Intentions, an integral part of the mental state of an agent, play an important role in

Abduction in Logic Programming started in the late 80s, early 90s, in an attempt to extend logic programming into a framework suitable for a variety of problems in Artificial Intelligence and other areas of Computer Science. This paper aims to chart out the main developments of the field over the last ten years and to take a critical view of these developments from several perspectives: logical, epistemological, computational and suitability to application. The paper attempts to expose some of the challenges and prospects for the further development of the field.

this paper, we argue that no such set of postulates will be adequate for every application. In particular, we make a fundamental distinction between two kinds of modifications to a knowledge base. The first one, update, consists of bringing the knowledge base up to date when the world described by it changes. For example, most database updates are of this variety, e.g. "increase Joe's salary by 5%". Another example is the incorporation into the knowledge base of changes caused in the world by the actions of a robot (Ginsberg and Smith 1987, Winslett 1988, Winslett 1990) . We show that the AGM postulates must be drastically modified to describe update. The second type of modification, revision, is used when we are obtaining new information about a static world. For example, we may be trying to diagnose a faulty circuit and want to incorporate into the knowledge base the results of successive tests, where newer results may contradict old ones. We claim the AGM postulates describe only revision.

We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too week to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not necessarily captured by a belief set. We also show that a simple modification to the AGM framework can allow belief revision to be a function of epistemic states. We establish a model-based representation theorem which characterizes the proposed postulates and constrains, in turn, the way in which entrenchment orderings may be transformed under iterated belief revision. Keywords: Iterated revision, AGM postulates, conditional beliefs, probabilistic conditioning, epistemic states, ...

Belief revision leads to temporal nonmonotonicity, i.e., the set of beliefs does not grow monotonically with time. Default reasoning leads to logical nonmonotonicity, i.e., the set of consequences does not grow monotonically with the set of premises. The connection between these forms of nonmonotonicity will be studied in this paper focusing on syntaxbased approaches. It is shown that a general form of syntax-based belief revision corresponds to a special kind of partial meet revision in the sense of the theory of epistemic change, which in turn is expressively equivalent to some variants of logics for default reasoning. Additionally, the computational complexity of the membership problem in revised belief sets and of the equivalent problem of derivability in default logics is analyzed, which turns out to be located at the lower end of the polynomial hierarchy. 1 INTRODUCTION Belief revision is the process of incorporating new information into a knowledge base while preserving consist...

The economic theory of rationality promises to equal mathematical logic in its importance for the mechanization of reasoning. We survey the growing literature on how the basic notions of probability, utility, and rational choice, coupled with practical limitations on information and resources, influence the design and analysis of reasoning and representation systems. 1 Introduction People make judgments of rationality all the time, usually in criticizing someone else's thoughts or deeds as irrational, or in defending their own as rational. Artificial intelligence researchers construct systems and theories to perform or describe rational thought and action, criticizing and defending these systems and theories in terms similar to but more formal than those of the man or woman on the street. Judgments of human rationality commonly involve several different conceptions of rationality, including a logical conception used to judge thoughts, and an economic one used to judge actions or...

Revising beliefs is a task any intelligent agent has to perform. For this reason, belief revision has received much interest in Artificial Intelligence. However, there are serious problems when trying to analyze belief revision techniques developed in the field of Artificial Intelligence on the knowledge level. The symbolic representation of beliefs seems to be crucial. The theory of epistemic change shows that a partial knowledge-level analysis of belief revision is possible, but leaves open the question of how this theory is related to belief revision approaches in Artificial Intelligence. In particular, it remains an open question whether the results achieved in the knowledge-level analysis are valid. Furthermore, the idea of reason maintenance, which is considered to be essential in AI, has no counter-part in the theory of epistemic change. Addressing these problems, it is shown how to reconstruct symbol-level belief revision on the knowledge level. 1 Introduction Any intelligen...

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In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gardenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.

: Revision and update operators add new information to some old information represented by a logical theory. Katsuno and Mendelzon show that both revision and update operators can be characterized as accomplishing a minimal change in the old information to accommodate the new information. Arbitration operators add two or more weighted informations together where the weights indicate the relative importance of the informations rather than a strict priority. This paper shows that arbitration operators can be also characterized as accomplishing a minimal change. The operator of model-fitting is also defined and analyzed in the paper. 1 Introduction Arbitration is the process of settling a conflict between two or more persons. Arbitration occurs in many situations. For example, settling a labor dispute by an outsider, reaching a verdict in a trial, evaluating several alternative research hypotheses, negotiating an international peace agreement, or setting the price of a product in a compe...