A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices are critical to the verbal system. In addition to making predictions for normal human adults, the theory makes specific predictions for children, elderly people, and patients suffering from Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, major depression, amnesia, or lesions of the prefrontal cortex. Two separate formal descriptions of the theory are also provided. One describes trial-by-trial learning, and the other describes global dynamics. The theory is tested on published neuropsychological data and on category learning data with normal adults.

The prefrontal cortex has long been thought to subserve both working memory (the holding of information online for processing) and executive functions (deciding how to manipulate working memory and perform processing). Although many computational models of working memory have been developed, the mechanistic basis of executive function remains elusive, often amounting to a homunculus. This article presents an attempt to deconstruct this homunculus through powerful learning mechanisms that allow a computational model of the prefrontal cortex to control both itself and other brain areas in a strategic, task-appropriate manner. These learning mechanisms are based on subcortical structures in the midbrain, basal ganglia, and amygdala, which together form an actor-critic architecture. The critic system learns which prefrontal representations are task relevant and trains the actor, which in turn provides a dynamic gating mechanism for controlling working memory updating. Computationally, the learning mechanism is designed to simultaneously solve the temporal and structural credit assignment problems. The model’s performance compares favorably with standard backpropagation-based temporal learning mechanisms on the challenging 1-2-AX working memory task and other benchmark working memory tasks.

The frontal cortex and basal ganglia interact via a relatively well-understood and elaborate system of interconnections. In the context of motor function, these interconnections can be understood as disinhibiting or "releasing the brakes" on frontal motor action plans --- the basal ganglia detect appropriate contexts for performing motor actions, and enable the frontal cortex to execute such actions at the appropriate time. We build on this idea in the domain of working memory through the use of computational neural network models of this circuit. In our model, the frontal cortex exhibits robust active maintenance, while the basal ganglia contribute a selective, dynamic gating function that enables frontal memory representations to be rapidly updated in a task-relevant manner. We apply the model to a novel version of the continuous performance task (CPT) that requires subroutine-like selective working memory updating, and compare and contrast our model with other existing models and th...

A selection problem arises whenever two or more competing systems seek simultaneous access to a restricted resource. Consideration of several selection architectures suggests there are significant advantages for systems which incorporate a central switching mechanism. We propose that the vertebrate basal ganglia have evolved as a centralised selection device, specialised to resolve conflicts over access to limited motor and cognitive resources. Analysis of basal ganglia functional architecture and its position within a wider anatomical framework suggests it can satisfy many of the requirements expected of an efficient selection mechanism. Key words: behaviour, action, movement, switching, model, architecture, motor control Citation: Redgrave, P., Prescott, T.J. and Gurney, K. (1999). The basal ganglia: a vertebrate solution to the selection problem?, Neuroscience, 89, 1009--1023. INTRODUCTION Despite a prodigious volume of work in recent years there is still no consensus co...

A fundamental question is whether people have available one category learning system, or many. Most multiple systems advocates postulate one explicit and one implicit system. Although there is much agreement about the nature of the explicit system, there is less agreement about the nature of the implicit system. In this article, we review a dual systems theory of category learning called competition between verbal and implicit systems (COVIS) developed by Ashby et al. (1998). The explicit system dominates the learning of verbalizable, rule-based category structures and is mediated by frontal brain areas such as the anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex (PFC), and head of the caudate nucleus. The implicit system, which uses procedural learning, dominates the learning of non-verbalizable, information-integration category structures, and is mediated by the tail of the caudate nucleus and a dopamine-mediated reward signal. We review nine studies that test six a priori predictions from COVIS, each of which is supported by the data.

This review proposes that implicit learning processes are the cognitive substrate of social intuition. This hypothesis is supported by (a) the conceptual correspondence between implicit learning and social intuition (nonverbal communication) and (b) a review of relevant neuropsychological (Huntington's and Parkinson's disease), neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and neuroanatomical data. It is concluded that the caudate and putamen, in the basal ganglia, are central components of both intuition and implicit learning, supporting the proposed relationship. Parallel, but distinct, processes of judgment and action are demonstrated at each of the social, cognitive, and neural levels of analysis. Additionally, explicit attempts to learn a sequence can interfere with implicit learning. The possible relevance of the computations of the basal ganglia to emotional appraisal, automatic evaluation, script processing, and decision making are discussed. These "feelings " have an efficiency of operation which it is impossi-ble for thought to match. Even our most highly intellectualized operations depend upon them as a "fringe " by which to guide our inferential movements. They give us our sense of rightness and wrongness, of what to select and emphasize and follow up, and what

We propose a systems-level computational model of the basal ganglia based closely on known anatomy and physiology. First, we assume that the thalamic targets, which relay ascending information to cortical action and planning areas, are tonically inhibited by the basal ganglia. Second, we assume that the output stage of the basal ganglia, the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi), selects a single action from several competing actions via lateral interactions. Third, we propose that a form of local working memory exists in the form of reciprocal connections between the external globus pallidus (GPe) and the subthalamic nucleus (STN). As a test of the model, the system was trained to learn a sequence of states that required the context of previous actions. The striatum, which was assumed to represent a conjunction of cortical states, directly selected the action in the GP during training. The STN-to-GP connection strengths were modi�ed by an associative learning

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Foraging- and feeding-related behaviors across eumetazoans share similar molecular mechanisms, suggesting the early evolution of an optimal foraging behavior called area-restricted search (ARS), involving mechanisms of dopamine and glutamate in the modulation of behavioral focus. Similar mechanisms in the vertebrate basal ganglia control motor behavior and cognition and reveal an evolutionary progression toward increasing internal connections between prefrontal cortex and striatum in moving from amphibian to primate. The basal ganglia in higher vertebrates show the ability to transfer dopaminergic activity from unconditioned stimuli to conditioned stimuli. The evolutionary role of dopamine in the modulation of goal-directed behavior and cognition is further supported by pathologies of human goal-directed cognition, which have motor and cognitive dysfunction and organize themselves, with respect to dopaminergic activity, along the gradient described by ARS, from perseverative to unfocused. The evidence strongly supports the evolution of goal-directed cognition out of mechanisms initially in control of spatial foraging but, through increasing cortical connections, eventually used to forage for information.

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