This paper focuses on feedback for managing the vertical flight path in automated glass cockpits. Current aircraft displays provide feedback for lateral path management and vertical path control. When pilots use a higher level of automation for navigating in the vertical domain, automation surprises may result in serious incidents or accidents. The paper presents a Vertical Situation Display (VSD) that is being developed and evaluated at NASA Ames Research Center. The VSD shall provide valuable feedback for glass-cockpit pilots managing automated vertical navigation devices. Capacity and economic constraints may require aircraft to use high levels of automation to follow predetermined 3D/4D flight paths precisely from takeoff to touchdown in the near future.

In this paper we present a Vertical Situation Display (VSD) for Flight Management System equipped aircraft. It was developed, implemented and evaluated in the Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator at NASA Ames Research Center. The VSD was designed to support flight crews in managing the vertical flight path when using high levels of aircraft automation inside Terminal Areas.

Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the advancement of aeronautics and space science. The NASA Scientific and Technical Information (STI) Program Office plays a key part in helping NASA maintain this important role. The NASA STI Program Office is operated by Langley Research Center, the Lead Center for NASA’s scientific and technical information. The NASA STI Program Office provides access to the NASA STI Database, the largest collection of aeronautical and space science STI in the world. The Program Office is also NASA’s institutional mechanism for disseminating the results of its research and development activities. These results are published by NASA in the NASA STI Report Series, which includes the following report types:

Japan, killing 264 passengers and flightcrew members. Contributing to the accident were conflicting actions taken by the flightcrew and the airplane’s autopilot. The crash provided a stark example of how a breakdown in the flightcrew/automation interface can affect flight safety. Although this particular accident involved an A300-600, other accidents, incidents, and safety indicators demonstrate that this problem is not confined to any one airplane type, airplane manufacturer, operator, or geographical region. This point was tragically demonstrated by the crash of a Boeing 757 operated by American Airlines near Cali, Columbia on December 20, 1995, and a November 12, 1995 incident (very nearly a fatal accident) in which an American Airlines Douglas MD-80 descended below the minimum descent altitude on approach to Bradley International Airport, CT, clipped the tops of trees, and landed short of the runway. As a result of the Nagoya accident, as well as other incidents and accidents that appear to highlight difficulties in flightcrews interacting with flight deck automation, the FAA’s Transport Airplane Directorate, under the approval of the Director, Aircraft Certification Service, launched a study to evaluate the flightcrew/flight deck automation interfaces of current generation transport category airplanes. This report is the culmination of that study. Page iReport of the FAA Human Factors Team This page intentionally left blank