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Hilbert’s twentyfourth problem
 American Mathematical Monthly
, 2001
"... 1. INTRODUCTION. For geometers, Hilbert’s influential work on the foundations of geometry is important. For analysts, Hilbert’s theory of integral equations is just as important. But the address “Mathematische Probleme ” [37] that David Hilbert (1862– 1943) delivered at the second International Cong ..."
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1. INTRODUCTION. For geometers, Hilbert’s influential work on the foundations of geometry is important. For analysts, Hilbert’s theory of integral equations is just as important. But the address “Mathematische Probleme ” [37] that David Hilbert (1862– 1943) delivered at the second International Congress of Mathematicians (ICM) in Paris has tremendous importance for all mathematicians. Moreover, a substantial part of
The scope of logic: deduction, abduction, analogy
"... The present form of mathematical logic originated in the twenties and early thirties from the partial merging of two different traditions, the algebra of logic and the logicist tradition (see [27], [41]). This resulted in a new form of logic in which several features of the two earlier traditions co ..."
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The present form of mathematical logic originated in the twenties and early thirties from the partial merging of two different traditions, the algebra of logic and the logicist tradition (see [27], [41]). This resulted in a new form of logic in which several features of the two earlier traditions coexist. Clearly neither the algebra of logic nor the logicist’s logic is identical to the present form of mathematical logic, yet some of their basic ideas can be distinctly recognized within it. One of such ideas is Boole’s view that logic is the study of the laws of thought. This is not to be meant in a psychologistic way. Frege himself states that the task of logic can be represented “as the investigation of the mind; [though] of the mind, not of minds” [17, p. 369]. Moreover Frege never charges Boole with being psychologistic and in a letter to Peano even distinguishes between the followers of Boole and “the psychological logicians ” [16, p. 108]. In fact for Boole the laws of thought which are the object of logic belong “to the domain of what is termed necessary truth ” [2, p. 404]. For him logic does not depend on psychology, on the contrary psychology depends on logic insofar as it is only through an investigation of logical operations that we could obtain “some probable