Rothschild, and three most helpful referees. Very special thanks for many years of helpful insights are due to Richard Day and Luigi Ermini. Hamlet: “What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties!”

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. A rapidly growing number of user and student modeling systems have employed numerical techniques for uncertainty management. The three major paradigms are those of Bayesian networks, the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, and fuzzy logic. In this overview, each of the first three main sections focuses on one of these paradigms. It first introduces the basic concepts by showing how they can be applied to a relatively simple user modeling problem. It then surveys systems that have applied techniques from the paradigm to user or student modeling, characterizing each system within a common framework. The final main section discusses several aspects of the usability of these techniques for user and student modeling, such as their knowledge engineering requirements, their need for computational resources, and the communicability of their results. Key words: numerical uncertainty management, Bayesian networks, Dempster-Shafer theory, fuzzy logic, user modeling, student modeling 1. Introdu...

Strategies for hypothesis testing in scientific investigation and everyday reasoning have interested both psychologists and philosophers. A number of these scholars stress the importance of disconnrmation in reasoning and suggest that people are instead prone to a general deleterious "confirmation bias." In particular, it is suggested that people tend to test those cases that have the best chance of verifying current beliefs rather than those that have the best chance of falsifying them. We show, however; that many phenomena labeled "confirmation bias" are better understood in terms of a general positive test strategy. With this strategy, there is a tendency to test cases that are expected (or known) to have the property of interest rather than those expected (or known) to lack that property. This strategy is not equivalent to confirmation bias in the first sense; we show that the positive test strategy can be a very good heuristic for determining the truth or falsity of a hypothesis under realistic conditions. It can, however, lead to systematic errors or inefficiencies. The appropriateness of human hypothesis-testing strategies and prescriptions about optimal strategies must be understood in terms of the interaction between the strategy and the task at hand.

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

This is the manuscript that was published, with only minor copy-editing alterations, as: Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review. 108, 814-834 Copyright 2001, American Psychological Association To obtain a reprint of the final type-set article, please go through your library’s journal services, or contact the author directly Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. Four reasons are given for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as anthropology and primatology. Author notes

A stochastic optimized-submovement model is proposed for Pitts ' law, the classic logarithmic tradeoff between the duration and spatial precision of rapid aimed movements. According to the model, an aimed movement toward a specified target region involves a primary submovement and an optional secondary corrective submovement. The submovements are assumed to be programmed such that they minimize average total movement time while maintaining a high frequency of target hits. The programming process achieves this minimization by optimally adjusting the average magnitudes and durations of noisy neuromotor force pulses used to generate the submovements. Numerous results from the literature on human motor performance may be explained in these terms. Two new experiments on rapid wrist rotations yield additional support for the stochastic optimizedsubmovement model. Experiment 1 revealed that the mean durations of primary submovements and of secondary submovements, not just average total movement times, conform to a square-root approximation of Pitts ' law derived from the model. Also, the spatial endpoints of primary submovements have standard deviations that increase linearly with average primary-submovement velocity, and the average primary-submovement velocity influences the relative frequencies of secondary submovements, as predicted by the model. During Experiment 2, these results were replicated and

Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand. The author reviews evidence of such a bias in a variety of guises and gives examples of its operation in several practical contexts. Possible explanations are considered, and the question of its utility or disutility is discussed. When men wish to construct or support a theory, how they torture facts into their service! (Mackay, 1852/ 1932, p. 552) Confirmation bias is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning. (Evans, 1989, p. 41) If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning that deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the candidates for consideration. Many have written about this bias, and it appears to be sufficiently strong and pervasive that one is led to wonder whether the bias, by itself, might account for a significant fraction of the disputes, altercations, and misunderstandings that occur among individuals, groups, and nations. Confirmation bias has been used in the psychological literature to refer to a variety of phenomena. Here I take the term to represent a generic concept that subsumes several more specific ideas that connote the inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question.

: Psychological research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypotheses. We model such confirmatory bias in a symmetric model in which exactly one of two hypotheses is true. We show that the confirmatory bias induces overconfidence: Given any probabilistic assessment by an agent that one of the hypotheses is probably true, the appropriate beliefs should deem it less likely to be true. When the agent believes relatively weakly in a hypothesis after receiving extensive information, the hypothesis he believes in may be more likely to be wrong than right. If the confirmatory bias is strong enough, with positive probability the agent may eventually come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis even after receiving an infinite amount of information. Keywords: Confirmatory bias, overconfidence, bounded rationality. JEL Classification: A12, B49, D83 Acknowledgments: We thank Jimmy Chan, Erik Eyste...

This review proposes that implicit learning processes are the cognitive substrate of social intuition. This hypothesis is supported by (a) the conceptual correspondence between implicit learning and social intuition (nonverbal communication) and (b) a review of relevant neuropsychological (Huntington's and Parkinson's disease), neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and neuroanatomical data. It is concluded that the caudate and putamen, in the basal ganglia, are central components of both intuition and implicit learning, supporting the proposed relationship. Parallel, but distinct, processes of judgment and action are demonstrated at each of the social, cognitive, and neural levels of analysis. Additionally, explicit attempts to learn a sequence can interfere with implicit learning. The possible relevance of the computations of the basal ganglia to emotional appraisal, automatic evaluation, script processing, and decision making are discussed. These "feelings " have an efficiency of operation which it is impossi-ble for thought to match. Even our most highly intellectualized operations depend upon them as a "fringe " by which to guide our inferential movements. They give us our sense of rightness and wrongness, of what to select and emphasize and follow up, and what