanism as input, and produce as output another redistribution mechanism that dominates the original. One technique immediately produces an undominated redistribution mechanism that is not necessarily anonymous. Another technique preserves anonymity, and repeated application results in an undominated redistribution mechanism in the limit. We show experimentally that these techniques improve the known redistribution mechanisms.
Welfare Guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
, 2010
"... We analyze the price of anarchy (POA) in a simple and practical non-truthful combinatorial auction when players have subadditive valuations for goods. We study the mechanism that sells every good in parallel with separate second-price auctions. We first prove that under a standard “no overbidding ” ..."
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Cited by 10 (2 self)
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We analyze the price of anarchy (POA) in a simple and practical non-truthful combinatorial auction when players have subadditive valuations for goods. We study the mechanism that sells every good in parallel with separate second-price auctions. We first prove that under a standard “no overbidding ” assumption, for every subadditive valuation profile, every pure Nash equilibrium has welfare at least 50 % of optimal — i.e., the POA is at most 2. For the incomplete information setting, we prove that the POA with respect to Bayes-Nash equilibria is strictly larger than 2 — an unusual separation from the full-information model — and is at most 2 ln m, where m is the number of goods.
Failures of the VCG Mechanism in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges
- IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS (AAMAS
, 2006
"... The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechanism: the problem of revenue guarantees, and that of collusion. The existence of these problems even in one-item settings ..."
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Cited by 9 (4 self)
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The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechanism: the problem of revenue guarantees, and that of collusion. The existence of these problems even in one-item settings is well-known; in this paper, we lay out their full extent in multi-item settings. We study four settings: combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial exchanges. In each setting, we give an example of how additional bidders (colluders) can make the outcome much worse (less revenue or higher cost) under the VCG mechanism (but not under a first price mechanism); derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such an effective collusion to be possible under the VCG mechanism; and (when nontrivial) study the computational complexity of deciding whether these conditions hold.
Sponsored search: an overview of the concept, history, and technology
"... Abstract: The success of sponsored search has radically affected how people interact with the information, websites, and services on the web. Sponsored search provides the necessary revenue streams to web search engines and is critical to the success of many online businesses. However, there has bee ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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Abstract: The success of sponsored search has radically affected how people interact with the information, websites, and services on the web. Sponsored search provides the necessary revenue streams to web search engines and is critical to the success of many online businesses. However, there has been limited academic examination of sponsored search, with the exception of online auctions. In this paper, we conceptualise the sponsored search process as an aspect of information searching. We provide a brief history of sponsored search and an extensive examination of the technology making sponsored search possible. We critique this technology, highlighting possible implications for the future of the sponsored search process.
A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions ∗
, 2009
"... the most recent version of this paper is at www.paulklemperer.org We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference Rules, ” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almostriskless, profitable deviations from “truthful bidding ” are often easy for bidders to ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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the most recent version of this paper is at www.paulklemperer.org We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference Rules, ” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almostriskless, profitable deviations from “truthful bidding ” are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via
- Metrics on Payoff Distributions.” Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00
, 2009
"... Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by coalitions, and computational tractability. In the search for ma ..."
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Cited by 4 (2 self)
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Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by coalitions, and computational tractability. In the search for maximally-strategyproof mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy other desirable properties, we introduce a new metric to quantify the strategyproofness of a mechanism, based on comparing the payoff distribution, given truthful reports, against that of a strategyproof “reference” mechanism that solves a problem relaxation. Focusing on combinatorial exchanges, we demonstrate that the metric is informative about the eventual equilibrium, where simple regretbased metrics are not, and can be used for online selection of an effective mechanism. 1
Ex post implementation
, 2005
"... We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and- in economic environments-sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition ..."
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Cited by 3 (1 self)
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We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and- in economic environments-sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satis…ed in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints. In many economically signi…cant environments, ex post implementation can be achieved in the direct mechanism. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation). The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin monotonicity. Ex post implementation in the direct mechanism is also possible in this case. We describe an example where the Pareto correspondence

