The term incident command system (ICS) denotes a particular approach to assembly and control of the highly reliable, temporary organizations employed by many firefighters, police, and other public safety professionals to manage diverse resources at a wide variety of emergency scenes. Our inductive study of a fire department’s use of the ICS identified three main factors enabling this distinctively bureaucratic system to produce remarkably flexible and reliable organizations for complex and volatile task environments. In general, this research suggests the possibility of new organizational forms able to capitalize on the control and efficiency benefits of bureaucracy, while at the same time avoiding or overcoming the considerable tendencies toward inertia that are thought to accompany bureaucratic systems. Recent organization science research indicates that an expanding number of organizations are facing increasingly unforgiving socio-political-economic contexts (cf. D’Aveni, 1994). Operational failures resulting in inappropriate, incomplete, laggardly or otherwise mindless organizational responses to unexpected and demanding environmental contingencies (such as major and unforeseen competitive threats, product malfunctions and recalls, supplier collapses, technology breakdowns, etc.) are ever more likely to be immediately

This comprehensive analysis addresses the United States’ alarming lack of preparedness to respond effectively to a massive disaster as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina. First, a timeline of problematic response events during and after Hurricane Katrina orients readers to some of the specific problems encountered at different levels of government. Second, a list of the “Dirty Dozen”—12 major failures that have occurred in prior disasters, which also contributed to inadequate response during and after Hurricane Katrina— is presented. Third, this article encourages expanding psychology’s role beyond the treatment of trauma to encompass disaster planning and mitigation efforts from a broader public health perspective. Finally, areas for important interdisciplinary research in human behavior that will influence our nation’s overall preparedness for future catastrophes are identified, and ways psychologists can become personally involved beyond treating casualties are discussed.

Organizations are occasionally faced with technology-based and accident-triggered crises that may cause costly disasters if not handled properly. Questions arise: How should organizations, with their complex processes and human involvement, be designed if they are to perform well in such crises? Would organizations benefit from structural changes during crises? From a neo-information processing perspective that views organizations as composed of cognitively restricted, socially situated, and task-oriented actors, we argue that the causes and consequences of crises may be better understood through the systematic examination of both environmental and organizational factors. We address our research questions using a rather unique approach: a matched analysis of 80 real organizational cases and 80 computer-simulated organizations. The findings show that a crisis can present critical challenges to organizational performance both externally and internally, and that there is no design guarantee that a high-performing organization will continue to perform well during a crisis situation. In addition, when organizations restructure to adapt to crisis situations, they often face the serious challenges of having to understand not only the external environment, but also organizational design traps. Key words: organizational performance; organizational design; computational modeling; real-crisis cases Whether theories of organization can be applied to nonconventional events or crisis situations has largely been assumed but certainly not fully explored (Carley

in crisis management

est la revue officielle de l’AIMS

for the Study of Business Markets (ISBM #9901). The authors appreciate helpful feedback from James

Many authors have discussed the potential industry costs of food recalls yet only limited empirical analyses of these costs have been conducted. This paper uses stock market reactions to four recent recalls as an indicator of industry costs. A partial event analysis technique is used to demonstrate the unique impact of recalls separate of any general market trends. These recalls (Odwalla, two IBP events, and Sara Lee) vary by product, company size (and scope), and severity. A discussion of the crisis management strategies conducted by the three companies is included. Detailed information regarding the response of stock prices to recalls is useful in two related ways. First, such data can be used to discuss potential firm and industry-level benefits of adopting particular food safety interventions. Second, it is interesting to compare the market reaction to different recalls to determine if the size and scope (relative to the firms ’ product range) and severity (in terms of the number of illnesses and deaths associated with the product prior to recall) influence the magnitude of the reaction. Early indications suggest that though share price levels recoup initial losses reasonably quickly a measure of price variability takes longer to recover. Stock Market Reaction to Food Recalls Foodborne illness imposes significant costs on various stakeholders be they consumers,