I discuss the concept and empirical importance of intemational technology diffusion from the point of view of recent work on endogenous technological change. In this literature, technologyis viewed as technological knowledge. I first review the maj or concepts, and how intemational technology diffusion relates to other factors affecting economic growth in open economies. The following main section of the paper provides a review of recent empirical results on (i) basic results in intemational technology diffusion; (ii) the importance of specific channels of diffusion, in particular trade and foreign direct investment; (iii) the spatial distribution of technological knowledge, and (iv) other issues.

Abstract not found

We examine the effects of aid on growth in cross-sectional and panel data—after correcting for the possible bias that poorer (or stronger) growth may draw aid contributions to recipient countries. Even after this correction, we find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth. We also find no evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than others. Our findings suggest that for aid to be effective in the future, the aid apparatus will have to be rethought.

all R&D-performing countries converge to parallel growth paths. All other countries stagnate. Any parameter change that would have raised a country’s growth rate in standard Schumpeterian theory will permanently raise its productivity and per-capita income relative to other countries and raise the world growth rate. Transitional dynamics are analyzed for each country and for the world economy. Steady-state income differences obey the same equation as in neoclassical theory, but since R&D is positively correlated with investment rates, capital accumulation accounts for less than estimated by neoclassical theory. (JEL E10, O40) Cross-country evidence on income differences has been used in recent years to cast doubt

helpful discussions. We thank the editor and several referees for close reading and useful criticism. Constantino Hevia, Natalia Kovrijnykh, and Oleksiy Kryvtsov provided many suggestions and able assistance. We study a variation of the Eaton-Kortum model, a competitive, constant-returnsto-scale multicountry Ricardian model of trade. We establish existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium with balanced trade where each country imposes an import tariff. We analyze the determinants of the cross-country distribution of trade volumes, such as size, tariffs and distance, and compare a calibrated version of the model with data for the largest 60 economies. We use the calibrated model to estimate the gains of a world-wide trade elimination of tariffs, using the theory to explain the magnitude of the gains as well as the differential effect arising from cross-country differences in pre-liberalization of tariffs levels and country size.

Research on the macroeconomic impact of capital account liberalization finds few, if any, robust effects of liberalization on real variables. In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, I argue that the textbook theory of liberalization holds up quite well to a critical reading of this literature. The lion’s share of papers that find no effect of liberalization on real variables tell us nothing about the empirical validity of the theory, because they do not really test it. This paper explains why it is that most studies do not really address the theory they set out to test. It also discusses what is necessary to test the theory and examines papers that have done so. Studies that actually test the theory show that liberalization has significant effects on the cost of capital, investment, and economic growth.

Abstract not found

In a series of papers, my colleagues and I have demonstrated that levels of per capita income, economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated with geographical and ecological variables such as climate zone, disease ecology, and distance from the coast. Three recent papers purport to show that the role of geography in explaining cross-country patterns of income per capita operates predominantly or exclusively through the choice of institutions, with little direct effect of geography on income after controlling for the quality institutions. This note shows that malaria transmission, which is strongly affected by ecological conditions, directly affects the level of per capita income after controlling for the quality of institutions.

This paper derives and empirically examines how factor proportions determine the structure of commodity trade. It integrates a many-country version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of goods developed by Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1980) with the Krugman (1980) model of monopolistic competition and transport costs. The commodity structure of production and bilateral trade is fully determined. Two main predictions emerge. There is a quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction. Countries capture larger shares of world production and trade of commodities that more intensively use their abundant factors. There is a quasi-Rybczynski effect. Countries that rapidly accumulate a factor see their production and export structures systematically move towards industries that intensively use that factor. Both predictions receive support from the data. Factor proportions appear to be an important determinant of the structure of international trade.

Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 …rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected firms in banking. Classifying a firm as “political” if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We find that political firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks-private banks provide no political favors. Using firm fixed e¤ects and exploiting variation for the same firm across lenders or over time allows for cleaner identification of the political preference result. We also find that political rents increase with the strength of the firm’s politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. We provide direct evidence against alternative explanations such as socially motivated lending by government banks to politicians. The economy wide costs of the rents identified are estimated to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of GDP every year.