this article. We are grateful to Ana Arazola, Lorilei Cardenas, Wendy Hiller, Jennifer Mueller, and Danna Upton for their assistance in conducting the research and to Matthias Mehl and Sherlock Campbell for comments on an earlier draft. Parts of this project were funded by a grant from the National Institutes of Health (MH52391). Correspondence should be addressed to James W. Pennebaker, Department of Psychology, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712; e-mail: pennebaker@ psy.utexas.edu

this article should be addressed to Evan Heir, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208. Electronic mail may be sent to heit@nwu.edu

Many people were instrumental to the development, execution, and writing of this thesis. Most important among these is my advisor, Richard Shiffrin. His insight and guidance are sprinkled liberally throughout this work. Nearly all the experiments were designed and performed through the hard work and dedication of two students: Keith Lyle and Kirsten Ruys. Their names, as well as Richard Shiffrin’s, appear in a version of this work submitted for publication. Besides those directly involved in the priming studies, there was a supporting cast of characters. Most important amongst these were Karen Loffland and Coralee Sons who made all the red tape melt away. Without the expertise of Bill Wang the technical difficulties would have been insurmountable. The advice and comments of members of the Shiffrin lab, which included Mark Steyvers, David Diller, Denis Cousineau, Amy Criss, Lael Schooler, Rachel Shoup and Peter Nobel, were invaluable. William K. Estes and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers deserve recognition for helpful comments on early drafts of this thesis. I am grateful to my parents, Ernest and Ellen, for bringing me into this world and instilling in me a sense of scientific curiousity. Most important of all, I would like to thank my wife, Christina Anderson, who believed in me

Abstract not found

ositive side, though, the second person might have some advantage over the first person in learning how to shift gears, because the second person would not have to overcome negative transfer from experience with automatic transmissions. As another example, imagine that you are an explorer visiting a remote island, with the purpose of writing a book about the people that you see there. You bring to this island many forms of prior knowledge that will guide you in learning about these new people. For example, based on your experiences in other places, you would expect to see males and females, younger and older people, shy people and arrogant people. You would also have certain hypotheses at a more abstract level, for example, that the clothes that someone wears may be related to the person's age and gender. (Goodman, 1955, referred to such abstract hypotheses as overhypotheses.) In a way, these biases due to previous knowledge might seem to be undesirable. After all, wouldn't be it be be

This article investigates how and why people remember the existence of hidden information. To obtain data on this kind of memory phenomenon, we observed an experienced programmer doing her own work at her own computer. The programmer's interaction with the computer generates much more information than fits on the screen at once. Most of this information is hidden, scrolled out of the way by the programming environment to make Direct all correspondence to: Erik M. Altmann, George Mason University, Human Factors & Applied Cognition, Mailstop 2E5, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA; E-Mail: altmann@gmu.edu

Abstract not found

Although it is natural to suppose that visual mental imagery is important in human deductive reasoning, the evidence is equivocal. This article argues that reasoning studies have not distinguished between ease of visualization and ease of constructing spatial models. Rating studies show that these factors can be separated. Their results yielded four sorts of relations: 1. visuo-spatial relations that are easy to envisage visually and spatially; 2. visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but hard to envisage spatially; 3. spatial relations that are hard to envisage visually but easy to envisage spatially; and 4. control relations that are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. Three experiments showed that visual relations slow down the process of reasoning in comparison with control relations, whereas visuo-spatial and spatial relations yield inferences comparable to those of control relations. We conclude that irrelevant visual detail can be a nuisance in r...

studies, which offer higher spatial resolution, will shed new light on when and why encoding yields subsequent remembering. Keywords: subsequent memory effect; episodic encoding; episodic memory; event-related potentials; fMRI; PET 1. INTRODUCTION In the course of a typical day, humans experience many complex events: perceiving faces and other objects, reading words and text passages, interpreting the meaning of spoken phrases, and the like. Yet, at the end of the day, only a subset of these experiences are memorable, with many of the day's events having been forgotten. To understand human memory, it is critically important to determine why some experiences can be later remembered, whereas others are subsequently forgotten. Considerable behavioural and neuropsychological evidence indicates that the ability to remember a given experience is affected by many factors, including the kinds of processing operations that are engaged at the time of encoding and retrieval, and interactions

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e.g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and