We introduce Jinja, a Java-like programming language with a formal semantics designed to exhibit core features of the Java language architecture. Jinja is a compromise between realism of the language and tractability and clarity of the formal semantics. The following aspects are formalised: a big and a small step operational semantics for Jinja and a proof of their equivalence; a type system and a definite initialisation analysis; a type safety proof of the small step semantics; a virtual machine (JVM), its operational semantics and its type system; a type safety proof for the JVM; a bytecode verifier, i.e. data flow analyser for the JVM; a correctness proof of the bytecode verifier w.r.t. the type system; a compiler and a proof that it preserves semantics and well-typedness. The emphasis of this work is not on particular language features but on providing a unified model of the source language, the virtual machine and the compiler. The whole development has been carried out in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.

Abstract. Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a general approach to mobile code safety in which programs are augmented with a certificate (or proof). The practical uptake of PCC greatly depends on the existence of a variety of enabling technologies which allow both to prove programs correct and to replace a costly verification process by an efficient checking procedure on the consumer side. In this work we propose Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC), a novel approach which uses abstract interpretation as enabling technology. We argue that the large body of applications of abstract interpretation to program verification is amenable to the overall PCC scheme. In particular, we rely on an expressive class of safety policies which can be defined over different abstract domains. We use an abstraction (or abstract model) of the program computed by standard static analyzers as a certificate. The validity of the abstraction on the consumer side is checked in a single-pass by a very efficient and specialized abstract-interpreter. We believe that ACC brings the interpretation techniques to the area of mobile code safety. We have implemented and benchmarked ACC within the Ciao system preprocessor. The experimental results show that the checking phase is indeed faster than the proof generation phase, and that the sizes of certificates are reasonable. 1

The Java Virtual Machine executes bytecode programs that may have been sent from other, possibly untrusted, locations on the network. Since the transmitted code may be written by a malicious party or corrupted during network transmission, the Java Virtual Machine contains a bytecode verifier to check the code for type errors before it is run. As illustrated by reported attacks on Java run-time systems, the verifier is essential for system security. However, no formal specification of the bytecode verifier exists in the Java Virtual Machine Specification published by Sun. In this paper, we develop such a specification in the form of a type system for a subset of the bytecode language. The subset includes classes, interfaces, constructors, methods, exceptions, and bytecode subroutines. We also present a type checking algorithm and prototype bytecode verifier implementation, and we conclude by discussing other applications of this work. For example, we show how to extend our formal system to check other program properties, such as the correct use of object locks.

Abstract. Java is normally compiled to bytecode, which is verified and then executed by the Java Virtual Machine. Bytecode produced via compilation must pass verification. The main cause of complexity for bytecode verification is subroutines, used by compilers to generate more compact code. The techniques to verify subroutines proposed in the literature reject certain programs produced by mundane compilers or are otherwise difficult to realize within an implementation of the Java Virtual Machine. This paper presents a novel technique which is very simple to understand, implement, and prove sound. It is also very powerful: the set of accepted programs has a simple characterization which most likely includes all code generable by current compilers and which enables future compilers to make more extensive use of subroutines. 1 Java Bytecode Java [2, 11] is normally compiled to a platform-independent bytecode language, which is executed by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [18]. This bytecode language features intra-method subroutines, used by Java compilers to generate more compact code [18, Sect. 7.13].

Reasoning about Java bytecode (JBC) is complicated due to its unstructured control-flow, the use of three-address code combined with the use of an operand stack, etc. Therefore, many static analyzers and model checkers for JBC first convert the code into a higher-level representation. In contrast to traditional decompilation, such representation is often not Java source, but rather some intermediate language which is a good input for the subsequent phases of the tool. Interpretive decompilation consists in partially evaluating an interpreter for the compiled language (in this case JBC) written in a high-level language w.r.t. the code to be decompiled. There have been proofs-of-concept that interpretive decompilation is feasible, but there remain important open issues when it comes to decompile a real language such as JBC. This paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first modular scheme to enable interpretive decompilation of a realistic programming language to a high-level representation, namely of JBC to Prolog. We introduce two notions of optimality which together require that decompilation does not generate code more than once for each program point. We demonstrate the impact of our modular approach and optimality issues on a series of realistic benchmarks. Decompilation times and decompiled program sizes are linear with the size of the input bytecode program. This demonstrates empirically the scalability of modular decompilation of JBC by partial evaluation.

This paper presents a static type system for the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) code that enforces an access control mechanism similar to that found in a Java implementation. In addition to verifying type consistency of a given JVM code, the type system statically verifies whether the code accesses only those resources that are granted by the prescribed access policy. The type system is proved to be sound with respect to an operational semantics that enforces access control dynamically, similar to Java stack inspection. This result ensures that “well typed code cannot violate access policy. ” The authors then develop a type inference algorithm and show that it is sound with respect to the type system. These results allows us to develop a static system for JVM access control without resorting to costly runtime stack inspection.

Abstract. Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as a framework for mobile code safety in which the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certificate and its generation is carried out automatically by a fixed-point analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fixedpoint) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single pass of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main challenge is to reduce the size of certificates as much as possible while at the same time not increasing checking time. We introduce the notion of reduced certificate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the full certificate in a single pass. Based on this notion, we instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the necessary extensions in order to identify the information relevant to the checker. We also provide a correct checking algorithm together with sufficient conditions for ensuring its completeness. The experimental results within the CiaoPP system show that our proposal is able to greatly reduce the size of certificates in practice. 1

This article presents a type certifying compiler for a subset of Java and proves the type correctness of the bytecode it generates in the proof assistant Isabelle. The proof is performed by defining a type compiler that emits a type certificate and by showing a correspondence between bytecode and the certificate which entails welltyping. The basis for this work is an extensive formalization of the Java bytecode type system, which is first presented in an abstract, lattice-theoretic setting and then instantiated to Java types.

Abstract. A Java Card applet is, in general, not allowed to access fields and methods of other applets on the same smart card. This applet isolation property is enforced by dynamic checks in the Java Card Virtual Machine. This paper describes a refined type system for Java Card that enables static checking of applet isolation. With this type system, firewall violations are detected at compile time. Only a special kind of downcast requires dynamic checks. 1

Language-based information-flow security considers programs that manipulate pieces of data at different sensitivity levels. Securing information flow in such programs remains an open challenge. Recently, considerable progress has been made on understanding dynamic monitoring for secure information flow. This paper presents a framework for inlining dynamic information-flow monitors. A novel feature of our framework is the ability to perform inlining on the fly. We consider a source language that includes dynamic code evaluation of strings whose content might not be known until runtime. To secure this construct, our inlining is done on the fly, at the string evaluation time, and, just like conventional offline inlining, requires no modification of the hosting runtime environment. We present a formalization for a simple language to show that the inlined code is secure: it satisfies a noninterference property. We also discuss practical considerations and preliminary experimental results.