Results 1 
2 of
2
Adequacy for algebraic effects
 In 4th FoSSaCS
, 2001
"... We present a logic for algebraic effects, based on the algebraic representation of computational effects by operations and equations. We begin with the acalculus, a minimal calculus which separates values, effects, and computations and thereby canonises the order of evaluation. This is extended to ..."
Abstract

Cited by 30 (16 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We present a logic for algebraic effects, based on the algebraic representation of computational effects by operations and equations. We begin with the acalculus, a minimal calculus which separates values, effects, and computations and thereby canonises the order of evaluation. This is extended to obtain the logic, which is a classical firstorder multisorted logic with higherorder value and computation types, as in Levy’s callbypushvalue, a principle of induction over computations, a free algebra principle, and predicate fixed points. This logic embraces Moggi’s computational λcalculus, and also, via definable modalities, HennessyMilner logic, and evaluation logic, though Hoare logic presents difficulties. 1
Security Analysis of a Probabilistic Nonrepudiation Protocol
 Proc. of PAPMPROBMIV ’02, LNCS 2399
, 2002
"... Abstract. Noninterference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of noninterference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In partic ..."
Abstract

Cited by 13 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Noninterference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of noninterference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In particular, as a case study, we model and analyze a nonrepudiation protocol which employs a probabilistic algorithm to achieve a fairness property. The analysis, conducted by resorting to a definition of probabilistic noninterference in the context of process algebras, confirms that a solely nondeterministic approach to the information flow theory is not enough to study the security guarantees of cryptographic protocols. 1