this article may be addressed to either Michael Kahana or Robert Sekuler, Volen National Center for Complex Systems, MS 013, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254-9110. E-mail may be sent to kahana @brandeis.edu or sekuler@brandeis.edu plex multidimensional stimulus spaces (Nosofsky, 1992; Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Ashby & Perrin, 1988), with decision rules that can predict performance in a variety of classification paradigms (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1998; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese, 1999; Maddox & Ashby, 1996). Although models of classification and models of visual discrimination share many assumptions about stimulus representation and subjects' decision rules, models of classification have been primarily developed to explain subjects' classification of combinations of simple geometric forms, whereas models of discrimination have been developed to explain subjects ' discrimination of elemental visual stimuli, including sinusoidal luminance gratings. Because such stimuli can be combined to synthesize more complex images such as textures and natural scenes, they represent a natural test-bed for assessing theories' power and generalizability

In unidimensional absolute identification tasks, participants identify stimuli that vary along a single dimension. Performance is surprisingly poor compared with discrimination of the same stimuli. Existing models assume that identification is achieved using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes. The authors propose an alternative relative judgment model (RJM) in which the elemental perceptual units are representations of the differences between current and previous stimuli. These differences are used, together with the previous feedback, to respond. Without using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes, the RJM accounts for (a) information transmission limits, (b) bowed serial position effects, and (c) sequential effects, where responses are biased toward immediately preceding stimuli but away from more distant stimuli (assimilation and contrast).

Categorization research typically assumes that the cognitive system has access to a (more or less noisy) representation of the absolute magnitudes of the properties of stimuli and that this information is used in reaching a categorization decision. However, research on identification of simple perceptual stimuli suggests that people have very poor representations of absolute magnitude information and that judgments about absolute magnitude are strongly influenced by preceding material. The experiments presented here investigate such sequence effects in categorization tasks. Strong sequence effects were found. Classification of a borderline stimulus was more accurate when preceded by a distant member of

... framework of cognitive psychology in favor of the framework of nonlinear dynamical systems theory. Van Orden et al. presented evidence that“purposive behavior originates in self-organized criticality ” (p. 333). Here, the authors show that Van Orden et al.’s analyses do not test their hypotheses. Further, the authors argue that a confirmation of Van Orden et al.’s hypotheses would not have constituted firm evidence in support of their framework. Finally, the absence of a specific model for how self-organized criticality produces the observed behavior makes it very difficult to derive testable predictions. The authors conclude that the proposed paradigm shift is presently unwarranted.

This paper presents an unusual prediction made by the DUAL-based model of judgment JUDGEMAP and its verification. The model is shortly presented as well as the simulation data obtained with it. These data predict that people will use the information on an irrelevant dimension when judging another dimension. This prediction is then tested in a psychological experiment and confirmed.

Research on sequential effects in magnitude scaling is reviewed, and its implications about the adequacy of current time series regression models is discussed. A regression model that unifies what at first appear to be contradictory results is proposed. Theoretical models of judgment and perception are introduced, and their relation to alternative regression models is clarified. A theoretical model of relative judgment that clarifies the role of judgmental error and frames of reference in magnitude scaling is examined in detail. Four experiments that test the model are presented. The results, along with recent results presented by Ward (1987), provide support for the model. The importance of being explicit about the relation of theoretical models to regression models and about the role of error in these models is discussed. In the 1950s, Stevens (e.g., 1956, 1957) popularized a new class of procedures where subjects "directly " indicated sensation magnitude by responding to presented magnitudes of physical stimuli with numbers (or stimuli). Stevens observed that, when plotted on log-log coordinates, the (geometric) means of responses given to each stimulus intensity showed a

Investigations of decision making have typically assumed stationarity, even though commonly observed “context effects ” are dynamic by definition. Mirror effects are an important class of context effects that can be explained by changes in participants ’ decision criteria. When easy and difficult conditions are blocked alternately and a mirror effect is observed, participants must repeatedly change their decision criteria. The authors investigated the time course of these criterion changes and observed the buildup of mirror effects on a trial-by-trial basis. The data are consistent with slow, systematic changes in decision criteria that lag behind stimulus changes. The length of this lag is considerable: analysis of a simple dynamic signal-detection model suggests participants take an average of around 14 trials to adjust to new decision environments. This trial-level measurement of experimentally induced changes has implications for traditional blockwise analyses of data and for models of decision making.

Accounts of learning and generalization typically focus on factors related to lasting changes in representation (i.e., long-term memory). The authors present evidence that shorter term effects also play a critical role in determining performance and that these recency effects can be subdivided into perceptual and decisional components. Experimental results based on a probabilistic category structure show that the previous stimulus exerts a contrastive effect on the current percept (perceptual recency) and that responses are biased toward or away from the previous feedback, depending on the similarity between successive stimuli (decisional recency). A method for assessing these recency effects is presented that clarifies open questions regarding stimulus generalization and perceptual contrast effects in categorization and in other domains.

in auditory short-term memory

Two lexical decision experiments were conducted to determine whether there is a specific, localized influence of the item-frequency of consecutive trials (i.e., first-order sequential effects) when the trials are not related to each other. Both low-frequency words and nonwords were influenced by the frequency of the precursor word (Experiment 1). In contrast, high-frequency words showed little sensitivity to the frequency of the precursor word (Experiment 2), although they showed longer reaction times for word trials preceded by a nonword trial. The presence of sequential effects in the lexical decision task suggests that participants shift their response criteria on a trial-by-trial basis.