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82
ERC -- A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition
- FORTHCOMING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 1999
"... We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two-perio ..."
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Cited by 167 (11 self)
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We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two-period alternating offer, and dictator games; games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the gift exchange game; and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand and Cournot markets, and the guessing game.
Minimal-Intelligence Agents for Bargaining Behaviors in Market-Based Environments
, 1997
"... This report describes simple mechanisms that allow autonomous software agents to engage in bargaining behaviors in market-based environments. Groups of agents with such mechanisms could be used in applications including market-based control, internet commerce, and economic modelling. After an int ..."
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Cited by 91 (9 self)
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This report describes simple mechanisms that allow autonomous software agents to engage in bargaining behaviors in market-based environments. Groups of agents with such mechanisms could be used in applications including market-based control, internet commerce, and economic modelling. After an introductory discussion of the rationale for this work, and a brief overview of key concepts from economics, work in market-based control is reviewed to highlight the need for bargaining agents. Following this, the early experimental economics work of Smith (1962) and the recent results of Gode and Sunder (1993) are described.
Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing
- IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
, 2001
"... Abstract-- This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double a ..."
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Cited by 48 (6 self)
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Abstract-- This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction with discriminatory midpoint pricing. Buyers and sellers use a modified Roth-Erev individual reinforcement learning algorithm to determine their price and quantity offers in each auction round. It is shown that high market efficiency is generally attained, and that market microstructure is strongly predictive for the relative market power of buyers and sellers, independently of the values set for the reinforcement learning parameters. Results are briefly compared against results from an earlier study in which buyers and sellers instead engage in social mimicry learning via genetic algorithms. Index Terms – Wholesale electricity market, restructuring, repeated double auction, market power, efficiency, concentration, capacity, individual reinforcement learning, genetic algorithm social learning, agent-based computational economics. I.
Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
, 2000
"... We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the coll ..."
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Cited by 37 (3 self)
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We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the CournotNash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioral rules, and outcomes.
Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: experiments with uniform-price and dynamic Vickrey auctions
- Econometrica
, 2001
"... We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding riva ..."
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Cited by 33 (5 self)
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We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding rivals’ drop-out prices. Although both auctions have the same normal form representation, bidding is much closer to equilibrium in the ascending price auctions. We explore the behavioral process underlying these differences along with dynamic Vickrey auctions designed to eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from demand reduction in the uniform price auctions. Key words: multi-unit demand auctions, uniform price auction, dynamic Vickrey auction, demand reduction, experiment.
Zero is Not Enough: On The Lower Limit of Agent Intelligence for Continuous Double Auction Markets
, 1997
"... Gode and Sunder's (1993) results from using "zero-intelligence" (zi) traders, that act randomly within a structured market, appear to imply that convergence to the theoretical equilibrium price in continuous double-auction markets is determined more by market structure than by the intelligence of ..."
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Cited by 24 (2 self)
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Gode and Sunder's (1993) results from using "zero-intelligence" (zi) traders, that act randomly within a structured market, appear to imply that convergence to the theoretical equilibrium price in continuous double-auction markets is determined more by market structure than by the intelligence of the traders in that market. However, it is demonstrated here that the average transaction prices of zi traders can vary significantly from the theoretical equilibrium value when the market supply and demand are asymmetric, and that the degree of difference from equilibrium is predictable from a priori probabilistic analysis. In this sense, it is shown here that Gode and Sunder's results are artefacts of their experimental regime. Following this, `zero-intelligence-plus' (zip) traders are introduced: like zi traders, these simple agents make stochastic bids. Unlike zi traders, they employ an elementary form of machine learning. Groups of zip traders interacting in experimental markets...
Collective action as a social exchange
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 1999
"... Social interactions are frequently associated with social approval. Anticipation of social sanctions may have important economic consequences, in particular in the realm of collective action and voluntary cooperation. This paper investigates the impact and the limitations of social rewards on people ..."
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Cited by 23 (5 self)
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Social interactions are frequently associated with social approval. Anticipation of social sanctions may have important economic consequences, in particular in the realm of collective action and voluntary cooperation. This paper investigates the impact and the limitations of social rewards on people’s behavior in the provision of a public good. We examine whether the opportunity to receive social approval in exchange for participation in collective actions is capable of overcome free-riding. We find that approval incentives alone are not sufficiently strong to cause a reduction in free-riding. However, in combination with some minimal social familiarity approval incentives generate a significant rise in cooperation. Our results also suggest that approval incentives give rise to multiple equilibria. ©1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Journal of Economic Theory
, 2002
"... Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others ’ payoff information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive exper ..."
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Cited by 23 (0 self)
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Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others ’ payoff information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes there is a mixture of adaptive learners and sophisticated players. An adaptive learner adjusts his behavior the EWA way. A sophisticated player rationally best-responds to her forecasts of all other behaviors. A sophisticated player can be either myopic or farsighted. A farsighted player develops multiple-period rather than single-period forecasts of others ’ behaviors and chooses to ‘‘teach’ ’ the other players by choosing a strategy scenario that gives her the highest discounted net present value. We estimate the model using data from p-beauty contests and repeated trust games with incomplete information. The generalized model is better than the adaptive EWA model in describing and predicting behavior. Including teaching also allows an empirical
Sophisticated ewa learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Journal of Economic Theory
, 2002
"... Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others ' payo ® information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive exper ..."
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Cited by 21 (6 self)
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Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others ' payo ® information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experienceweighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes there is a mixture of adaptive learners and sophisticated players. An adaptive learner adjusts his behavior the EWA way. A sophisticated player rationally best-responds to her forecasts of all other behaviors. A sophisticated player can be either myopic or farsighted. A farsighted player develops multiple-period rather than single-period forecasts of others ' behaviors and chooses to `teach ' the other players by choosing a strategy scenario that gives her the highest discounted net present value. We estimate the model using data from p-beauty contests and repeated trust games with incomplete information. The generalized model is better than the
Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental Study
, 2000
"... The classical price competition model (named after Bertrand), prescribes that in equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs. Moreover, prices do not depend on the number of competitors. Since this outcome is not in line with real-life observations, it is known as the `Bertrand Paradox.' In exper ..."
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Cited by 19 (3 self)
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The classical price competition model (named after Bertrand), prescribes that in equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs. Moreover, prices do not depend on the number of competitors. Since this outcome is not in line with real-life observations, it is known as the `Bertrand Paradox.' In experimental price competition markets we find that prices do depend on the number of competitors: the Bertrand solution does not predict well when the number of competitors is two, but (after some opportunities for learning) predicts well when the number of competitors is three or four. A bounded rationality explanation of this is suggested. 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

