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SHA: A Design for Parallel Architectures?
 Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings Eurocrypt’97, LNCS 1233
, 1997
"... To enhance system performance computer architectures tend to incorporate an increasing number of parallel execution units. This paper shows that the new generation of MD4based customized hash functions (RIPEMD128, RIPEMD160, SHA1) contains much more software parallelism than any of these com ..."
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Cited by 16 (4 self)
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To enhance system performance computer architectures tend to incorporate an increasing number of parallel execution units. This paper shows that the new generation of MD4based customized hash functions (RIPEMD128, RIPEMD160, SHA1) contains much more software parallelism than any of these computer architectures is currently able to provide. It is conjectured that the parallelism found in SHA1 is a design principle. The critical path of SHA1 is twice as short as that of its closest contender RIPEMD160, but realizing it would require a 7way multipleissue architecture. It will also be shown that, due to the organization of RIPEMD160 in two independent lines, it will probably be easier for future architectures to exploit its software parallelism.
A PracticeOriented Treatment of Pseudorandom Number Generators
 ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY–EUROCRYPT 02 PROCEEDINGS
, 2002
"... We study Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) as used in practice. We first give a general security framework for PRNGs, incorporating the attacks that users are typically concerned about. We then analyze the most popular ones, including the ANSI X9.17 PRNG and the FIPS 186 PRNG. Our results also ..."
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Cited by 15 (1 self)
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We study Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) as used in practice. We first give a general security framework for PRNGs, incorporating the attacks that users are typically concerned about. We then analyze the most popular ones, including the ANSI X9.17 PRNG and the FIPS 186 PRNG. Our results also suggest ways in which these PRNGs can be made more efficient and more secure.
On recent results for MD2, MD4 and MD5
 Bulletin No. 4, RSA Laboratories
, 1996
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Security of Cyclic Double Block Length Hash Functions including AbreastDM
"... Abstract. We provide the first proof of security for AbreastDM, one of the oldest and most wellknown constructions for turning a block cipher with nbit block length and 2nbit key length into a 2nbit cryptographic hash function. In particular, we prove that when AbreastDM is instantiated with AE ..."
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Cited by 9 (2 self)
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Abstract. We provide the first proof of security for AbreastDM, one of the oldest and most wellknown constructions for turning a block cipher with nbit block length and 2nbit key length into a 2nbit cryptographic hash function. In particular, we prove that when AbreastDM is instantiated with AES256, i.e. a block cipher with 128bit block length and 256bit key length, any adversary that asks less than 2 124.42 queries cannot find a collision with success probability greater than 1/2. Surprisingly, this about 15 years old construction is one of the few constructions that have the desirable feature of a nearoptimal collision resistance guarantee. We generalize our techniques used in the proof of AbreastDM to a huge class of double block length (DBL) hash functions that we will call cyclic. Using this generalized theorem we are able to derive several DBL constructions that lead to compression functions that even have a higher security guarantee and are more efficient than AbreastDM. Furthermore we give DBL constructions that have the highest security guarantee of all DBL compression functions currently known in literature. We also provide an analysis of preimage resistance for cyclic compression functions. Note that this work has been already presented at Dagstuhl ’09.
RSVP Security Properties
 Work in Progress
, 2005
"... This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document summarizes the security properties of RSVP. The goal of this analysis is ..."
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Cited by 7 (2 self)
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document summarizes the security properties of RSVP. The goal of this analysis is to benefit from previous work done on RSVP and to
On the Security of TandemDM
"... Abstract. We provide the first proof of security for TandemDM, one of the oldest and most wellknown constructions for turning a blockcipher with nbit blocklength and 2nbit keylength into a 2nbit cryptographic hash function. We prove, that when TandemDM is instantiated with AES256, i.e. blockle ..."
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Cited by 6 (2 self)
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Abstract. We provide the first proof of security for TandemDM, one of the oldest and most wellknown constructions for turning a blockcipher with nbit blocklength and 2nbit keylength into a 2nbit cryptographic hash function. We prove, that when TandemDM is instantiated with AES256, i.e. blocklength 128 bits and keylength 256 bits, any adversary that asks less than 2 120.4 queries cannot find a collision with success probability greater than 1/2. We also prove a bound for preimage resistance of TandemDM. Interestingly, as there is only one practical construction known (FSE’06, Hirose) turning such an (n,2n)bit blockcipher into a 2nbit compression function that has provably birthdaytype collision resistance, TandemDM is one out of two structures that possess this desirable feature.
On the Security of Dedicated Hash Functions
 In 19th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux
, 1998
"... Cryptographic hash functions are an important building block for a wide range of applications such as the authentication of information, digital signatures and the protection of passphrases. The most popular hash functions are the custom designed iterative hash functions from the MD4 family. Over t ..."
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Cited by 6 (2 self)
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Cryptographic hash functions are an important building block for a wide range of applications such as the authentication of information, digital signatures and the protection of passphrases. The most popular hash functions are the custom designed iterative hash functions from the MD4 family. Over the years various results on the cryptanalysis of these functions have become available and this paper intends to summarize these results and their impact. We will describe attacks on MD4, MD5 and RIPEMD, and discuss the design and security of the hash functions SHA1 and RIPEMD160 which are included in the new standard ISO/IEC 101183. 1 Introduction Cryptographic hash functions or messagedigest algorithms (see [Pre93] for a comprehensive treatment) are functions that map a string of arbitrary length into a fixed length result. Given h and an input x, computing h(x) must be easy and does not require any secret information. The cryptographic properties that are required depend on the appli...
Collision and Preimage Resistance of the Centera Content Address
, 2005
"... Centera uses cryptographic hash functions as a means of addressing stored objects, thus creating a new class of data storage referred to as CAS (content addressed storage). Such hashing serves the useful function of providing a means of uniquely identifying data and providing a global handle to that ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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Centera uses cryptographic hash functions as a means of addressing stored objects, thus creating a new class of data storage referred to as CAS (content addressed storage). Such hashing serves the useful function of providing a means of uniquely identifying data and providing a global handle to that data, referred to as the Content Address or CA. However, such a model begs the question: how certain can one be that a given CA is indeed unique? In this paper we describe fundamental concepts of cryptographic hash functions, such as collision resistance, preimage resistance, and secondpreimage resistance. We then map these properties to the MD5 and SHA256 hash algorithms, which are used to generate the Centera content address. Finally, we present a proof of the collision resistance of the Centera Content Address.
A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
 International Journal of Information Technology
, 2005
"... The characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) determine that the authentication approaches to protect routing and data packet transmission in MANETs should be lightweight and scalable. In this paper, we propose a lightweight authentication protocol, which utilizes oneway hash chain to prov ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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The characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) determine that the authentication approaches to protect routing and data packet transmission in MANETs should be lightweight and scalable. In this paper, we propose a lightweight authentication protocol, which utilizes oneway hash chain to provide effective and efficient authentication for communications between neighboring nodes in MANETs. Delayed key disclosure scheme is used to prevent from inthemiddle attack on key release. The security properties of the protocol are analyzed in the paper. We also demonstrate simulation results and performance analysis on trust management, message authentication and the delayed key disclosure approach. The analysis shows that the protocol incurs low overhead penalty
Cryptanalysis of 3Pass HAVAL
 Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT’03, volume 2894 of Lectures Notes in Computer Science
, 2003
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