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We propose that humans are adapted to transfer knowledge to, and receive knowledge from, conspecifics by teaching. This adaptation, which we call 'pedagogy', involves the emergence of a special communication system that does not presuppose either language or high-level theory of mind, but could itself provide a basis facilitating the development of these human-specific abilities both in phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms. We speculate that tool manufacturing and mediated tool use made the evolution of such a new social learning mechanism necessary. However, the main body of evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from developmental psychology. We argue that many central phenomena of human infant social cognition that may seem puzzling in the light of their standard functional explanation can be more coherently and plausibly interpreted as reflecting the adaptations to receive knowledge from social partners through teaching.

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This report is the result of a panel discussion at the Third Workshop of the UK's Special Interest Group on Multi-Agent Systems

Abstract: It is widely believed that what distinguishes the social cognition of humans from that of other animals is the belief-desire psychology of four-year-old children and adults (so-called theory of mind). We argue here that this is actually the second ontogenetic step in uniquely human social cognition. The first step is one year old children’s understanding of persons as intentional agents, which enables skills of cultural learning and shared intentionality. This initial step is ‘the real thing ’ in the sense that it enables young children to participate in cultural activities using shared, perspectival symbols with a conventional/normative/reflective dimension—for example, linguistic communication and pretend play—thus inaugurating children’s understanding of things mental. Understanding beliefs and participating in collective intentionality at four years of age—enabling the comprehension of such things as money and marriage—results from several years of engagement with other persons in perspective-shifting and reflective discourse containing propositional attitude constructions. By all appearances, the cognitive skills of human beings are very different from those of other animal species, including our nearest primate relatives. Human

Abstract. In a persistent multi-agent system, it should be possible for new agents to benefit from the accumulated learning of more experienced agents. Parallel reasoning can be applied to the case of newborn animals, and thus the biological literature on social learning may aid in the construction of effective multi-agent systems. Biologists have looked at both the functions of social learning and the mechanisms that enable it. Many researchers have focused on the cognitively complex mechanism of imitation; we will also consider a range of simpler mechanisms that could more easily be implemented in robotic or software agents. Research in artificial life shows that complex global phenomena can arise from simple local rules. Similarly, complex information sharing at the system level may result from quite simple individual learning rules. We demonstrate in simulation that simple mechanisms can outperform imitation in a multi-agent system, and that the effectiveness of any social learning strategy will depend on the agents ’ environment. Our simple mechanisms have obvious advantages in terms of robustness and design costs. Keywords: Multi-agent systems, social learning, imitation, artificial life, biology. 1

Social learning can be adaptive, but little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Many researchers have focused on imitation but this may have led to simpler mechanisms being underestimated. We demonstrate in simulation that imitative learning is not always the best strategy for a group-living animal, and that the eectiveness of any such strategy will depend on details of the environment and the animal's lifestyle. We show that observations of behavioural convergence or \traditions" might suggest eective social learning, but are meaningless considered alone.

Imitation requires the imitator to solve the correspondence problem- to translate visual information from modelled action into matching motor output. It has been widely accepted for some 30 years that the correspondence problem is solved by a specialised, innate cognitive mechanism. This is the conclusion of a poverty of the stimulus argument, realised in the active intermodal matching model of imitation, which assumes that human neonates can imitate a range of body movements. An alternative, wealth of the stimulus argument, embodied in the associative sequence learning model of imitation, proposes that the correspondence problem is solved by sensorimotor learning, and that the experience necessary for this kind of learning is provided by the sociocultural environment during human development. In a detailed and wide-ranging review of research on imitation and imitation-relevant behavior in infancy and beyond, we find substantially more evidence in favour of the wealth argument than of the poverty argument.

Apparently imitative behaviours may have simpler explanations: we investigate a simple mechanism for social learning in an evolutionary simulation of food-preference copying in Norway rats. These animals learn preferences by interacting with conspecifics, but, unexpectedly, they fail to learn aversions after interacting with a poisoned demonstrator. Simulation results

Social learning is distinguished from innate behaviour and individual learning as a behavioural strategy. We investigate simple mechanisms for social learning in an evolutionary simulation of food-preference copying in Norway rats. These animals learn preferences by interacting with conspeci cs, but, unexpectedly, they fail to learn aversions after interacting with a poisoned demonstrator.