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36
Collusion resistant broadcast encryption with short ciphertexts and private keys
"... We describe two new public key broadcast encryption systems for stateless receivers. Both systems are fully secure against any number of colluders. In our first construction both ciphertexts and private keys are of constant size (only two group elements), for any subset of receivers. The public ke ..."
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Cited by 119 (13 self)
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We describe two new public key broadcast encryption systems for stateless receivers. Both systems are fully secure against any number of colluders. In our first construction both ciphertexts and private keys are of constant size (only two group elements), for any subset of receivers. The public key size in this system is linear in the total number of receivers. Our second system is a generalization of the first that provides a tradeoff between ciphertext size and public key size. For example, we achieve a collusion resistant broadcast system for n users where both ciphertexts and public keys are of size O (√n) for any subset of receivers. We discuss several applications of these systems.
Attributebased encryption with nonmonotonic access structures
 In ACM CCCS
, 2007
"... We construct an AttributeBased Encryption (ABE) scheme that allows a user’s private key to be expressed in terms of any access formula over attributes. Previous ABE schemes were limited to expressing only monotonic access structures. We provide a proof of security for our scheme based on the Decisi ..."
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Cited by 47 (4 self)
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We construct an AttributeBased Encryption (ABE) scheme that allows a user’s private key to be expressed in terms of any access formula over attributes. Previous ABE schemes were limited to expressing only monotonic access structures. We provide a proof of security for our scheme based on the Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellman (BDH) assumption. Furthermore, the performance of our new scheme compares favorably with existing, lessexpressive schemes. Categories and Subject Descriptors: E.3 [Data Encryption]: Public key cryptosystems. General Terms: Security.
Public Key Trace and Revoke Scheme Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
 In Public Key Cryptography — PKC ’03, volume 2567 of LNCS
, 2003
"... Abstract. A (public key) Trace and Revoke Scheme combines the functionality of broadcast encryption withthe capability of traitor tracing. Specifically, (1) a trusted center publishes a single public key and distributes individual secret keys to the users of the system; (2) anybody can encrypt a mes ..."
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Cited by 37 (8 self)
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Abstract. A (public key) Trace and Revoke Scheme combines the functionality of broadcast encryption withthe capability of traitor tracing. Specifically, (1) a trusted center publishes a single public key and distributes individual secret keys to the users of the system; (2) anybody can encrypt a message so that all but a specified subset of “revoked” users can decrypt the resulting ciphertext; and (3) if a (small) group of users combine their secret keys to produce a “pirate decoder”, the center can trace at least one of the “traitors ” given access to this decoder. We construct the first chosen ciphertext (CCA2) secure Trace and Revoke Scheme based on the DDH assumption. Our scheme is also the first adaptively secure scheme, allowing the adversary to corrupt players at any point during execution, while prior works (e.g., [14, 16]) only achieves a very weak form of nonadaptive security even against chosen plaintext attacks. Of independent interest, we present a slightly simpler construction that shows a “natural separation ” between the classical notion of CCA2security and the recently proposed [15, 1] relaxed notion of gCCA2security. 1
Efficient treebased revocation in groups of lowstate devices
 In Proceedings of Crypto ’04, volume 2204 of LNCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. We study the problem of broadcasting confidential information to a collection of n devices while providing the ability to revoke an arbitrary subset of those devices (and tolerating collusion among the revoked devices). In this paper, we restrict our attention to lowmemory devices, that i ..."
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Cited by 33 (1 self)
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Abstract. We study the problem of broadcasting confidential information to a collection of n devices while providing the ability to revoke an arbitrary subset of those devices (and tolerating collusion among the revoked devices). In this paper, we restrict our attention to lowmemory devices, that is, devices that can store at most O(log n) keys. We consider solutions for both zerostate and lowstate cases, where such devices are organized in a tree structure T. We allow the group controller to encrypt broadcasts to any subtree of T,evenifthetreeisbasedonanmultiway organizational chart or a severely unbalanced multicast tree. 1
IDBased Encryption for Complex Hierarchies with Applications to Forward Security and Broadcast Encryption
 In CCS ’04: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
, 2004
"... A forwardsecure encryption scheme protects secret keys from exposure by evolving the keys with time. Forward security has several unique requirements in hierarchical identitybased encryption (HIBE) scheme: (1) users join dynamically; (2) encryption is joiningtimeoblivious; (3) users evolve secre ..."
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Cited by 29 (6 self)
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A forwardsecure encryption scheme protects secret keys from exposure by evolving the keys with time. Forward security has several unique requirements in hierarchical identitybased encryption (HIBE) scheme: (1) users join dynamically; (2) encryption is joiningtimeoblivious; (3) users evolve secret keys autonomously. We present a scalable forwardsecure HIBE (fsHIBE) scheme satisfying the above properties. We also show how our fsHIBE scheme can be used to construct a forwardsecure publickey broadcast encryption scheme, which protects the secrecy of prior transmissions in the broadcast encryption setting. We further generalize fsHIBE into a collusionresistant multiple hierarchical IDbased encryption scheme, which can be used for secure communications with entities having multiple roles in rolebased access control. The security of our schemes is based on the bilinear DiffieHellman assumption in the random oracle model. 1
Traitor Tracing with Constant Transmission Rate
, 2002
"... Abstract. An important open problem in the area of Traitor Tracing is designing a scheme with constant expansion of the size of keys (users’ keys and the encryption key) and of the size of ciphertexts with respect to the size of the plaintext. This problem is known from the introduction of Traitor T ..."
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Cited by 28 (3 self)
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Abstract. An important open problem in the area of Traitor Tracing is designing a scheme with constant expansion of the size of keys (users’ keys and the encryption key) and of the size of ciphertexts with respect to the size of the plaintext. This problem is known from the introduction of Traitor Tracing by Chor, Fiat and Naor. We refer to such schemes as traitor tracing with constant transmission rate. Here we present a general methodology and two protocol constructions that result in the first two publickey traitor tracing schemes with constant transmission rate in settings where plaintexts can be calibrated to be sufficiently large. Our starting point is the notion of “copyrighted function ” which was presented by Naccache, Shamir and Stern. We first solve the open problem of discretelogbased and publickeybased “copyrighted function.” Then, we observe the simple yet crucial relation between (publickey) copyrighted encryption and (publickey) traitor tracing, which we exploit by introducing a generic design paradigm for designing constant
Breaking and Repairing Asymmetric PublicKey Traitor Tracing
 Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management
, 2003
"... Traitor tracing schemes are a very useful tool for preventing piracy in digital content distribution systems. A traitor tracing procedure allows the systemmanager to reveal the identities of the subscribers that were implicated in the construction of a piratedevice that illegally receives the digi ..."
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Cited by 18 (2 self)
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Traitor tracing schemes are a very useful tool for preventing piracy in digital content distribution systems. A traitor tracing procedure allows the systemmanager to reveal the identities of the subscribers that were implicated in the construction of a piratedevice that illegally receives the digital content (called traitors). In an important variant called “asymmetric ” traitor tracing, the systemmanager is not necessarily trusted, thus the tracing procedure must produce undeniable proof of the implication of the traitor subscribers. This nonrepudiation property of asymmetric schemes has the potential to significantly increase the effectiveness of the tracing procedure against piracy. In this work, we break the two previous proposals for efficient asymmetric publickey traitor tracing, by showing how traitors can evade the proposed traitor tracing procedures. Then, we present a new efficient Asymmetric PublicKey Traitor Tracing scheme for which we prove its traceability in detail (in the nonblackbox model); to the best of our knowledge this is the first such scheme. Our system is capable of proving the implication of all traitors that participate in the construction of a piratekey. We note that even though we break the
Scalable publickey tracing and revoking
, 2005
"... Traitor tracing schemes constitute a useful tool against piracy in the context of digital content distribution. They are encryption schemes that can be employed by content providers that wish to deliver content to an exclusive set of users. Each user holds a decryption key that is fingerprinted and ..."
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Cited by 13 (5 self)
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Traitor tracing schemes constitute a useful tool against piracy in the context of digital content distribution. They are encryption schemes that can be employed by content providers that wish to deliver content to an exclusive set of users. Each user holds a decryption key that is fingerprinted and bound to his identity. When a pirate decoder is discovered, it is possible to trace the identities of the users that contributed to its construction. In most settings, both the user population and the set of content providers are dynamic, thus scalable user management and scalable provider management are crucial. Previous work on publickey traitor tracing did not address the dynamic scenario thoroughly: no efficient scalable publickey traitor tracing scheme has been proposed, in which the populations of providers and users can change dynamically over time without incurring substantial penalty in terms of system performance and management complexity. To address these issues, we introduce a formal model for Scalable PublicKey Traitor Tracing, and present the first construction of such a scheme. Our model mandates for deterministic traitor tracing and unlimited number of efficient provider and user management operations. We present a formal adversarial model for our system and we prove our construction secure, against both adversaries that attempt to cheat the provider and user management mechanism, and adversaries that attempt to cheat the traitor tracing mechanism.
Optimal communication complexity of generic multicast key distribution
 Advances in cryptology  EUROCRYPT 2004, proceedings of the internarional conference on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques, volume 3027 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2004
"... Abstract. We prove a tight lower bound for generic protocols for secure multicast key distribution where the messages sent by the group manager for rekeying the group are obtained by arbitrarily nested application of a symmetrickey encryption scheme, with random or pseudorandom keys. Our lower boun ..."
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Cited by 12 (2 self)
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Abstract. We prove a tight lower bound for generic protocols for secure multicast key distribution where the messages sent by the group manager for rekeying the group are obtained by arbitrarily nested application of a symmetrickey encryption scheme, with random or pseudorandom keys. Our lower bound shows that the amortized cost of updating the group key for a secure multicast protocol (measured as the number of messages transmitted per membership change) is log 2(n) + o(1). This lower bound matches (up to a small additive constant) the upper bound