We study the complexity of decision problems that can be solved by a polynomial-time Turing machine that makes a bounded number of queries to an NP oracle. Depending on whether we allow some queries to depend on the results of other queries, we obtain two (probably) different hierarchies. We present several results relating the bounded NP query hierarchies to each other and to the Boolean hierarchy. We also consider the similarly-defined hierarchies of functions that can be computed by a polynomial-time Turing machine that makes a bounded number of queries to an NP oracle. We present relations among these two hierarchies and the Boolean hierarchy. In particular we show for all k that there are functions computable with 2 k parallel queries to an NP set that are not computable in polynomial time with k serial queries to any oracle, unless P = NP. As a corollary k + 1 parallel queries to an NP set allow us to compute more functions than are computable with only k parallel queries to a...

The traditional theory of Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability focuses on monotone Turing machines with one-way write-only output tape. This naturally leads to the universal enumerable Solomono-Levin measure. Here we introduce more general, nonenumerable but cumulatively enumerable measures (CEMs) derived from Turing machines with lexicographically nondecreasing output and random input, and even more general approximable measures and distributions computable in the limit. We obtain a natural hierarchy of generalizations of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity, suggesting that the "true" information content of some (possibly in nite) bitstring x is the size of the shortest nonhalting program that converges to x and nothing but x on a Turing machine that can edit its previous outputs. Among other things we show that there are objects computable in the limit yet more random than Chaitin's "number of wisdom" Omega, that any approximable measure of x is small for any x lacking a short description, that there is no universal approximable distribution, that there is a universal CEM, and that any nonenumerable CEM of x is small for any x lacking a short enumerating program. We briey mention consequences for universes sampled from such priors.

The probability distribution P from which the history of our universe is sampled represents a theory of everything or TOE. We assume P is formally describable. Since most (uncountably many) distributions are not, this imposes a strong inductive bias. We show that P(x) is small for any universe x lacking a short description, and study the spectrum of TOEs spanned by two Ps, one reflecting the most compact constructive descriptions, the other the fastest way of computing everything. The former derives from generalizations of traditional computability, Solomonoff’s algorithmic probability, Kolmogorov complexity, and objects more random than Chaitin’s Omega, the latter from Levin’s universal search and a natural resource-oriented postulate: the cumulative prior probability of all x incomputable within time t by this optimal algorithm should be 1/t. Between both Ps we find a universal cumulatively enumerable measure that dominates traditional enumerable measures; any such CEM must assign low probability to any universe lacking a short enumerating program. We derive P-specific consequences for evolving observers, inductive reasoning, quantum physics, philosophy, and the expected duration of our universe.

Kleene's Second Recursion Theorem provides a means for transforming any program p into a program e(p) which first creates a quiescent self copy and then runs p on that self copy together with any externally given input. e(p), in effect, has complete (low level) self knowledge, and p represents how e(p) uses its self knowledge (and its knowledge of the external world). Infinite regress is not required since e(p) creates its self copy outside of itself. One mechanism to achieve this creation is a self replication trick isomorphic to that employed by single-celled organisms. Another is for e(p) to look in a mirror to see which program it is. In 1974 the author published an infinitary generalization of Kleene's theorem which he called the Operator Recursion Theorem. It provides a means for obtaining an (algorithmically) growing collection of programs which, in effect, share a common (also growing) mirror from which they can obtain complete low level models of themselves and the other prog...

Degree theory, that is the study of the structure of the Turing degrees (or degrees of unsolvability) has been divided by Simpson [24; §5] into two parts—global and local. By the global theory he means the study of general structural properties of 3d— the degrees as a partially ordered set or uppersemilattice. The local theory concerns

We show that polynomial time truth-table reducibility via Boolean circuits to SAT is the same as log space truth-table reducibility via Boolean formulas to SAT and the same as log space Turing reducibility to SAT . In addition, we prove that a constant number of rounds of parallel queries to SAT is equivalent to one round of parallel queries.

Machine learning of limit programs (i.e., programs allowed finitely many mind changes about their legitimate outputs) for computable functions is stud-ied. Learning of iterated limit programs is also studied. To partially motivate these studies, it is shown that, in some cases, interesting global properties of computable functions can be proved from suitable (n + 1)-iterated limit pro-grams for them which can not be proved from any n-iterated limit programs for them. It is shown that learning power is increased when (n + 1)-iterated limit programs rather than n-iterated limit programs are to be learned. Many trade-off results are obtained regarding learning power, number (possibly zero) of limits taken, program size constraints and information, and number of errors tolerated in final programs learned.

Induction is the process by which we reason from the particular to the general; In this paper we use ideas from the theory of abstract machines and recursion theory to study this process. We focus on pure induction in which the conclusions "go beyond the information given " in the premises from which they are derived and on simple induction, which is rather a stark kind of induction that deals with computable predicates on the integers in rather straightforward ways. Our basic question is "What are the relationships between the kinds of abstract machinery we bring to bear on the job of doing induction and our ability to do that job well? " Our conclusions are as follows: (1) If we use only the abstract machinery of the digital computer in a computing center (which we assume to be capable of only evaluating totally computable functionals or functionals in 210 of the Arithmetic Hierarchy) then a single inductive procedure can only develop finitely many sound theories. (2) If we use only the abstract machinery of the mathematician (which we assume to be the machinery required to evaluate a functional in 271 of the Arithmetic Hierarchy) then we can develop inductive

This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess.

. Philosophical logicians proposing theories of rational belief revision have had little to say about whether their proposals assist or impede the agent's ability to reliably arrive at the truth as his beliefs change through time. On the other hand, reliability is the central concern of formal learning theory. In this paper we investigate the belief revision theory of Alchourr'on, Gardenfors and Makinson from a learning theoretic point of view. 1. CONSERVATISM AND RELIABILITY There are two fundamentally different perspectives on the study of belief revision. A conservative methodologist seeks to minimize the damage done to his current beliefs by new information. A reliabilist, on the other hand, seeks to find the truth whatever the truth might be. Both aims support hypothetical imperatives about how inquiry ought to proceed, imperatives that might be considered principles of inductive rationality. It would seem that there is some tension between the two perspectives. The conservative...