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Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives
- Econometrica
, 1986
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Cited by 123 (0 self)
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The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic choice
- Academy of Management Review
, 1996
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Cited by 33 (17 self)
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prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
- REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
, 2002
"... This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region-specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficientl ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region-specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within-region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non-monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of “constitutional rules” (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.
