We derive the asymptotic sampling distribution of various estimators frequently used to order distributions in terms of poverty, welfare and inequality. This includes estimators of most of the poverty indices currently in use, as well as estimators of the curves used to infer stochastic dominance of any order. These curves can be used to determine whether poverty, inequality or social welfare is greater in one distribution than in another for general classes of indices. We also derive the sampling distribution of the maximal poverty lines (or income censoring thresholds) up to which we may con dently assert that poverty or social welfare is greater in one distribution than in another. The sampling distribution of convenient estimators for dual approaches to the measurement ofpoverty is also established. The

Abstract. The way poverty is measured is important for an understanding of what has happened to poverty as well as for anti-poverty policy evaluation. Sen’s (1976) pathfinding work has motivated many researchers to focus on the way poverty should be measured. A poverty measure, argued by Sen, should satisfy certain properties or axioms and the desirability of a poverty measure should be evaluated by these axioms. During the last two decades, many researchers have adopted the axiomatic approach pioneered by Sen to propose additional axioms and develop alternative poverty measures. The objective of this survey is to provide a clarification on the extensive literature of aggregate poverty measures. In this survey, we first examine the desirability of each axiom, the properties of each poverty measure, and the interrelationships among axioms. The desirability of an axiom cannot be evaluated in isolation, and some combination of axioms may make it impossible to devise a satisfactory poverty measure; some axioms can be implied by other axioms combined and so are not independent; some others are ad hoc and are disqualified as axioms for poverty measurement. Based on the interactions among axioms, we identify the ‘core ’ axioms which together have a strong implication on the functional form of a poverty measure. We then review poverty measures that have appeared in the literature, evaluating the interrelationships among different measures, and examining the properties of each measure. The axioms each measure satisfies�violates are also summarized in a tabular form. Several ‘good ’ poverty measures, which have not been documented by previous surveys, are also included.

Measures for sparse best–basis selection are analyzed and shown to fit into a general framework based on majorization, Schur-concavity, and concavity. This framework facilitates the analysis of algorithm performance and clarifies the relationships between existing proposed concentration measures useful for sparse basis selection. It also allows one to define new concentration measures, and several general classes of measures are proposed and analyzed in this paper. Admissible measures are given by the Schur-concave functions, which are the class of functions consistent with the so-called Lorentz ordering (a partial ordering on vectors also known as majorization). In particular, concave functions form an important subclass of the Schur-concave functions which attain their minima at sparse solutions to the best basis selection problem. A general affine scaling optimization algorithm obtained from a special factorization of the gradient function is developed and proved to converge to a sparse solution for measures chosen from within this subclass.

recherche of Université de Sherbrooke. Abstract: This paper extends the previous literature on the ethical links between the measurement of poverty, social welfare and inequality. We show inter alia, how, when the range of possible poverty lines is unbounded above, a robust ranking of absolute poverty may be interpreted as a robust ranking of social welfare, and a robust ranking of relative poverty may be interpreted as a robust ranking of inequality, and this, for any order of stochastic dominance.

this paper; without such a framework the research suggestions would not make much sense. This rationale can be restated as a disclaimer: the policy ideas set forth in this essay are not to be construed as assumptions of fact about the present or future course of the Bank's policies

This paper estimates the welfare and distributional impact of two types of welfare reform in 14 member countries of the European Union. The reforms are revenue neutral and financed by an overall and uniform increase in marginal tax rates on earnings. The first reform distributes the additional tax revenue uniformly to everybody (traditional welfare) while the second reform distributes tax proceeds uniformly to workers only (in-work benefit). We build a simple model of labor supply encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margin. We then use EUROMOD to describe current welfare and tax systems in all European Union countries (except Sweden) and use calibrated labor supply elasticities along the intensive and extensive margins to analyze the e#ects of the two welfare reforms. We quantify the equity-e#ciency trade-o# for a range of elasticity parameters. In most countries, because of the large existing welfare programs with high phase-out rates, the uniform redistribution policy is, in general, undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme. The in-work benefit reform, on the other hand, is desirable in a very wide set of cases. We discuss the practical policy implications for European welfare policy.

We apply several well-being measures that combine average income with a measure of inequality to international and intertemporal comparisons of wellbeing in transition countries. Our well-being measures drastically change the impression of levels and changes in well-being compared to a traditional reliance on income measures. Due to low inequality and moderate income levels, socialist countries enjoyed relatively high levels of economic well-being. In the transition process, rising inequality and falling incomes have led to a dramatic absolute decline in well-being and a considerable drop in relative well-being vis--vis nontransition countries. We also find a close correlation between income losses and inequality increases. While the transition has been successful in expanding political and civil rights, our indicators suggest that most transition countries are still below the level of economic well-being of the late 1980s.

This paper investigates distributive justice using a fourfold experimental design: The ignorance and the risk scenarios are combined with the self--concern and the umpire modes. We study behavioral switches between self--concern and umpire mode and investigate the goodness of ten standards of behavior.

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The belief that efficiency and equity can somehow be separated represents one of the oldest dreams in economics........ Mark Blaug* The currently established welfare criterion used in international trade theory results in conclusions that are not only intellectually dishonest and deceptively misleading but are not as value free as is commonly believed. Although academic economists have devoted much effort to understanding the distributional effects of trade, the current welfare conclusions of trade basically ignore entirely the distributional effects. This paper argues that trade policy needs to be framed within a legitimate moral framework that moves distribution to the forefront. The welfare effects of trade should be judged by what actually happens, not by what could potentially happen in an idealized world with costless transfers. In the first section the inadequacy of current international welfare economics is discussed. Second, the justification for using a utilitarian framework is developed along with a brief history of the doctrine and its role in Cambridge welfare economics. Next the properties of a utility function that would be realistic as well as having desirable mathematical properties are discussed. Welfare considerations would not be especially important if trade did not create significant redistributions; therefore the size of the redistributions relative to the efficiency gains from trade liberalization is examined. Finally, the welfare effects of trade liberalization