Results 1  10
of
20
Evolutionary Game Theory
, 1995
"... Abstract. Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very def ..."
Abstract

Cited by 642 (9 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Experimentalists frequently claim that human subjects in the laboratory violate gametheoretic predictions. It is here argued that this claim is usually premature. The paper elaborates on this theme by way of raising some conceptual and methodological issues in connection with the very definition of a game and of players ’ preferences, in particular with respect to potential context dependence, interpersonal preference dependence, backward induction and incomplete information.
Core Rationalizability in TwoAgent Exchange
, 2000
"... We thank James Redekop for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial support ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We thank James Redekop for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial support
Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains.
, 2002
"... This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but nontrivial, requi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but nontrivial, requirements for rationalizability, I show that the hypothesis is falsifiable, as it imposes nontautological, nonparametric testable restrictions. An assessment of these restrictions, however, shows that they are extremely weak, and that a researcher should expect, before observing the data set, that the test based on these restrictions will be passed by observed data. Without further specific assumptions, there do not exist harsher tests, since the conditions derived here also turn out to be sufficient. Moreover, ruling out the possibility that individuals may be cooperating so as to attain Paretoefficient outcomes is impossible, as this behavior is in itself unfalsifiable with finite data sets. Imposing aggregation, or strategic complementarity and/or substitutability, if theoretically plausible, may provide for a harsher test.
INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIC DISTINGUISHABILITY
, 2010
"... A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higherorder preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent’s (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent’s preference over AnscombeAumann acts conditional on the unconditional prefer ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higherorder preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent’s (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent’s preference over AnscombeAumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.
Observable Implications of Nash and SubgamePerfect Behavior in Extensive Games ∗
, 2003
"... In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgameperfect equilibrium. Thus one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgameperfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgameperfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither. Further, we discuss the relevance of the test outcomes for rationalization of data by multiple preference profiles.
A Nonparametric Analysis of the Cournot Model ∗
, 2009
"... An observer makes a number of observations of an industry producing a homogeneous good. Each observation consists of the market price, the output of individual firms and perhaps information on each firm’s production cost. We provide various tests (typically, linear programs) with which the observer ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
An observer makes a number of observations of an industry producing a homogeneous good. Each observation consists of the market price, the output of individual firms and perhaps information on each firm’s production cost. We provide various tests (typically, linear programs) with which the observer can determine if the data set is consistent with the hypothesis that firms in this industry are playing a Cournot game at each observation. When cost information is wholly or partially unavailable, these tests could potentially be used to derive cost information on the firms. This paper is a contribution to the literature that aims to characterize (in various contexts) the restrictions that a data set must satisfy for it to be consistent with Nash outcomes in a game. It is also inspired by the seminal result of Afriat (and the subsequent literature) which addresses similar issues in the context of consumer demand, though one important technical difference from most of these results is that the objective functions of firms in a Cournot game are not necessarily quasiconcave.
General revealed Preference Theory
, 2010
"... We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a unive ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result "explains" classical revealed preference theory, as applied to individual rational choice. We obtain new applications to Nash equilibrium theory and Pareto optimal choice.