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89
Costly signalling and cooperation
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
, 2001
"... We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group, in which providing group benefits evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member’s quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signalin ..."
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Cited by 29 (2 self)
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We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group, in which providing group benefits evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member’s quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as an n-player game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, and assumes a payoff structure that would conform to an n-player public goods game in which non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable. We also show that this behavior is capable of proliferating in a population in which it is initially rare. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including providing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms. Our signaling model is distinctive in applying to group rather than dyadic interactions and in determining endogenously the fraction of the group that signals high quality in equilibrium.
Social preferences and reciprocity
, 2000
"... Much of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this ..."
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Cited by 29 (2 self)
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Much of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this
Thinking in Levels: A Dynamic Systems Approach to Making Sense of the World
- Journal of Science Education and Technology
, 1999
"... The concept of emergent “levels ” (i.e. levels that arise from interactions of objects at lower levels) is fundamental to scientific theory. In this paper, we argue for an expanded role for this concept of “levels ” in the study of science. We show that confusion of levels (and “slippage ” between l ..."
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Cited by 16 (5 self)
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The concept of emergent “levels ” (i.e. levels that arise from interactions of objects at lower levels) is fundamental to scientific theory. In this paper, we argue for an expanded role for this concept of “levels ” in the study of science. We show that confusion of levels (and “slippage ” between levels) is the source of many deep misunderstandings about patterns and phenomena in the world. These misunderstandings are evidenced not only in students ’ difficulties in the formal study of science but also in their misconceptions about experiences in their everyday lives. The StarLogo modeling language is designed as a medium for students to build models of multi-leveled phenomena and through these constructions explore the concept of levels. We describe several case studies of students working in StarLogo. The cases illustrate students ’ difficulties with the concept of levels, and how they can begin to develop richer understandings.
Reciprocity, culture, and human cooperation: Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment
- PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B – BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
, 2009
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Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
, 2003
"... Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who vi ..."
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Cited by 12 (1 self)
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Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of selfregarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection
Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism
- June 2003 158 Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller: Inequality and Economic Growth - European Versus U.S. Experiences, June 159 Mark P. Schindler: Rumors in Financial Markets: Survey on how they evolve, spread and are traded on, June 161 Haim Levy, Enrico De
, 2003
"... Abstract: In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetica ..."
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Cited by 12 (1 self)
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Abstract: In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide historical and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity. 1 This paper is part of a research project on strong reciprocity financed by the Network on Economic Environments and the Evolution of Individual Preferences and Social Norms of the MacArthur Foundation. Fehr and Henrich In recent years a large body of evidence has emerged from laboratory experiments indicating that a substantial fraction of people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms, even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers (see,
Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction
- BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
, 2003
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Punitive Sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device
- EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
, 2002
"... Those who contribute to a public good sometimes experience punitive sentiments toward others. But is the system that produces these sentiments an adaptation and, if so, which collective action problem was it designed to solve? Prior results from experimental economics show that acts of free riding a ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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Those who contribute to a public good sometimes experience punitive sentiments toward others. But is the system that produces these sentiments an adaptation and, if so, which collective action problem was it designed to solve? Prior results from experimental economics show that acts of free riding are sometimes punished; that punishment deters free-riding; and that the risk or actuality of punishment recruits higher levels of cooperation in a joint effort. This suggests that one function of punitive sentiments could be to recruit labor for collective actions. However, adaptations designed to cause participation in collective actions could not have evolved unless there were some mechanism that protected those who participated from having lower fitness than non-participating free riders. Therefore, a second possible function of punishment could be to eliminate or reverse fitness differentials that favor free rider designs over participant designs. To map the computational structure of this motivational adaptation (and hence identify its specific function) requires data that relate an individual's circumstances to his or her desire to punish. Herein we report such data. The results indicate that the computational system that regulates one's level of punitive sentiment in collective action contexts is functionally specialized for removing the fitness advantage enjoyed by free riders, rather than for labor recruitment or other functions. Results also support the hypothesis that a separate pro-reward motivational system exists that appears designed to handle the problem of labor recruitment. Rational choice counterexplanations for punitive sentiments were considered, but eliminated on the basis of the evidence.
Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
, 2006
"... The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snowdrift g ..."
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Cited by 10 (4 self)
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The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions, as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals. Here, we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In social dilemmas, cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost, while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without bearing the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy for describing how benefits accumulate when more than one cooperator is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four basic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection, (ii) coexistence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas.
The re-emergence of “emergence”: A venerable concept in search of a theory
- COMPLEXITY
, 2002
"... Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations a ..."
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations about what emergence means but “reductionist ” and “holistic ” theorists have very different views about the issue of causation. However, these two seemingly polar positions are not irreconcilable. Reductionism, or detailed analysis of the parts and their interactions, is essential for answering the “how ” question in evolution--how does a complex living system work? But holism is equally necessary for answering the “why ” question-- why did a particular arrangement of parts evolve? In order to answer the “why ” question, a broader, multi-leveled paradigm is required. The reductionist approach to explaining emergent complexity has entailed a search for underlying “laws of emergence.” Another alternative is the “Synergism Hypothesis, ” which focuses on the “economics ” – the functional effects produced by emergent wholes and their selective consequences. This theory, in a nutshell, proposes that the synergistic (co-operative) effects produced by various combinations of parts have played a major causal role in the evolution of biological complexity. It will also be argued that emergent phenomena represent, in effect, a subset of a much larger universe of combined effects in the natural world; there are many different kinds of synergy, but not all synergies represent emergent phenomena.

