this article.

Counterpart semantics is proposed as the appropriate semantical framework for a foundational investigation of quantified modal logics. It turns out to be a limit case of the categorical semantics of relational universes introduced by Ghilardi and Meloni in 1988. The main result is a deeper understanding of the interplay between substitution, quantification and identity wherever modalities are present. Languages with types and explicit substitutions are the tools used to clarify such an interplay and to disintangle classical problems related to modalities in first-order languages. It is shown that controversial modal principles are neither valid nor provable. Quine's worries are dispelled.

David Chalmers's version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at setting up a unified semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out such a project, and that Chalmers's theory does not coherently fit any of the three patterns. I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, is not easily identified with straightforward semantic ambiguity). 1. Intuitions and Attitudes In spite of the Kripkean paradigm's remarkable success, the Fregean intuitions will not go away. By 'Fregean intuitions ' I mean the feeling that certain linguistic phenomena require the kind of semantic treatment that a theory of meaning in the Fregean tradition would provide. Such phenomena, on the other hand, are not easily accommodated within a Kripkean framework. Let me briefly recall some of the phenomena in question: • 'Hesperus is Hesperus ' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus ' differ in cognitive value; a theory of meaning should account for the difference. I am indebted to discussions with Paolo Casalegno and Manuel Garcia Carpintero. I also greatly benefited from an extended exchange with David Chalmers.

In the Twentieth Century, Logic and Philosophy of Language are two of the few areas of philosophy in which philosophers made indisputable progress. For example, even now many of the foremost living ethicists present their theories as somewhat more explicit versions of the ideas of Kant, Mill, or Aristotle. In contrast, it would be patently absurd for a contemporary philosopher of language or logician to think of herself as working in the shadow of any figure who died before the Twentieth Century began. Advances in these disciplines make even the most unaccomplished of its practitioners vastly more sophisticated than Kant. There were previous periods in which the problems of language and logic were studied extensively (e.g. the medieval period). But from the perspective of the progress made in the last 120 years, previous work is at most a source of interesting data or occasional insight. All systematic theorizing about content that meets contemporary standards of rigor has been done subsequently. The advances Philosophy of Language has made in the Twentieth Century are of course the result of the remarkable progress made in logic. Few other philosophical disciplines gained as much from the developments in logic as the Philosophy of Language. In the

Abstract: In this study, we explore the notion of existential generalization (from non-quantifying sentences) with respect to the notion of presupposition and their relations to the suppositions de dicto / de re what is dealt by means of Tichý’s transparent intensional logic. They are specified de dicto and de re versions of existential generalization as well as de dicto and de re versions of existential consequences and existential presuppositions. We classify contingent / tautological de dicto / de re existential consequences / presuppositions (a special contribution is made by the distinction between so-called occupational and instantiational existential statements). Then we show two exceptional kinds of consequences / presuppositions. Finally, we investigate three typical kinds of failures of considered existential generalization.

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