It is a pleasure to be asked to comment upon Lars Svensson’s thoughtful and ambitious paper, though it raises far too many issues for me to attempt to address them all in the limited time available here. Svensson offers a thorough review of the recent scholarly literature on the conduct of monetary policy, and also reviews one of the most important recent developments in central bank practice as well, namely the evolving methodology of “inflation forecast targeting.” In my own remarks, I would like to develop further a single theme, which is the advantage of central bank commitment to a systematic approach to monetary policy. This theme also figures in Svensson’s discussion, but I believe that its consequences extend even further than he indicates.

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The fundamental goal of all good design and engineering is to create maximal value added for any given investment. There are many dimensions in which value can be assessed, from monetary profit to the solution of social problems. The benefits sought are often domain-specific, yet the logic is the same: design is an investment activity. Software economics is the field that seeks to enable significant improvements in software design and engineering through economic reasoning about product, process, program, and portfolio and policy issues. We summarize the state of the art and identify shortfalls in existing knowledge. Past work focuses largely on costs, not on benefits, thus not on value added; nor are current technical software design criteria linked clearly to value creation. We present a roadmap for research emphasizing the need for a strategic investment approach to software engineering. We discuss how software economics can lead to fundamental improvements in software design and engineering, in theory and practice. 1

We introduce a new mechanism-design problem called fair imposition. In this setting a center wishes to fairly allocate tasks among a set of agents whose cost structures are known only to them, and thus will not reveal their true costs without appropriate incentives. The center, with the power to impose arbitrary tasks and payments on the agents, has the additional goal that his net payment to these agents is never positive (or, that it is tightly bounded if a loss is unavoidable). We consider two di#erent notions of fairness that the center may wish to achieve. The central notion, which we call k-fairness, is in the spirit of max-min fairness. We present both positive results (in the form of concrete mechanisms) and negative results (in the form of impossibility theorems) concerning these criteria. We also briefly discuss an alternative, more traditional interpretation of our setting and results, in the context of auctions.

Education The current approaches in terms of information security awareness and education are descriptive (i.e. they are not accomplishment-oriented nor do they recognize the factual/normative dualism); and current research has not explored the possibilities offered by motivation/behavioural theories. The first situation, level of descriptiveness, is deemed to be questionable because it may prove eventually that end-users fail to internalize target goals and do not follow security guidelines, for example ± which is inadequate. Moreover, the role of motivation in the area of information security is not considered seriously enough, even though its role has been widely recognised. To tackle such weaknesses, this paper constructs a conceptual foundation for information systems/organizational security awareness. The normative and prescriptive nature of end-user guidelines will be considered. In order to understand human behaviour, the behavioural science framework, consisting in intrinsic motivation, a theory of planned behaviour and a technology acceptance model, will be depicted and applied. Current approaches (such as the campaign) in the area of information security awareness and education will be analysed from the viewpoint of the theoretical framework, resulting in information on their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, a novel persuasion strategy aimed at increasing users ' commitment to security guidelines is presented.

1. What are called ‘intuitions ’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it rests on bad epistemology: specifically, on an impossible ideal of unproblematically identifiable evidence. 3. Our resistance to scepticism about judgement is not simply epistemic conservativism, for we resist it on behalf of others as well as ourselves. A reason is needed for thinking that beliefs tend to be true. 4. Evolutionary explanations of the tendency assume what they should explain. Explanations that appeal to constraints on the determination of reference are more promising. Davidson’s truth-maximizing principle of charity is examined but rejected. 5. An alternative principle is defended on which the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge rather than truth. It is related to an externalist conception of mind on which knowing is the central mental state. 6. The knowledge-maximizing

We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment, and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest.

action needs to be stated with some care. Defenders of absolutism throughout the ages, from Bodin, Richelieu, and Louis XIV to Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, have sought to present their own putatively legitimate political authority as founded in fact upon the profound and pervasive trust of its faithful and law-abiding subjects, contested only by the wilfully and inexcusably <<74>> contumacious. But one may doubt in fact whether the passion of trust can ever have been a very prominent characteristic of intricate and massively inegalitarian political relations - perhaps indeed of any political relations of substantial demographic or geographic scope. 2 Certainly it is scarcely a prominent feature, or a natural consequence of either of the leading forms of contemporary state: the huckstering interest brokerage of advanced capitalist democracies or the petulant accents of monopolistic party authority in existing socialist states. Nor, it may be as well to add, would there be

Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Therefore, in a situation in which private and social interests diverge, it should be possible to bring about a welfare improvement by imposing rules that provide the necessary incentives for more socially efficient choices. However, experimental evidence shows that individuals do not typically behave as if they are purely selfinterested; they tend to make choices that strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in several villages in Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This surprising result occurred because individuals confronted with an external regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and, instead, made choices that were more consistent with pure self interests; that is, the regulation itself appeared to crowd out otherregarding behavior. The implication is that a policy design aimed simply at establishing incentives that move purely self-interested individuals toward more efficient choices will not necessarily improve social efficiency if the institution itself lessens civic-mindedness and encourages more selfish behavior. Keywords: Institutional Crowding-Out, External Regulation, Local Environmental Quality, Experiments, South America, Colombia 1.

This essay attempts to discern some of the general features of a legal system like the American by drawing on (and rearranging) commonplaces and less than systematic gleanings from the literature. The speculative and tentative nature of the assertions here will be apparent and is acknowledged here wholesale to spare myself and the reader repeated disclaimers. I would like to try to put forward some conjectures about the way in which the basic architecture of the legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means of redistributive (that is, systemically equalizing) change. Our question, specifically, is, under what conditions can litigation 1 be redistributive, taking litigation in the broadest sense of the presentation of claims to be decided by courts (or court-like agencies) and the whole penumbra of threats, feints, and so forth, surrounding such presentation. For purposes of this analysis, let us think of the legal system as comprised of these elements: * This essay grew out of a presentation to Robert Stevens ’ Seminar on the Legal Profession and Social Change at Yale Law School in the autumn of 1970, while the author was Senior Fellow in the School’s Law and Modernization Program. It has gathered bulk and I hope substance in the course of a succession of presentations and revisions. It has accumulated a correspondingly heavy burden of obligation to my colleagues and students. I would like to acknowledge the helpful