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Truth Definitions, Skolem Functions And Axiomatic Set Theory
 Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
, 1998
"... this paper, it will turn out logicians have universally missed the true, exceedingly simple feature of ordinary firstorder logic that makes it incapable of accommodating its own truth predicate. (See Section 4 below.) This defect will also be shown to be easy to overcome without transcending the fi ..."
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this paper, it will turn out logicians have universally missed the true, exceedingly simple feature of ordinary firstorder logic that makes it incapable of accommodating its own truth predicate. (See Section 4 below.) This defect will also be shown to be easy to overcome without transcending the firstorder level. This eliminates once and for all the need of set theory for the purposes of a metatheory of logic.
Axiom of choice and excluded middle in categorical logic
 Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
, 1995
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Elementary constructive operational set theory. To appear in: Festschrift for Wolfram Pohlers, Ontos Verlag
"... Abstract. We introduce an operational set theory in the style of [5] and [17]. The theory we develop here is a theory of constructive sets and operations. One motivation behind constructive operational set theory is to merge a constructive notion of set ([1], [2]) with some aspects which are typical ..."
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Abstract. We introduce an operational set theory in the style of [5] and [17]. The theory we develop here is a theory of constructive sets and operations. One motivation behind constructive operational set theory is to merge a constructive notion of set ([1], [2]) with some aspects which are typical of explicit mathematics [14]. In particular, one has nonextensional operations (or rules) alongside extensional constructive sets. Operations are in general partial and a limited form of self–application is permitted. The system we introduce here is a fully explicit, finitely axiomatised system of constructive sets and operations, which is shown to be as strong as HA. 1.
Locality, Weak or Strong Anticipation and Quantum Computing. I. Nonlocality in Quantum Theory
"... Abstract The universal Turing machine is an anticipatory theory of computability by any digital or quantum machine. However the ChurchTuring hypothesis only gives weak anticipation. The construction of the quantum computer (unlike classical computing) requires theory with strong anticipation. Categ ..."
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Abstract The universal Turing machine is an anticipatory theory of computability by any digital or quantum machine. However the ChurchTuring hypothesis only gives weak anticipation. The construction of the quantum computer (unlike classical computing) requires theory with strong anticipation. Category theory provides the necessary coordinatefree mathematical language which is both constructive and nonlocal to subsume the various interpretations of quantum theory in one pullback/pushout Dolittle diagram. This diagram can be used to test and classify physical devices and proposed algorithms for weak or strong anticipation. Quantum Information Science is more than a merger of ChurchTuring and quantum theories. It has constructively to bridge the nonlocal chasm between the weak anticipation of mathematics and the strong anticipation of physics.
EM + Ext − + ACint is equivalent to ACext
, 2004
"... It is well known that the extensional axiom of choice (ACext) implies the law of excluded middle (EM). We here prove that the converse holds as well if we have the intensional (‘typetheoretical’) axiom of choice ACint, which is provable in MartinLöf’s type theory, and a weak extensionality princip ..."
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It is well known that the extensional axiom of choice (ACext) implies the law of excluded middle (EM). We here prove that the converse holds as well if we have the intensional (‘typetheoretical’) axiom of choice ACint, which is provable in MartinLöf’s type theory, and a weak extensionality principle (Ext−), which is provable in MartinLöf’s extensional type theory. In particular, EM ⇔ ACext holds in extensional type theory. The following is the principle ACint of intensional choice: if A, B are sets and R a relation such that (∀x: A)(∃y: B)R(x, y) is true, then there is a function f: A → B such that (∀x: A)R(x, f(x)) is true. It is provable in MartinLöf’s type theory [8, p. 50]. It follows from ACint that surjective functions have right inverses: If =B is an equivalence relation on B and f: A → B, we say that f is surjective if (∀y: B)(∃x: A)(y =B f(x)) is true. With R(y, x) def = (y =B f(x)), surjectivity
Independence, Randomness and the Axiom of Choice
, 1992
"... We investigate various ways of introducing axioms for randomness in set theory. The results show that these axioms, when added to ZF, imply the failure of AC. But the axiom of extensionality plays an essential role in the derivation, and a deeper analysis may ultimately show that randomness is incom ..."
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We investigate various ways of introducing axioms for randomness in set theory. The results show that these axioms, when added to ZF, imply the failure of AC. But the axiom of extensionality plays an essential role in the derivation, and a deeper analysis may ultimately show that randomness is incompatible with extensionality.
Did Brouwer Really Believe That?
, 2007
"... This article is a commentary on remarks made in a recent book [12] that perpetuate several myths about Brouwer and intuitionism. The footnote on page 279 of [12] is an unfortunate, historically and factually inaccurate, blemish on an otherwise remarkable book. In that footnote, in which Ok discusses ..."
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This article is a commentary on remarks made in a recent book [12] that perpetuate several myths about Brouwer and intuitionism. The footnote on page 279 of [12] is an unfortunate, historically and factually inaccurate, blemish on an otherwise remarkable book. In that footnote, in which Ok discusses Brouwer (who, incidentally, was normally known not as “Jan ” but as “Bertus”, a shortening of his second name, Egbertus), 1 he says:...later in his career, he [Brouwer] became the most forceful proponent of the socalled intuitionist philosophy of mathematics, which not only forbids the use of the Axiom of Choice but also rejects the axiom that a proposition is either true or false (thereby disallowing the method of proof by contradiction). The consequences of taking this position are dire. For instance, an intuitionist would not accept the existence of an irrational number! In fact, in his later years, Brouwer did not view the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem as a theorem. These sentences contain a number of outdated but still common misconceptions