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A Theory of Sentience
, 2000
"... 1.1 Four assays of quality................................................................ 4 1.2 The structure of appearance.................................................... 11 1.3 Intrinsic versus relational........................................................ 13 1.4 Four refutations......... ..."
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Cited by 49 (5 self)
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1.1 Four assays of quality................................................................ 4 1.2 The structure of appearance.................................................... 11 1.3 Intrinsic versus relational........................................................ 13 1.4 Four refutations....................................................................... 17 2. Qualities and their Places................................................................ 25 2.1 The appearance of space......................................................... 25 2.2 Some brainmind mysteries..................................................... 26 2.3 Spatial qualia........................................................................... 33 2.4 Appearances partitioned.......................................................... 35 2.5 Ties that bind........................................................................... 38 2.6 Featureplacing introduced...................................................... 43 3 Places Phenomenal and Real............................................................ 47 3.1 Spacetime regions.................................................................. 47 3.2 Three varieties of visual field.................................................. 50 3.3 Why I am not an array of impressions..................................... 55 3.4 Why I am not an intentional object......................................... 58 3.5 Sensory identification.............................................................. 61 3.6 Some examples of sensory reference....................................... 66
Binding connectivity in copular sentences
, 1994
"... This paper takes a its point of departure the hypothesis that surface structures directly receive a model theoretic interpretation, without being mapped into (or derived from) a mediating level such as deep structure or LF. In particular, I am concerned with those cases centering around binding whic ..."
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Cited by 29 (2 self)
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This paper takes a its point of departure the hypothesis that surface structures directly receive a model theoretic interpretation, without being mapped into (or derived from) a mediating level such as deep structure or LF. In particular, I am concerned with those cases centering around binding which are often thought to necessitate some kind of abstract level. Note that the standard view of bi ing and binding constraints is that there are two items a bind r and a bindee and that these have to be in some particular syntactic relationship in order for binding to take place. It is, however, well known that there are many cases where on the surface the two items are not in fact in the appropriate configurational relationship the usual solution is thus to posit some abstract level at which they are. But an alternative solution is to reject the idea that binding is a relationship between two NPs in a given syntactic configuration, and this is the view which will be taken here. In this paper, I will concentrate on one instance of (apparently) unexpected binding effects found in specificational copular sentences. Copular sentences are particularly illuminating in this regard since they in fact exhibit a variety of connectivity effects; a few of these are sketched in (1). (1) a. Binding of reflexive within predicative constituent What John is is proud of himself. (Higgins, 1973, etc.) b. Binding of reflexive within an NP What John hated was the picture of himself in the yearbook.
Some foundational questions concerning language studies: With a focus on categorial grammars and model theoretic possible worlds semantics
 Journal of Pragmatics
, 1992
"... ..."
Incremental Dynamics
, 1998
"... An incremental semantics for a logic with dynamic binding is developed on the basis of a variable free notation for dynamic logic. The variable free indexing mechanism guarantees that active registers are never overwritten by new quantifier actions. The resulting system has the same expressive power ..."
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Cited by 17 (4 self)
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An incremental semantics for a logic with dynamic binding is developed on the basis of a variable free notation for dynamic logic. The variable free indexing mechanism guarantees that active registers are never overwritten by new quantifier actions. The resulting system has the same expressive power as Dynamic Predicate Logic or Discourse Representation Theory, but comes with a more well behaved consequence relation. A calculus for dynamic reasoning with anaphora is presented and its soundness and completeness are established. Incremental dynamic logic provides an explicit account of anaphoric context and yields new insight into the dynamics of anaphoric linking in reasoning. 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification: 03B65, 68Q55 1991 Computing Reviews Classification System: F.3.1, F.3.2, I.2.4, I.2.7 Keywords and Phrases: dynamic semantics of natural language, complete calculus for dynamic reasoning with anaphora, incremental interpretation, monotonic semantics, anaphora and context ...
A Resolution Decision Procedure for Fluted Logic
 In Proc. CADE17
, 2000
"... Fluted logic is a fragment of firstorder logic without function symbols in which the arguments of atomic subformulae form ordered sequences. A consequence of this restriction is that, whereas firstorder logic is only semidecidable, fluted logic is decidable. In this paper we present a sound, comp ..."
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Cited by 13 (10 self)
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Fluted logic is a fragment of firstorder logic without function symbols in which the arguments of atomic subformulae form ordered sequences. A consequence of this restriction is that, whereas firstorder logic is only semidecidable, fluted logic is decidable. In this paper we present a sound, complete and terminating inference procedure for fluted logic. Our characterisation of fluted logic is in terms of a new class of socalled fluted clauses. We show that this class is decidable by an ordering refinement of firstorder resolution and a new form of dynamic renaming, called separation.
A Survey of Decidable FirstOrder Fragments and Description Logics
 Journal of Relational Methods in Computer Science
, 2004
"... The guarded fragment and its extensions and subfragments are often considered as a framework for investigating the properties of description logics. There are also other, some less wellknown, decidable fragments of firstorder logic which all have in common that they generalise the standard tran ..."
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The guarded fragment and its extensions and subfragments are often considered as a framework for investigating the properties of description logics. There are also other, some less wellknown, decidable fragments of firstorder logic which all have in common that they generalise the standard translation of to firstorder logic. We provide a short survey of some of these fragments and motivate why they are interesting with respect to description logics, mentioning also connections to other nonclassical logics.
The locality of interpretation: the case of binding and coordination
 Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory VI, CLC Publications, Ithaca
, 1996
"... This paper will first elucidate the relationship between three claims concerning the syntax/semantics interface, and more importantly will then provide evidence for all three. The first claim is that surface structures directly receive a modeltheoretic interpretation, without the use of mediating ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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This paper will first elucidate the relationship between three claims concerning the syntax/semantics interface, and more importantly will then provide evidence for all three. The first claim is that surface structures directly receive a modeltheoretic interpretation, without the use of mediating levels of representation such as deep structure and/or LF. The second claim is a corollary of the first: I will refer to it as the hypothesis of local interpretation. This hypothesis says that each surface syntactic expression does in fact have a meaning. Note that the contrasting position here would claim that some surface constituents have no meaning in and of themselves, and hence surface structures must be mapped into another level of representation in order to be assigned meanings. Before moving on to the third claim, it will be instructive to elucidate the hypothesis of local interpretation by example. Consider the case of Right Node Raising (RNR), as illustrated in (1): (1) Mary loves and John hates modeltheoretic semantics. The traditional view of this is that the semantics cannot directly assign a meaning to (1) because the expression Mary loves does not have any meaning, nor does John hates, nor does Mary loves and John hates (this latter assumption follows under the traditional view that the meaning of and connects only propositions). Thus, in both traditional transformational grammar work and within some more recent work, it has been assumed that (1) must be derived from (via a transformation) or mapped into (via reconstruction) another level of representation such as (2), where the semantics actually interprets (2): (2) Mary loves modeltheoretic semantics and John hates modeltheoretic semantics. However, it has been known for quite some time that (1) is indeed compatible with the hypothesis of local interpretation. One possible analysis, for
Logic and artificial intelligence
 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2003. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/logicai
"... www.rthomaso.eecs.umich.edu ..."
The Simplicity of Everything
, 2002
"... Part One of my dissertation is about composite objects: things with proper parts, like plates, planets, plants and people. I begin chapter 1 by pointing out that if one were to judge by the way we normally speak about composite objects, one would suppose that we were all completely certain of a theo ..."
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Part One of my dissertation is about composite objects: things with proper parts, like plates, planets, plants and people. I begin chapter 1 by pointing out that if one were to judge by the way we normally speak about composite objects, one would suppose that we were all completely certain of a theory I call folk mereology. For instance, we seem to be completely convinced that whenever some things are piled up, there is an objecta pilewhich they compose. I point out that folk mereology is neither an analytic truth nor a theory for which we have conclusive empirical evidence. So what are we to make of the feeling that it makes no sense to deny folk mereology? What this shows, I claim, is that the standard which an assertion about composite objects has to meet in order to be correct is not strict and literal truth, but something less demanding.
Firstorder resolution methods for modal logics
 In Volume in Memoriam of Harald Ganzinger, LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. In this paper we give an overview of results for modal logic which can be shown using techniques and methods from firstorder logic and resolution. Because of the breadth of the area and the many applications we focus on the use of firstorder resolution methods for modal logics. In additi ..."
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Cited by 4 (3 self)
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Abstract. In this paper we give an overview of results for modal logic which can be shown using techniques and methods from firstorder logic and resolution. Because of the breadth of the area and the many applications we focus on the use of firstorder resolution methods for modal logics. In addition to traditional propositional modal logics we consider more expressive PDLlike dynamic modal logics which are closely related to description logics. Without going into too much detail, we survey different ways of translating modal logics into firstorder logic, we explore different ways of using firstorder resolution theorem provers, and we discuss a variety of results which have been obtained in the setting of firstorder resolution. 1